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l)THE FINANCIAL REPORTING ENVIRONMENT
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA, REGULATORS AND AUDITORS
Financial reporting is the process of disclosing financial information about a company
to external users. This dissertation investigates three different parties involved in the
environment of financial reporting: the media, regulators and auditors. The media, or
more specifically the financial press, are central to the first study. This study shows that
reporting practices are sensitive to critique in the financial press. Both reporting choices
and investor decisions can be affected by negative press. The second study in this
dissertation examines a remarkable change in the regulation of financial reporting that
took place during the past decade: the diffusion of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) across the globe.  The competitive benefits of IFRS that are commonly put
forward are not equally important for every country. The study explores alternative
motivations that may have been driving the widespread acceptance of IFRS and finds that
changing ideas and the desire for legitimacy also play a role. The third study explores
auditor selection in a time when credible financial reporting is particularly salient, namely
when a company goes public. Many firms switch to another audit firm when they go
public. Different audit quality levels are selected depending on characteristics of the firm,
ownership or the offering.  But despite the careful selection of an auditor, audit quality
does not seem to reduce underpricing. Overall, the studies in this dissertation emphasize
that in order to enrich our understanding of financial reporting we need to examine its
environment.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The financial reporting environment 
Companies have been reporting financial accounting information to external parties for 
many years and have done so all over the world. But the particular way in which companies 
report their financial situation to the outside world differs from country to country and 
evolves over time. Financial reporting is shaped by the interplay of the parties in society that 
have an interest in this information, including the preparers (managers of reporting 
companies) and users of the information, information intermediaries, regulators and 
auditors. Together, these parties constitute the financial reporting environment. Each of the 
constituents is briefly introduced below. Section 1.2 describes the forces in the financial 
reporting environment that are central to the core chapters of this dissertation. 
Financial reporting includes financial statements and other forms of communication that 
provide financial information, such as earnings announcements, analyst presentations, press 
releases and prospectuses. In market-based economies, financial reporting information is 
used by external parties for at least two reasons: to evaluate investment opportunities (ex-
ante) and to monitor management (ex-post) (Beyer et al., 2010; Christensen and Demski, 
2003). The ex-ante demand for this type of information arises from information asymmetry1 
between the outside investors (users of the information) and the managers of the company 
(preparers of the information). Information asymmetry exists because managers typically 
have more information about the company’s expected performance than outsiders. If outside 
capital providers lack credible information to evaluate investment opportunities, an efficient 
allocation of resources in a market economy is impeded. An important role of financial 
reporting information is therefore to mitigate information asymmetry and provide 
information that is useful to assess future cash flow prospects and make investment decisions 
(valuation role). The second, ex-post role of financial information emerges from agency 
problems between managers and outside capital providers. Once the investment is made, 
                                                          
1
 The information asymmetry perspective in this section is in line with an extensive body of prior literature, as 
discussed in review papers by Healy and Palepu (2001) and more recently Beyer et al. (2010). The information 
asymmetry problem was first described in the economic literature by Akerlof (1970). According to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) it was first applied to accounting information by Gonedes et al. (1976) and Gonedes (1978). 
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potential conflicts of interest between investor (owner) and management arise. In an attempt 
to alleviate these problems, investors use financial information to monitor management’s 
behaviour. According to this stewardship role of information, the objective of financial 
reporting is to facilitate contracting.  
Together the two distinct, but related, roles of financial reporting provide an information-
based perspective on financial reporting, where investors (users) have information demands 
and managers (preparers) have incentives to supply financial information. From this point 
of view, the financial reporting environment is shaped by the extent of information 
asymmetry and agency problems (Beyer et al., 2010). 
In an ideal world, the forces of supply and demand would lead management to voluntarily 
disclose the optimal level and quality of financial information to capital providers2. 
Nevertheless, in most developed market economies, corporate financial reporting is heavily 
regulated, including substantial mandatory disclosure requirements. The prevalence of 
financial reporting regulations across countries is generally explained by existing market 
imperfections or externalities. For example, in the absence of regulations, there would be a 
free riders problem (potential investors would use the information that shareholders 
implicitly pay for) which would lead to an underproduction of financial information (e.g. 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
Although financial reports have been published for hundreds of years, the regulation of these 
reports is a relatively recent phenomenon. In most developed economies, the regulation of 
accounting commenced in the early twentieth century, when the separation of ownership and 
management of business entities was on the rise and the information asymmetry problem 
emerged. Accounting systems evolved independently in most countries which led to 
considerable variation among countries. Depending on specific characteristics of the legal 
system, tax regulation and the financing system, countries developed different regulatory 
institutions and different accounting rules. By the end of the twentieth century, when capital 
markets became more and more international, the regulatory diversity was considered to be 
a problem. A demand arose for international accounting standards, which would facilitate 
the international comparison of financial information. Currently, the vast majority of 
countries use some form of international accounting standards rather than domestically 
developed standards. The rise of international accounting standards, especially during the 
                                                          
2
 This idea is central to the unravelling argument or disclosure principle (attributed to Grossmann, 1981) and 
Milgrom (1981)). The general spirit of the argument is summarized by Leuz and Wysocki (2008, p.15) as “Firms 
are expected to voluntarily provide information if there are net benefits to disclosure because they ultimately bear 
the costs of withholding information.” As Beyer et al. (2010) explain, the conditions for the unravelling result do 
not hold. 
17_Erim_Koning_BW stand.job
 Introduction 17 
 
 
 
past decade, has shaped the assumptions on which financial reports are based as well as their 
primary objective. The most influential accounting standards in the world, IFRS and US 
GAAP3, state objectives in their underlying frameworks that emphasize the central role of 
corporate reporting for the functioning of an efficient financial market. The main concern is 
the usefulness of financial reporting information for investment purposes. The international 
consensus with respect to this decision usefulness approach is an illustration of the influence 
that regulators have over the shape of financial reports.  
In order for the financial reports to be useful they have to be credible. The regulation of 
financial reports and the use of accounting standards are not sufficient to achieve that. 
Auditors play a key role in this respect. External auditors can provide the outside users of 
financial reports with independent assurance that the disclosed information is credible. In 
many countries, public interest companies are required to have their financial statements 
certified by an independent auditor. Assuming higher quality audits are more costly, 
companies have an incentive to select an audit firm that provides the optimal level of quality. 
Understanding this selection process would enhance our understanding of the role that 
auditors play in the financial information environment.  
Finally, information intermediaries, such as financial analysts, rating agencies and the 
financial press, generate new information about business entities and increase their visibility. 
For example, sell side analysts disseminate the information prepared by companies and 
provide additional information by means of their reports and recommendations. The role of 
the financial press as intermediary has not received much attention, although its spreads 
news from financial reports to the broader public affecting the companies’ information 
environment.  But in addition to the informational role, the scrutiny of the press may also 
have a disciplining effect on company’s financial reporting strategy.  
From the short description in this section of the forces that shape financial reporting, it may 
be clear that the financial reporting environment is complex and consists of several 
                                                          
3
 IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) are the accounting standards promulgated by an independent 
private regulatory agency: the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). These standards are being used 
at the time of writing by more than 120 countries. US GAAP (the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles of the 
United States) are the accounting standards that are currently applied in the largest financial market of the world 
(the U.S.). For years the issuers of both sets of standards have tried to cooperate and to converge the US GAAP and 
IFRS. Currently, there are many similarities but the remaining differences seem hard to resolve. For example, after 
years of trying to write a joint conceptual framework for IFRS and US GAAP, the IASB recently decided to 
continue independently to write its own framework. 
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interrelated elements, of which some have been researched more than others. This 
dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of the financial reporting environment. 
 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
 
The previous section briefly introduced the main actors in the financial reporting 
environment: the preparers, users, intermediaries, auditors and regulators. The core of this 
dissertation consists of three chapters4 that each focus on a different selection of constituents 
of the financial reporting environment. This section provides a short introduction to each of 
the chapters. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the users, preparers and intermediaries. More specifically: it 
investigates the use of a controversial accounting practice by reporting companies and 
investors (the preparers and users) when this practice is criticized by the press (the 
intermediaries). In doing so, it addresses the question whether regulation is necessary for the 
functioning of capital markets even when there are sophisticated information intermediaries. 
This study is set in the years that a series of accounting scandals occurred, at the beginning 
of this century. In the U.S., investors’ trust was shaken by large scale fraud at high profile 
companies such as WorldCom and Enron. In response to these scandals, the U.S. regulators 
decided to take measures and impose additional extensive regulations on financial reporting 
(SOX and specific SEC regulations).  A particular accounting practice that was criticized for 
being misleading is the disclosure of alternative earnings measures. This was a popular 
practice both in the U.S. and elsewhere, where companies would report a self-constructed 
performance measure, usually by excluding certain items from net income (as defined by 
accounting standards). The financial press accused companies that presented self-
constructed earnings measures (rather than using the earnings measures as defined in the 
accounting standards) of being opportunistic and manipulating investors. In the U.S. the 
regulators responded to these concerns and part of SOX is dedicated to curtailing the 
reporting of alternative earnings measures.  Several studies investigated these events in the 
U.S. and report that the use of alternative earnings measures became less misleading under 
                                                          
4
 Chapter 2 of this dissertation is based on a published paper (Koning, Roosenboom and Mertens, 2010). An earlier 
version of this paper was published in the ERIM Report Series Research in Management (Koning et al., 2007). 
Chapter 3 and 4 are based on unpublished working papers: Koning, Roosenboom and Mertens (2013a) and Koning, 
Roosenboom and Mertens (2013b).   
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the new regulations (e.g. Heflin and Hsu, 2008). But it may be misleading shorthand to 
conclude that the regulation was effective or even necessary to curtail undesirable reporting 
practices. The second chapter takes a closer look at this issue by choosing a setting where 
regulators do not intervene.  The setting is the Netherlands in the years 2000-2005, when it 
faced a similar decline in investor confidence as a result of high profile frauds (most notably 
Ahold in 2003). Also in the Netherlands, the practice of reporting self-invented earnings 
measures led to critical newspaper articles, in which the financial press expressed concerns 
that investors are being misled. But in contrast to the U.S., Dutch regulators did not 
intervene. The finding that investors’ and managers’ use of alternative earnings measures 
alters in the absence of a regulatory intervention in the Dutch setting sheds a different light 
on the disciplining role of intermediaries versus regulators. 
While regulators kept aloof in the second chapter, they are central in the Chapter 3. In this 
part of the thesis we particularly examine the choices regulators make with respect to 
mandatory accounting standards. In the past decade we witnessed an unprecedented 
worldwide shift to one set of accounting standards issued by a private regulatory body: the 
International Accounting Standards Board (the IASB). At the time of writing, more than 120 
countries of various shapes and sizes use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
promulgated by the IASB. The switch to IFRS led to a vast literature investigating the 
determinants and consequences of IFRS adoption on a company level. Instead, the study 
presented in chapter 3 focuses on the decisions on a country level, and examines why some 
countries adopted IFRS when they did. The key benefit of adopting IFRS that has been 
emphasized by the IASB is increased ability for entities to access capital from international 
sources. International capital is mobile these days, and governments have incentives to 
engage in competition for this scarce resource. But the question is if this has really been the 
driver of the adoption decision for countries with very divers financing needs and 
infrastructures. Chapter 3 attempts to explain the diffusion pattern of IFRS across globe 
while allowing for alternative motivations. It applies a framework based on the insights from 
international relations that distinguishes between four diffusion mechanisms, based on the 
change that motivated for the policy adoption and the response to the change. The decision 
to adopt a new policy (IFRS in this case) may be motivated by changes in the expected 
rewards (changing incentives) or by a change in the perception of the new policy (changing 
ideas). The response to the change may primarily be driven by the utility of the policy or by 
the potential effect on the country’s international reputation. In a two by two matrix, this 
constitutes four distinct mechanisms that potentially drive the diffusion of IFRS. In addition 
to the widely accepted explanation that competition drives the IFRS diffusion, this 
framework offers three alternative explanations: regulators’ decision to adopt IFRS may be 
driven by coercion, emulation or learning. We attempt to disentangle these mechanisms 
20_Erim_Koning_BW stand.job
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empirically and explore the extent to which regulators were motivated by the alternative 
drivers.  
In Chapter 4 the preparers of financial information and the auditors take centre stage. In 
general, auditors are appointed to provide assurance that the financial statements present a 
true and fair view of the company’s financial position and performance. In the audit 
literature, it is generally assumed that the services provided by audit firms differ in quality 
and that larger audit firms offer higher quality. The study in chapter 4 examines the 
engagement between auditor and client parties at a very special moment in the client’s life: 
at the point that the company is offering (part of) its shares to the public financial market. 
The issuing company will report its financial position and performance in a prospectus and 
will select an auditor to certify the prospectus. When a company goes public, information 
asymmetry is high and disclosing credible information is especially important. Therefore, it 
is likely that the company will choose its auditor with care. We distinguish between the 
choice of an audit quality level and the switch to another audit quality level prior to the IPO.  
We study this selection process in the setting of U.K. initial public offering (IPO’s) because 
of a combination of specific institutional circumstances. Most notably, companies in the 
U.K. have more to choose from at the audit market as the Big 4 audit firms are slightly less 
dominant compared to other for instance the U.S.  In this setting, we explore why some IPO 
firms would choose a big audit firm while other prefer a medium size or even small audit 
firm. In addition, we explore if and how the selection of an audit firm of a specific quality 
level matters for the pricing of the IPO. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of the studies presented and concludes. 
21_Erim_Koning_BW stand.job
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Chapter 2  
The impact of media attention on the use of alternative 
earnings measures5 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the controversial areas in financial reporting that received considerable media 
attention is the disclosure of self-constructed earnings measures. Regulators such as 
financial market authorities and accounting standard setters repeatedly expressed their 
worries about the possibly misleading use of financial information that does not comply with 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), i.e. non-GAAP measures. In the U.S., the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and pursuant SEC regulation have addressed the practice 
of non-GAAP reporting, allowing it only under strict conditions. Several U.S. studies report 
that non-GAAP regulation seems to be effective, in the sense that the reporting practices 
became less opportunistic (e.g. Heflin and Hsu, 2008). Additionally, investors act as if non-
GAAP information is more informative after the SEC regulation (Marques, 2006). Still, the 
reporting environment changed in various ways, regulatory changes being only one factor.  
This study focuses on the influence of media attention on both firms’ reporting 
behaviour and investors’ response to the reported information. It is argued that media 
attention directed at allegedly misleading non-GAAP information has increased awareness 
of the use or potential abuse of these alternative earnings measures and has had a substantial 
influence on the behaviour of companies and investors. To study the impact of the media in 
the U.S. is difficult, since all listed companies are affected post- Enron by substantial new 
regulation. This would create the problem of disentangling the effect of regulation from the 
                                                          
5
 This chapter is based on Koning, M., Roosenboom, P.G.J. & Mertens, G.M.H. (2010 published in Abacus). An 
earlier version of this paper was published in the ERIM Report Series Research in Management (Koning et al., 
2007). 
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effect of media attention. We circumvent this problem by exploring non-GAAP reporting in 
the setting of the Dutch financial market. The practice of non-GAAP reporting also induced 
a sharp debate in the media in the Netherlands6, however in this case regulators and policy 
makers did not respond with additional regulation similar to SOX in the U.S. Hence, the 
Netherlands allows study of reporting practices and, more specifically, the use of non-GAAP 
earnings measures of publicly listed companies in an environment of changing public 
opinions and negative media attention. 
The contribution to the literature is threefold. First and most important is the 
contribution to the debate concerning the effectiveness of regulation in general and SOX 
more specifically. SOX has been criticized for being a hasty overreaction to corporate 
scandals, imposing substantial costs on companies without compelling evidence that this 
would create economic benefits (Romano, 2005). This assumes that financial regulation 
should be based on scientific evidence, an argument that was made more explicitly by 
Buijink (2006). Recent papers have tried to fill this gap and investigate the effect of SOX by 
comparing financial reporting before and after the Act became effective (Bartov and Cohen, 
2007; Cohen, et al., 2008; Kolev, et al., 2008; Marques, 2006). However, these studies 
inevitably suffer from the problem that the effect of SOX cannot be isolated and that other 
factors may have caused the observed changes in financial reporting (Coates, 2007; Leuz, 
2007).  Our paper employs a different institutional setting, i.e. the Netherlands, to provide 
evidence on how companies and investors change their behaviour in the absence of such a 
regulatory shock.  
Second, the study adds to the growing literature on the effects of media on financial 
markets. While other studies try to infer the effect of company specific media coverage on 
stock prices (Dyck and Zingales, 2003) or on corporate governance characteristics (Dyck, et 
al., 2008; Joe, et al., 2009), we focus on the effect of media coverage on financial reporting 
practices. 
Third, we provide additional evidence on the use of alternative earnings measures. 
Recent studies have examined the use of non-GAAP measures as reported in earnings 
releases in the United States (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bowen et al., 2005; Lougee and 
Marquardt, 2004). A vast majority of the international accounting literature stresses the 
importance of institutional factors and market forces in shaping management’s incentives to 
report informative earnings measures (Ball et al., 2003). To our knowledge, no research has 
                                                          
6
 For example, the speech delivered by jury-member Erik van der Merwe at the presentation of the Henri Sijthoff 
award, an influential annual award for the best corporate financial report for Dutch listed companies, was very 
critical towards the growing popularity of self-constructed earnings measures (Het Financieele Dagblad, 14 October 
2002) 
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been conducted on the use of alternative earnings measures outside the United States and 
Canada. 
Evidence is reported here that the practice of reporting non-GAAP earnings 
measures in earnings press releases published during 2000-April 2005 is popular in the less 
regulated reporting environment of the Netherlands. First, analysis of the financial reporting 
environment during the sample period reveals a dynamic environment that leads to increased 
negative attention from the media for non-GAAP reporting. We then measure the popularity 
of non-GAAP reporting in terms of reporting frequency and prominence. The reporting 
behaviour is found to change after a peak in negative media attention. Although non-GAAP 
earnings measures are reported frequently after a peak in negative media attention, the 
motivation to report these measures seems to have changed. The majority of firms that 
reported non-GAAP earnings before 2003 stop thereafter. The companies that initiate or 
continue to report non-GAAP in 2003 and after are more strongly motivated by opportunistic 
motivations (loss avoidance or meeting analyst’s forecasts). In other words, companies stop 
reporting non-GAAP measures after negative media attention unless the expected benefits 
of non-GAAP reporting are higher. On the other hand, the difference between reported non-
GAAP and GAAP earnings is smaller in 2003 and after. From these results one can infer 
that companies’ reporting behaviour is affected by media pressure, even without regulatory 
intervention. The effect is stronger for companies whose non-GAAP reporting practices 
were specifically criticized in the press. 
Next the focus shifts to the investors’ use of non-GAAP information as a basis for 
their decisions. The association between abnormal returns and non-GAAP earnings as well 
as GAAP earnings is investigated. We identify the development of the informativeness over 
time and find that the appreciation of non-GAAP information has changed. Prior to 2003 
investors seem to price non-GAAP earnings rather than operating earnings as defined under 
GAAP. Starting 2003, the situation changes, as investors seem to turn away from non-GAAP 
measures and start to price GAAP operating earnings instead. GAAP bottom-line earnings 
are informative throughout the entire period. Overall, in the period from January 2003 to 
June 2005 investors seem to turn away from non-GAAP information after a peak in negative 
media attention. 
The empirical results support the conjecture that the use of financial reporting 
information can change in the absence of any regulatory intervention. Investors’ perception 
of specific reporting practices is shown to change after the public debate, and more specific, 
media attention. Arguably, investors that become more aware of the possibly negative 
aspects of certain non-GAAP earnings measures ignore these disclosures in their decision 
making. At the same time, media attention seems to affect firms’ reporting behaviour, in 
particular those companies that were the subject of a critical newspaper article. Although 
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overall the frequency and prominence with which non-GAAP measures are reported 
increases, companies seem to have different reasons to report non-GAAP earnings after a 
period of increased negative media attention. It seems investors are careful in the absence of 
regulation and ignore reported information that may not be reliable. Regulation may not be 
necessary to protect investors against confusing or misleading reporting practices when 
investors are aware. Nevertheless, regulation may restore the credibility, at least to some 
extent, of reporting practices that were publicly criticized, as some U.S. findings for non-
GAAP reporting seem to suggest (e.g. Marques 2006, Kolev et al., 2008). For companies, 
cost-benefit comparisons of reporting non-GAAP measures are different in a regulated or 
non-regulated situation. These findings are particularly relevant for standard setters, policy 
makers and financial market participants, since the debate on optimal level of regulation is 
on a new high. 
2.2 Literature review 
The effectiveness of regulation 
The effectiveness and desirability of regulation of financial markets has long been debated 
(e.g. Stigler, 1964; Benston, 1973). In the aftermath of recent corporate scandals, regulators 
imposed far-reaching regulation on financial markets to restore investors’ trust. These new 
regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley law of 2002, evoked the discussion on the 
effectiveness of regulation and led to several academic studies discussing the costs and 
benefits of SOX (e.g. Romano, 2005; Coates, 2007; Leuz, 2007).  
The effects of SEC interventions concerning non-GAAP reporting have been 
investigated in a number of studies. Looking at firms’ reporting behaviour, Marques (2006) 
and Heflin and Hsu (2008) find that non-GAAP reporting decreases significantly after SEC 
intervention. Entwistle et al. (2006) also find that the number of firms reporting non-GAAP 
information after the introduction of SEC regulation declines sharply. They also report that 
the reported non-GAAP information is less biased and presented less prominently after the 
SEC regulation. Kolev et al. (2008) find that after SEC intervention the predictive ability of 
the exclusions from GAAP earnings improves. Companies that stop reporting non-GAAP 
information had significantly lower quality exclusions in the period before SEC intervention, 
which suggests that SEC intervention caused the more opportunistic non-GAAP reporters to 
stop.  
These results seem to suggest that SEC regulation was effective in the sense that 
non-GAAP reporting became less opportunistic. On the other hand, the decreasing frequency 
of non-GAAP reporting may also imply that some informative reporters stopped publishing 
non-GAAP measures (Marques, 2006; Heflin and Hsu, 2008).  Similarly, Kolev et al. (2008) 
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report evidence of unintended negative consequences. When exclusions are specified and 
split into special items and other exclusions, they find that the quality of reported special 
items deteriorates after SOX. They interpret their results as evidence that managers adapt to 
the stricter regulation by replacing opportunistic non-GAAP reporting with accounts 
manipulation7 through the use of special items.  
Besides companies’ reporting behaviour, investors’ reaction to non-GAAP 
information has been analysed as well. Investors’ response to non-GAAP measures has been 
compared to the response to GAAP earnings in several studies. Based on actual press 
releases, investors were revealed to find non-GAAP earnings more informative, more 
persistent and cause stronger revisions to analysts’ beliefs than GAAP earnings 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2003, Lougee and Marquard, 2004). This evidence suggests that the 
‘flexible’ non-GAAP reporting leads to information that investors find useful.  
A number of studies have analysed investors’ reactions to non-GAAP information 
before and after the implementation of SOX and Regulation G. For example, Heflin and Hsu 
(2008) find a decline in the reaction of investors to forecast errors after the implementation 
of Regulation G. On the other hand, Marques (2006) reports that investors react more 
positively to non-GAAP disclosures after the regulation became effective. She suggests the 
findings may be explained by SEC Regulation increasing the credibility of non-GAAP 
disclosures.  
Taken together, the U.S. evidence suggests that SEC regulation has influenced the 
use of non-GAAP disclosures, but that there may also be unintended consequences that 
effectively decrease the quality of reported financial information. Moreover, studies that 
examine the effectiveness of regulation face the problem of contemporaneous changes in the 
reporting environment. Our research design addresses precisely that issue, asking what 
would happen in the absence of additional regulation. First the reporting environment is 
analysed, identifying media attention for non-GAAP reporting as a changing characteristic 
that has likely influenced companies and investors. 
 
Media attention  
Negative media attention for non-GAAP disclosures is assumed to have changed the 
reporting environment. This section of the paper deals with the theoretical underpinning of 
the effect of media attention on regulators, companies and investors.  
                                                          
7
 ‘Manipulation’ here refers to the practice of deliberately reporting recurring items as non-recurring, as reported 
by Kolev et al. (2008) in order to arrive at more favourable (non-GAAP) earnings. This practice would explain their 
finding that the quality of special items decreased following SEC intervention. 
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Intuitively media attention is likely to influence financial market institutions and 
regulators. This notion is supported by the institutional crisis literature in political science. 
Research in political science strongly suggests that policy makers are more responsive to 
public pressure when the issue is more salient. (e.g. Burstein, 2003; Page and Shapiro, 1983; 
Monroe, 1998). The financial scandals, the backdrop of the non-GAAP reporting discussion, 
attracted substantial media attention and yielded several salient stories. Public pressure 
sustained by media attention can ‘force’ institutions to respond in order to restore confidence 
(e.g. Lodge and Hood, 2002; Boin and ‘t Hart, 2000). According to the literature, regulators 
can respond to institutional crises by radical departures from the status quo or by a more 
conservative adaptive strategy. In the U.S., the SEC responded with a radical reform of the 
financial regulations. In the Netherlands, institutions tried to reinforce the existing 
regulations by pointing out the importance of the existing regulation and the definition of 
net income. Framed in this literature, the U.S. and the Netherlands represent two alternative 
responses to public pressure sustained by media attention. 
Other studies show that companies adjust their behaviour in reaction to media 
attention. For example, Dyck et al. (2008) find that press coverage increases the probability 
of companies taking action to improve corporate governance. Joe et al. (2009) explore the 
impact of Business Week’s publication of the worst corporate board officers and find that 
companies are inclined to enhance their corporate governance after negative media coverage  
and change their financial reporting strategy. On the other hand, Core et al. (2008) find no 
evidence that negative press coverage influences executive compensation. 
Press coverage can also impact investors’ trading decisions. An early study by 
Foster (1979) analyses the effect of the critical articles by the iconoclastic accounting critic 
Abe Briloff. Foster (1979) finds an average drop in price of 8% for companies whose 
accounting practices are criticised by Briloff. Brown et al. (2009) adopt a similar approach 
examining the impact of a leading Australian financial journalist, Trevor Sykes. Dyck and 
Zingales (2003) find that stock prices react most to the earnings metric that is emphasized 
by the press. In their study to the effect of Business Week’s list of worst board members, 
Joe et al. (2009) find that individual investors overreact to this negative media coverage.  
The empirical evidence from previous research on the effect of media coverage is 
based on press coverage of individual companies. This media attention is likely to change 
the reporting behaviour of managers.  As Dyck et al. (2008) suggest, the influence of media 
attention on manager’s behaviour works through reputation based mechanisms. This relation 
is probably stronger in case of company specific media attention8. Investors’ decisions are 
influenced by the media because they can provide credibility (Dyck and Zingales, 2003). 
                                                          
8
 For example, when a company’s name is in the heading of a newspaper article on specific financial reporting 
practices, the company may be more inclined to respond than when its name is not mentioned at all. 
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Conversely, media attention can also destroy credibility. Mercer (2004) identifies the level 
of external assurance as one of the four factors influencing disclosure credibility. Although 
the evidence is largely anecdotal, the opinions expressed in the financial press can provide 
this external assurance to investors. Similarly, negative media attention for certain disclosure 
practices will harm the credibility of that information and make it less useful for economic 
decisions. Building on this literature, we argue that the media attention for the misuse of 
non-GAAP information created more awareness and consequently influenced the behaviour 
of companies as well as investors.  
2.3 The changing environment of non-GAAP reporting 
Changing regulation is only one aspect that may influence the disclosure choices and the use 
of financial information. This is illustrated by considering changes in the financial reporting 
environment that relate to the use of non-GAAP metrics.  
Most notably, during the period of interest the first major accounting scandals in 
both the U.S (Enron in 2001) and the Netherlands (Royal Ahold early 2003) were revealed. 
Partly in response to these causes celebres and alleged fraudulent practices, regulators issued 
several statements that directly implicated the practice of reporting non-GAAP information. 
Since the financial reporting environment is important for our analysis, developments are 
described in some more detail. 
 In the Netherlands, the Dutch Accounting Standards Board (the DASB9) noted that 
Dutch companies were reporting non-GAAP10 earnings measures in financial reports more 
frequently. In the 2002 edition of the DASB guidelines, the DASB addresses this issue in 
the introduction. The increased frequency with which companies report EBITA and 
EBITDA in the income statement worries the DASB. In that same introduction, they state 
explicitly that reporting EBITA or EBITDA within the income statement is incompatible 
with the law and that those measures can only be reported in the notes to the financial 
statements. This is because neither EBITA nor EBITDA fits into the prescribed formats of 
the income statement. Interestingly, the DASB does not include any guidelines as to how 
                                                          
9
 From June 2005, the Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving uses the name Dutch Accounting Standards Board 
internationally. Before that, the English name was Council for Annual Reporting (CAR). We use the current name. 
10
  In the Netherlands, the term generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) is not defined formally. Instead, 
the accounting practice is based on the law, the body of case law and guidelines as set by the DASB. Together, the 
regulation from these three sources is referred to as Dutch accounting rules. 
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these measures should be reported or disclosed outside the income statement11. It therefore 
seems that the DASB was primarily concerned with the application of the prescribed formats 
of the financial statements.  So, contrary to SOX and Regulation G, the DASB 
communication is not induced by accounting scandals or alleged opportunistic use of non-
GAAP measures. The DASB announcement is an affirmation of existing legislation rather 
than a change in regulation. Moreover, the affirmation leaves the publication of non-GAAP 
measures outside the income statement completely free, so it does not affect financial 
information in press releases or earnings announcements. Nevertheless, the DASB gave a 
clear signal that any earnings measure that does not fit in the prescribed format of the income 
statement is a deviation from GAAP.  
The emergence of EBITA and EBITDA in the Netherlands coincides with changes 
in international standards on goodwill reporting. Following similar developments in the 
U.S., in 2001 a new accounting directive by the DASB became effective that required 
goodwill to be capitalised and amortised. Before 2001, it was allowed to set off acquired 
goodwill against retained earnings. This new accounting standard was anticipated for some 
time already and many companies had adopted this goodwill treatment before the standard 
became effective12. On the other hand, even after 2001 there were a small number of 
companies that ignored the accounting guideline and continued to record acquired goodwill 
against equity. 13 Anecdotal evidence suggests that among companies that did capitalize 
                                                          
11
 Comparing this to Australia, one sees a similar approach during the period of interest. Before 2005, there were 
no specific guidelines for pro forma reporting. In July 2005, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) issued a proposal for specific guidelines for pro forma disclosures (ASIC, Disclosing pro forma financial 
information; Consultation Paper 69, July 2005). In this proposal, the ASIC interprets the Corporations Act 2001 in 
order to reveal the specific restrictions on the use of pro forma information imposed by law. According to the act, 
pro forma financial information may be included in a financial report, but not as part of the financial statements as 
the statements must comply with specific requirements of the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB). 
Effectively this means that pro forma information can only be reported in the disclosures. The requirement in 
s295(3) that the additional information needs to be necessary for a true and fair view, seems to be more strict than 
the Dutch regulations.   
12
 Descriptive evidence of goodwill accounting in the Netherlands can be found in several articles in MAB 
(Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie), for example Hoogendoorn, M.N., “Goodwill to amortize or 
not to amortize” (Goodwill: : afschrijven of niet afschrijven), MAB February 2002. 
13
 Dutch law still allowed this accounting procedure, so for a while legislation and guidelines were not aligned. 
Contrary to some countries (like Australia) DASB’s accounting guidelines, however, are not legally enforceable. 
Moreover, the Dutch law had not been aligned, causing the DASB directives to be inconsistent with the legal 
requirements. Because of this situation, some companies chose to ignore the guidelines. 
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goodwill, reporting earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
became popular. This non-GAAP earnings measure allowed them to avoid the negative 
effect of goodwill amortization on net earnings. In the U.S., reporting EBITDA or similar 
earnings measures was already widespread by that time. The SEC issued a warning in 2001, 
with the intent to caution companies on their reporting of non-GAAP measures and to call 
the dangers of these measures to the attention of investors.  
Following the Sarbanes-Oxley law of November 2002, the SEC established rules 
to regulate the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures. Early 2003, the SEC reduced 
the flexibility in non-GAAP reporting considerably with the passing of Regulation G.  This 
rule requires all publicly disclosed non-GAAP information to be reconciled with GAAP 
information. Furthermore, management has to explain why the non-GAAP information is 
relevant for investors. In addition, the GAAP information must be presented with the same 
prominence as the non-GAAP information. Besides the costly expanded disclosures that are 
required under Regulation G, management is also exposed to the risk of litigation if the 
requirements are not met.  
In 2004, the Dutch professional accountants and auditors organization, Royal 
NIVRA14 investigated the annual statements of listed companies for the years 2002 and 2003 
and found that alternative measures such as EBITDA are reported frequently15. In a research 
report by the Dutch Financial Market Authority (AFM), the various earnings measures 
reported in the annual reports over 2002 from 50 Dutch listed companies are criticized16.   
Early 2004, the AFM issued a press release to urge companies to adhere to guidelines that 
were very similar to Regulation G17. Royal NIVRA pressed external auditors and their 
clients that GAAP net income should be paramount in financial reports and that exotic 
                                                          
14 NIVRA is the abbreviation of Netherlands Institute of Registeraccountants. Registeraccountant is a legally 
protected title, comparable to Certified Public Accountant in the US or Chartered Accountant in Australia. 
15 See Hooghiemstra and Van der Tas,  “Reporting Financial Performance” (Rapportering over financial 
performance), in: Backhuijs, R.G. Bosman and  Knoops, Het jaar 2002 verslagen. Onderzoek jaarverslaggeving 
Nederlandse ondernemingen, Kluwer/Koninklijk NIVRA , 2003, and Hooghiemstra and Van der Tas, “Disclosure 
on performance indicators “(Informatieverschaffing over prestatie-indicatoren), in: Backhuijs et al., Het jaar 2003 
verslagen. Onderzoek jaarverslaggeving Nederlandse ondernemingen, Kluwer/Koninklijk NIVRA, 2004. 
16 See “AFM critical towards the quality of annual reports” (“AFM kritisch over kwaliteit jaarverslagen” Het 
Financieele Dagblad, 5 December 2003) 
17 “Non Gaap Earnings measures”, press release published by the AFM, 17 February 2004 
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alternative measures should be banned.18 Audit firms argued that financial disclosures in 
press releases should be regulated similarly to SOX19. Despite this discussion, no specific 
regulation was issued to address the issue. 
 To summarize, the reporting of non-GAAP measures has led to discussions both in 
the U.S and the Netherlands. Although faced with a similar challenge, the response of 
regulators in the Netherlands has been fundamentally different in comparison to the U.S. In 
contrast to the SEC, Dutch regulatory agencies such as the DASB and the AFM did not issue 
any specific rules for the disclosure of non-GAAP information in press releases. They did 
affirm the existing rules and legislation, stressing the importance of GAAP earnings. In the 
terminology of the institutional crisis literature, the Dutch regulators’ response was ‘light’ -
conservative adaptive-, while the U.S. regulators demonstrated a more ‘heavy’ radical 
approach. Overall, the Dutch environment of non-GAAP reporting is characterised by the 
absence of specific regulation directed at banning opportunistic non-GAAP earnings 
reporting practices in combination with negative attention from regulators and media. 
Nonetheless, there was substantial discussion about the practice of publishing non-GAAP 
earnings, warning against misleading and confusing use of alternative measures and 
advocating rehabilitation of GAAP net income. This provides a unique opportunity to 
explore whether the financial reporting practices and investors’ response change without 
regulatory intervention. 
 
Earnings debate in the Dutch press 
Similar to the U.S. debate, the Dutch discussion on the use of alternative earnings measures 
was taking place in the media.  It was not until late 2003 that financial market institutions 
(NIVRA, AFM and the DASB) started to participate in the discussion. Several other articles 
in Dutch newspapers had already warned against the use of alternative earnings measures20. 
In order to get a more comprehensive picture of the media attention surrounding non-GAAP 
reporting, a search was performed in all Dutch written newspapers in the years 1999-2005 
as available in Lexis Nexis. As already explained, media attention is expected to influence 
behaviour of financial market participants (i.e. companies and investors). Newspaper 
coverage is used as a proxy for media attention. Articles that specifically cover the earnings-
                                                          
18 “NIVRA demands rehabilitation of original net earnings” (NIVRA eist eerherstel oud winstbegrip, Het 
Financieele Dagblad, 14 January 2004)  
19  “Ebitda taboo in press releases” (Ebitda taboe in persberichten, Het Financieele Dagblad, 23 February 2004). 
20 The discussion, although rather technical, reached the non-financial press as well.  See for example “Five lessons 
from Enron’s bankruptcy ” (Vijf lessen uit het bankroet van Enron, De Volkskrant, 19 January 2002) and “An 
earnings measure for every company” (Elke onderneming een eigen winstbegrip, De Volkskrant, 14 May 2002) 
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measures debate were searched. These articles typically point out that earnings are a hybrid 
concept that can be calculated in various ways and that this may lead to confusion`. We use 
several text string21  searches in order to capture all the newspaper articles published on the 
subject. For each article, we determine if the central message deals with the earnings debate. 
For example, articles are removed that discuss the earnings announcement of a specific 
company and mention the use of non-GAAP earnings metrics in the context of that 
announcement.  
 
                                                          
21
 We use variations of ‘alternative’ or a synonym in combination with ‘definition of earnings’ (in Dutch: 
“winstbegrip”) or similar wordings. A second search uses Ebitda (and variations) in combination with a financial 
market institution (DASB, AFM, NIVRA) or references to financial reporting (financial statements, annual report 
etc.) Together, we use 32 search words in different combinations. 
Figure 2.1 
Earnings debate in Dutch press 
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 This yields a total of 96 newspaper articles of which 42 were published in the 
Dutch financial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad22 (The Financial Daily). The articles 
published in the financial newspaper as well as the press in general all had a rather critical 
tone, warning against misleading reporting practices. As reproduced in Figure 2.1, the flow 
of articles seems to build up to a peak in 2002, after which the number decreases again. 
. 
 
Roughly one third (33 of 96) of the newspapers articles concerning the discussion of earnings 
measures were published in 2002. In 2004, another spike in the interest in the earnings debate 
occurred. This time, the attention was motivated by concurrent statements of AFM and 
Royal NIVRA. Companies and their auditors were called upon to adhere to GAAP earnings 
as the most important earnings measure and to refrain from confusing non-GAAP measures. 
This led to an extensive debate in the newspapers in January and February of 2004 (17 of 
the 26 articles of 2004). The statements by the AFM and Royal NIVRA may be considered 
evidence of the influence of media attention on regulators. Arguably as a result of the 
negative press of non-GAAP measures regulators had to respond and issued a statement. 
Regulators reaffirmed the existing rules and regulations, which qualifies as an adaptive 
conservative response in terms of the institutional crises literature (Boin and ‘t Hart, 2000). 
The spread of the newspaper coverage supports the notion that 2002 is an important 
year in the earnings debate examined here. In the year where accounting was front-page 
news, substantial attention was paid to more technical topics such as alternative earnings 
measures. This set the spotlight on misleading reporting practices of non-GAAP earnings 
measures.  During the first years of our sample (2000-2002) the negative attention for the 
use of non-GAAP earnings measures increased. 2002 is the most important year in this 
discussion, as the media were focused on accounting scandals after the Enron fraud and 
several scandals that were revealed in 2002 (e.g. WorldCom, Tyco, Qwest). Moreover, in 
2002 the legislation concerning the use of non-GAAP information in the U.S. became 
effective. Two periods are distinguished in our sample based on the peak in negative media 
attention in 2002 (as depicted in Figure 2.1): the period before 2003, and the period 2003 
                                                          
22
 The Financial Daily is the only financial newspaper in the Netherlands and targets a very specific audience. The 
impact of the coverage of a specific topic in the Financial Daily is therefore very different from the impact of other 
newspapers. While the Financial Daily indicates the interest of the financial professionals, the coverage by other 
newspapers may reflect the impact on the public opinion. In order for a rather technical topic such as non-GAAP 
reporting to have an impact, it has to be forced out of its usual niche. We hypothesize that media attention is a proxy 
for public pressure, which is measured more accurately by the coverage of the general newspapers. Based on these 
arguments, the distinction between the Financial Daily and the general newspapers is functional.  
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and after. In other words, the sample is divided between press releases that were issued 
before and after 1 January 2003. This permits analysis of the (1) non-GAAP reporting 
behaviour by companies (2) investors’ responses to GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
measures before and after negative media attention.  
 
2.4 Sample selection 
The quarterly earnings announcements were retrieved from the companies’ websites in order 
to obtain the earnings release in its original format. Under Dutch regulation, only (half-) year 
reports are compulsory, but the majority of the companies voluntarily publish quarterly 
earnings releases. 
Non-GAAP measures were collected from original earnings releases for the primary sample. 
This offers some advantages. For example, it leads to more accurate information on the 
reporting behaviour of companies. Adjustments to GAAP earnings made by analysts are not 
necessarily the same as those reported by firms in their press releases. When compared, non-
GAAP earnings as reported in press releases on average differ significantly from the street 
earnings reported by analysts (Bhattacharya et al. (2003), Marques (2006)). A more practical 
reason for using press releases is that analysts’ street earnings are not readily available given 
that analyst databases such IBES have only limited coverage on Dutch companies. 
The Dutch capital market is relatively small, allowing us to collect all earnings press releases 
of the large and midcap listed companies, and determine whether they report non-GAAP 
earnings measures or not. This provides a more comprehensive picture of reporting practices 
in earnings announcements. Prior studies with U.S. data used text searches in order to collect 
a sample of non-GAAP reporting companies (f.e. Bhattacharya et al., 2003, Lougee and 
Marquardt, 2004). This way, only the earnings releases with the ex ante defined non-GAAP 
measures can be selected, which may lead to self-selection problems.  
Quarterly, half-year and annual earnings release data are hand collected for (large- and 
midcap) companies that were listed at Euronext Amsterdam indexes, issued between 2000 
and April 200523.  In line with prior research, all the collected earnings release data is 
referred to as firm-quarters, even for companies that report semi-annually. 
                                                          
23
 The collected press releases concern reporting quarters from the fourth quarter of 1999 up to and including the 
fourth quarter of 2004. For the purpose of our analyses, we classify the earnings releases depending on the year in 
which they were published. 
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 The analyses in the following sections are based on different samples. The initial sample 
consists of 766 earnings releases, reported in 21 different quarters for a total of 56 
companies. The descriptive evidence of the reporting behaviour of companies is based on 
the full sample of 766 earnings releases. Analyst data is only available for a subset of 143 
firm quarters. For the analysis of the use of non-GAAP earnings by investors, the sample 
size is smaller due to data requirements. As set out in Table 2.1, data required to examine 
market reactions are only available for 545 press releases. Therefore our analyses of the 
response to the different earnings measures are based on 545 press releases. 
 
 
Table 2.1 
Sample selection 
   
 
Companies listed AEX/AMX 1999-2004  70
No press releases available [a] 14
  56
   
Theoretical initial sample [b] 1,176
Archive starts later than the 4th quarter 1999  188
Not reported 1st and 3rd quarters for firms that report semi-
annually [c] 189
  799
Missing release  33
Sample for descriptive analysis  766
  
No data for four quarters earlier (q-4)  215
Insufficient data to estimate market model  6
Final sample  545
  
 
[a] The following firms are removed from the list (necessary data not available, often merger-related): ASR 
Verzekeringen, Baan, Cap Gemini, CMG, Endemol, Gucci, KPN Qwest, Libertel, Pakhoed, PinkRoccade, 
Rodamco Asia, UPC, Vodafone Libertel and Volker Wessels.  
[b] 21 quarters of 56 companies would lead to a maximum of 1,176 earnings releases 
[c] Listed companies at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are not required to report quarterly but semi-annually. 
Therefore in the first and in the third quarter a number of companies do not report earnings 
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For each of the firm-quarters, earnings releases are read and coded and the reported earnings 
measures are listed. The non-GAAP earnings measure that is reported first in the earnings 
release was the focus. Our assumption is that this is the non-GAAP measure that 
management wants to put emphasis on. An earnings metric is defined to be non-GAAP if 
the measure is not defined under Dutch regulation. Under Dutch law, the presentation format 
of the profit and loss account is prescribed.24 The Dutch standard setter DASB has 
emphasized in 2001 that the prescribed formats should not be altered in order to present 
measures such as EBITA or EBITDA as a subtotal. Accordingly, measures that do not fit in 
the prescribed models of the profit and loss account are considered to be non-GAAP. 
In contrast, GAAP earnings are defined as either bottom-line earnings or a recognized 
subtotal of the profit and loss account not in violation with the prescribed model, such as 
earnings before extraordinary items. Within these GAAP measures, we distinguish operating 
result from bottom-line earnings. Proponents of non-GAAP measures claim that these 
adjusted GAAP measures provide more insight into a company’s permanent earnings by 
excluding transitory items. This can result in non-GAAP measures referred to as adjusted 
bottom-line measures or adjusted operating measures, depending on the items that 
management considers to be transitory. In order to compare the information content of the 
different measures we need both operating GAAP and bottom-line GAAP. 
2.5 The non-GAAP reporting behaviour of companies 
The frequency and prominence of non-GAAP reporting by Dutch companies is examined 
first. From the descriptive evidence, we draw some tentative conclusions about companies’ 
motivations. One motivation may be that the underlying economics or the accounting 
standards have changed. This possibility is explored in the second paragraph, where we 
analyze the items that are excluded from GAAP earnings to arrive at the reported non-GAAP 
measure. Finally, to get a more profound understanding of the factors that drive non-GAAP 
reporting, the likelihood of companies emphasizing non-GAAP earnings in their 
announcement is analyzed by means of a logit model.  
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 In Dutch referred to as ‘Modellenbesluit’. This means that every line item is defined and all line items should 
appear in a pre-specified sequence. 
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The frequency and prominence of non-GAAP reporting 
To begin, an exploratory analysis is undertaken of the way Dutch companies report non-
GAAP measures in their earnings press releases. The popularity of earnings measures in 
both the frequency and the prominence with which they are reported is observed.  Of the 
initial sample of 766 earnings releases, 523 (68%) contain at least one non-GAAP earnings 
measure. The companies that report these self-constructed measures present them 
prominently in their earnings press releases: in 341 firm quarters, a non-GAAP earnings 
measure is emphasized by reporting it before GAAP earnings (45% of the total sample, 65% 
of the non-GAAP releases). Figure 2.2 graphically illustrates the development of non-GAAP 
reporting over time.  The frequency of reporting non-GAAP measures increases steadily 
over the period 2000-2005 (from 55% to 83%). Furthermore, non-GAAP earnings are 
reported more often as the first and therefore primary earnings measure. In 2005 55% of the 
press releases publish a non-GAAP measure first, as compared to 30% in 2000. Based on 
Figure 2.2 
Frequency of non-GAAP reporting 2000-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequency (relative to the total number of press releases in our sample for the year) of press releases containing 
a non-GAAP measure and frequency of non-GAAP earnings metrics reported as the first earnings measure 
(primary measure) in the year of publication. 
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this we conclude that the popularity of non-GAAP reporting has persisted in a period of 
negative media attention, even increasing after the turbulent year 2002. 
 
In order to uncover the motivation for non-GAAP reporting, we analyse if the non-GAAP 
measures are used (more or less) opportunistically. For example, if companies report non-
GAAP to mislead investors, one would expect the non-GAAP measures to be more positive 
than the GAAP measures. A simple way to measure this is to compare the frequency of non-
GAAP profits to the frequency of GAAP profits in our sample. In the initial sample of 766 
press releases, 93% of the reported non-GAAP earnings measures are a profit, compared to 
77% of GAAP bottom-line earnings or 78% of GAAP operating earnings. On average, non-
GAAP measures present a more favourable view of a firm’s financial performance. For 
companies in the U.S., similar results have been reported25.  
Another reason why companies report non-GAAP measures is to meet analyst forecasts. We 
therefore collect median and average analyst forecasts from the IBES database. Not all firms 
are covered by IBES and therefore sample size is reduced. In 54 cases firms do not meet 
median analyst forecasts with GAAP earnings. However, in 41 out of 54 cases (76%) firms 
do meet median analyst forecasts with non-GAAP earnings. Using average analyst forecasts 
this number equals 40 (75%) out of 53 cases. In 121 quarters with loss according to GAAP 
earnings, only 32 (26.4%) report losses under non-GAAP earnings. This is consistent with 
managers using non-GAAP earnings to avoid having to report a loss or to miss an analyst 
forecasts under GAAP earnings. 
At first glance, the growing popularity of non-GAAP reporting suggests that companies are 
not influenced by negative media attention and possibly increased investor scepticism. 
However, on closer inspection, one finds that only 9 (41%) out of the 22 firms that  reported 
non-GAAP measures at least once before the 2003, continued to report a non-GAAP 
earnings measure at least once in 2003 or later years. The majority of 13 firms (59%) 
discontinue reporting non-GAAP earnings (10 firms stop reporting non-GAAP earnings at 
one point in 2003 or after and 3 firms before 2003). This is consistent with managers 
changing their behaviour after negative media attention that previously went unnoticed in 
our analysis. At the same time, there are also 13 firms that report non-GAAP earnings for 
the first time in 2003 or after. This explains why overall we do not observe a decrease in the 
number of non-GAAP reporters.  Although the number of companies that report non-GAAP 
                                                          
25
 Bhattacharya et al. (2003) report 66% pro forma profits compared to 52% GAAP operating earnings profits. 
Although a direct comparison with our results is difficult because of differences in research design (for example 
different sample selection), it seems that non-GAAP disclosures are at least as favourable in the Netherlands as 
they are in the U.S. 
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measures at least once remains stable in the period before 2003 as compared to the years 
2003 and after, it is a different group of companies. Given the increased frequency with 
which non-GAAP measures are reported over time, it seems the companies that report non-
GAAP in 2003 or after do so in more quarters. 
The subset of firms that report non-GAAP earnings in 2003 or later therefore is a mix of 9 
companies that already reported non-GAAP earnings before 2003 and 13 new non-GAAP 
reporters in 2003 and later years. This raises the question why firms start or continue to 
report non-GAAP earnings. Firms that newly adopt non-GAAP reporting in 2003 and 
thereafter must see offsetting benefits in the additional disclosure (especially after the 
negative media attention on non-GAAP reporting). The same argument applies to the firms 
that already reported before 2003 and continue to do so afterwards. 
In sum, the descriptive evidence presented in this subsection reveals that non-GAAP 
measures as compared to GAAP measures are on average more positive and avoid reporting 
a loss or missing an analyst forecast more often. Although the proportion of earnings 
announcements containing non-GAAP earnings measures increases and these measures are 
reported more prominently, the composition of the group of non-GAAP reporters changes 
over time. In the next subsection, we explore non-GAAP reporting behaviour in more detail 
by examining the nature of the adjustments companies made.  
 
Specific exclusions from GAAP earnings 
In order to understand the underlying reasons that companies have to report a certain 
adjusted earnings measure, we take a look at the specific items that they exclude from GAAP 
earnings.  For example, as Entwistle et al. (2006) suggest, the exclusion of certain items may 
be influenced by changes in accounting standards (for example goodwill amortization) or 
changes in the business environment (for example acquisition related charges). Moreover, 
the consistency with which a company chooses to exclude specific items is examined to 
increase an understanding of companies’ motivations. 
For each earnings press release, we tabulate the items that are excluded from GAAP earnings 
to arrive at the reported non-GAAP earnings measure. Based on the descriptions of the non-
GAAP measures in the earnings releases, 22 different categories are identified. A list of the 
exclusions is provided in Table 2.2. 
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In total, there are 1268 exclusions from the 523 non-GAAP measures reported in the press 
releases. On average, a non-GAAP measure excludes 2.4 items from GAAP earnings. This 
number is stable throughout the sample period, suggesting that the average complexity of 
the non-GAAP measures remains fairly stable. On the other hand, the variation of non-
GAAP measures has grown, since the number of categories of exclusions increases from 17 
Table 2.2 
Exclusions from GAAP earnings 
 
Exclusion 
 
2000-2002 
n=225 
2003-2005 
n=298 
TOTAL 
n=523 
Non-Operating Items 114 50.7% 145 48.7% 259 
Depreciation*** 69 30.7% 53 17.8% 122 
Amortization*** 175 77.8% 196 65.8% 371 
Impairment*** 0 0.0% 15 5.0% 15 
Exceptional Items** 52 23.1% 95 31.9% 147 
Extraordinary Items 52 23.1% 57 19.1% 109 
Restructuring Charges 14 6.2% 14 4.7% 28 
Acquisition related charges 3 1.3% 1 0.3% 4 
Sale of assets* 0 0.0% 5 1.7% 5 
Share Compensation 
Expense*** 12 5.3% 2 0.7% 14 
R&D*** 7 3.1% 0 0.0% 7 
Revaluation (fixed/financial 
assets) ** 14 6.2% 34 11.4% 48 
Current cost valuation 10 4.4% 9 3.0% 19 
Foreign Currency 10 4.4% 13 4.4% 23 
Provisions/accruals 7 3.1% 10 3.4% 17 
Discontinued operations 8 3.6% 12 4.0% 20 
Realized investment 
gains/losses 11 4.9% 13 4.4% 24 
Rent 5 2.2% 6 2.0% 11 
Penalties/Claims* 3 1.3% 11 3.7% 14 
Pension charges 0 0.0% 2 0.7% 2 
Finance related charges 0 0.0% 3 1.0% 3 
Excluded Segments** 0 0.0% 6 2.0% 6 
TOTAL EXCLUSIONS 566  702  1,268 
 
     
no specification  4 1.8% 9 3.0%  
Incomplete specification 5 2.2% 9 3.0%  
 
     
Switched primary measure 67 29.8% 86 28.9% 153 
Switched definition of non-
GAAP measure 93 41.3% 128 43.0% 221 
 
     
      
Note: For each exclusion we test whether the percentages are equal across the two periods.  For 
exclusions with superscript ***, ** or * equality is rejected at 1%, 5% or 10% significance respectively. 
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to 21.   When comparing the period before the negative media attention (before 2003) with 
the period after (2003 and after), the overall picture looks relatively stable with 10 types of 
exclusions increasing and 11 decreasing.  
From the 523 non-GAAP measures, 371 exclude amortization charges, which is substantial.  
This may raise the question as to what extent non-GAAP reporting is driven by changes in 
goodwill accounting standards. To address this concern, we take a closer look at the goodwill 
accounting choices of the companies in our sample. For each company we determine the 
quarter when they first started capitalizing and amortizing goodwill. In the sample, 51% of 
the companies started to capitalize goodwill before the introduction of the new guidelines in 
2001. In addition, 13 companies already voluntarily started to capitalize and amortize 
goodwill before the beginning of our sample period (fourth quarter 1999). Another 13 firms 
only have quarters with amortized goodwill included in our analysis. This means that 26 
companies (45%) have consistent goodwill accounting across sample quarters. 
When comparing the two periods, a significant decrease is evident in the frequency with 
which amortization is excluded from GAAP earnings, together with an increase in the 
exclusion of annual impairments. This coincides with an alternative accounting treatment of 
goodwill that was gaining popularity in this period, according to which goodwill is not 
amortized but instead tested for impairment annually. Taken together, adjustments related 
to goodwill (amortization and impairment) have decreased from 77.8% to 70.8%. The 
declining frequency and the consistent goodwill reporting of 45% of the sample both support 
the notion that goodwill accounting changes do not drive the findings.  
Another accounting guideline that was issued during the sample period relates to the 
reporting of exceptional and extraordinary items26. Exceptional and extraordinary charges 
are excluded 147 and 109 times respectively.  Although the new accounting guidelines 
effectively prohibit reporting extraordinary items in the income statement, this did cause 
companies to report a non-GAAP measure excluding extraordinary items more often.  
Finally, analysing these exclusions also helps to distinguish between opportunistic and 
informative use of these measures. Assuming informative incentives for non-GAAP 
reporting would lead to a consistent way of reporting, one would expect companies to report 
the same non-GAAP measure in its consecutive earnings releases. Moreover, companies 
                                                          
26
 During the sample period, the DASB issued an accounting standard that effectively prohibited labelling items as 
extraordinary (except in very rare cases such as earthquakes). Items that are no longer allowed to be categorized as 
extraordinary are presented as exceptional items under the new accounting standard. Table 2 shows that excluding 
exceptional items from GAAP earnings has become more popular (with a significant increase from 52 to 95 
exclusions). However, it is conspicuous that the relative decrease for extraordinary items is insignificant. Given the 
fact that standards issued by the DASB are not enforceable, it seems that companies ignored the rules pertaining to 
extraordinary items.  
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would emphasize the same earnings measure in its press releases. Exploring the consistency 
with which the non-GAAP measures are being reported, it is evident that a stable proportion 
of the sample either switches the definition of the non-GAAP measure. Before 2003, 41% 
of the non-GAAP measures reported by a specific company is defined differently than the 
quarter before (43% of the non-GAAP measures in 2003 and later years). 30% of the non-
GAAP earnings releases in the period before 2003 report a different earnings measure most 
prominently in the press release than before (29% of the non-GAAP releases in 2003 and 
after). Furthermore, in a small number of earnings releases, the company omits explaining 
the definition of the non-GAAP measure by either reporting an incomplete specification or 
no specification at all.  
In sum, analysis of the excluded items shows that there are some shifts in the use of non-
GAAP earnings measures that may have been induced by changes in accounting standards 
but that these do not explain the overall trend. Moreover, a large proportion of our sample 
does not report the non-GAAP measures consistently. The next subsection will further 
examine what drives companies’ choice to report non-GAAP measures. 
 
Logit regression 
We now take a closer look at these descriptive results and estimate a logit model, trying to 
explain why firms use non-GAAP earnings as the primary earnings measure in some quarters 
but not in others.  The logit model examines whether the likelihood that the firm uses non-
GAAP as its primary earnings measure is associated with quarterly GDP growth and the 
number of acquisitions undertaken by the firm. Poor economic conditions are expected to be 
associated with a larger amount of exceptional items, which makes it more likely that firms 
adopt non-GAAP measures. Similarly, we expect companies to be more likely to report non-
GAAP earnings because GAAP earnings are lowered by the goodwill amortization. A 
dummy variable NEGATIVE MEDIA takes one for quarters in 2003 and later years. This 
allows investigation of whether firms are less likely to report non-GAAP measures after the 
peak in negative media attention.  Other determinants for non-GAAP reporting such as 
meeting analyst forecasts and avoiding reporting losses under GAAP earnings are also 
included.   
 
44_Erim_Koning_BW stand.job
44 Chapter 2  
 
 
 
The first column of the table shows that firms are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings 
as their primary earnings measure in quarters with poor economic growth and when they 
report a GAAP loss. Interestingly, there is no difference in the likelihood of reporting non-
Table 2.3 
Logit regression results: determination of non-GAAP reporting 
 
  Full 
sample 
Before media 
attention 
After 
media 
attention 
Full 
sample 
Before 
media 
attention 
After 
media 
attention 
 
GDP GROWTH -3.111 
(-4.921) 
 
***
 
-5.131 
(-1.723) 
 
**
 
-2.435 
(-1.233) 
 -19.791 
(-1.699) 
 
*
 
-32.639 
(-1.927) 
 
**
 
-8.947 
(-0.902) 
 
M&A ACTIVITY -0.128 
(-0.713) 
 -0.281 
(-1.15) 
 0.544 
(1.633) 
 
**
 
0.464 
(0.891) 
 0.026 
(0.034) 
 1.117 
(1.678) 
 
**
 
LOSS 0.493 
(3.056) 
 
***
 
0.306 
(1.344) 
 
*
 
0.635 
(2.733) 
 
***
 
0.930 
(2.350) 
 
***
 
0.234 
(0.393) 
 1.332 
(2.293) 
 
**
 
MISS 
FORECAST 
      0.721 
(1.903) 
 
**
 
0.075 
(0.135) 
 1.524 
(2.798) 
 
***
 
NEGATIVE 
MEDIA 
0.191 
(1.271) 
     0.934 
(1.247) 
     
Pseudo R2  0.014  0.016  0.023  0.132  0.084  0.159  
Wald Chi2 14.564 *** 8.557 ** 10.563 ** 21.291 *** 6.264 * 12.393 *** 
Number of firm-
quarters  
766  419  347  143  82  61  
             
Note: Table shows the logit regression results using a dummy variable PRIM_NON as the dependent variable. 
PRIM_NON takes on the value one if the firm uses non-GAAP earnings as the primary earnings measure in 
its press release. GDP GROWTH is the quarterly growth in Gross Domestic Product from the Dutch Statistical 
Office (CBS). M&A ACTIVITY is the number of acquisitions the firm undertakes in that quarter and is 
downloaded from Thomson’s SDC M&A database. LOSS is a dummy variable that indicates one if the firm 
reports a loss under GAAP earnings. MISS FORECAST is a dummy that indicates one if the firm fails to meet 
the median analyst forecast in that quarter. Analyst forecasts come from IBES. NEGATIVE MEDIA is a 
dummy variable that indicates one if the quarter is in 2003 or later years. We split the sample in observations 
before and after the negative general media attention.  z-statistics are shown in parentheses. * statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed), ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed) and 
***
 statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed). 
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GAAP earnings when comparing the period before and after the negative media attention on 
non-GAAP earnings. This is consistent with the earlier finding that non-GAAP reporting 
does not decline over time. 
If one compares the period before (second column) and after (third column) the negative 
media coverage the coefficient on the loss dummy is found to have doubled in size. This 
increase in the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level and suggests that 
companies that report losses under GAAP are more likely to emphasize non-GAAP earnings 
in their press releases after the negative media attention in 2002. In the period after the 
negative media attention firms are also more likely to use non-GAAP earnings as their 
primary earnings measure in quarters in which they conduct more mergers and acquisitions. 
Next, it is examined whether firms report non-GAAP earnings to meet analyst forecasts that 
they would not meet with GAAP earnings. Column four supports this hypothesis. If firms 
miss the median analyst forecast they are more likely to highlight non-GAAP earnings in 
their press releases, but only after the negative media attention in 2002 (column six).  
These results confirm the descriptive evidence here that turning GAAP losses into non-
GAAP profits and meeting analyst forecasts are important motivations for firms to report 
non-GAAP earnings. Especially after the negative media attention these two motivations 
have increased in importance. In this period firms are also more likely to make use of non-
GAAP earnings measures when they conduct more mergers and acquisitions. In the period 
before the negative media attention, poor economic conditions increase the likelihood of 
non-GAAP reporting. 
To take a further look at this, the influence of these factors on the size of the adjustments is 
also investigated. Adjustments are measured as the difference between non-GAAP and 
GAAP earnings27.  Table 2.4 shows the results. Adjustments are found to be larger when 
economic conditions are poor; the company reports a GAAP loss or when the company 
misses the median analyst forecast with its GAAP earnings. Interestingly, significantly lower 
adjustments are found after the negative media coverage on non-GAAP earnings in general. 
This suggests that managers decide to deviate less from GAAP earnings when reporting non-
GAAP earnings after the latter have been criticized in the media.  
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 More precisely: adjustments are the difference between the variables UE NONGAAP and UE GAAP, where UE 
is short for Unexpected Earnings. Unexpected earnings, either GAAP or non-GAAP, are defined as the difference 
between earnings per share for this period minus GAAP earnings from four quarters earlier (q-4). These are the 
same variables used in the analyses in the next section “Investors’ use of non-GAAP measures”. 
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Finally, we investigate whether managers of firms that are criticized in the media for their 
use of non-GAAP earnings also changed their reporting behavior; in particular, whether 
these managers are less likely to continue to use non-GAAP earnings as their primary 
measure in their press release one quarter after they were criticized in the media. As Dyck 
et al (2008) suggest, managers respond to negative media attention to reduce reputation 
 Table 2.4 
Determinants of  adjustments 
 
 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  
GDP GROWTH -0.969 
(-3.041) 
 
***
 
-1.466 
(-2.552) 
 
***
 
M&A ACTIVITY -0.026 
(-1.124) 
 -0.001 
(-0.081) 
 
LOSS 0.012 
(1.454) 
 
*
 
0.023 
(1.563) 
 
*
 
MISS FORECAST   0.024 
(1.456) 
 
*
 
NEGATIVE MEDIA -0.036 
(-4.103) 
 
***
 
-0.052 
(-2.935) 
 
***
 
R2  0.093  0.184  
F-statistic 8.866 *** 3.294 *** 
Number of firm-quarters  379  90  
     
Note: Table shows the OLS regression results using ADJUSTMENTS as the dependent variable. 
ADJUSTMENTS is the difference between UE NONGAAP and UEGAAP. GDP GROWTH is the 
quarterly growth in Gross Domestic Product from the Dutch Statistical Office (CBS). M&A 
ACTIVITY is the number of acquisitions the firm undertakes in that quarter and is downloaded 
from Thomson’s SDC M&A database. LOSS is a dummy variable that indicates one if the firm 
reports a loss under GAAP earnings. MISS FORECAST is a dummy that indicates one if the firm 
fails to meet the median analyst forecast in that quarter. Analyst forecasts come from IBES. 
NEGATIVE MEDIA is a dummy variable that indicates one if the quarter is in 2003 or later years. 
We split the sample in observations before and after the negative general media attention.  t-
statistics are shown in parentheses. * statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed), ** 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed) and *** statistically significant at the 1 
percent level (one-tailed) 
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effects and therefore the effect of negative publications is probably stronger when a company 
is named specifically in a negative newspaper article. Managers are found less likely to 
emphasize non-GAAP earnings in their press releases after negative media attention and 
adjust their behaviour. Of the 12 firms that were criticized, 6 (50%) turn away from non-
GAAP reporting the next quarter. However, 4 of these 6 firms (83%) take up non-GAAP 
reporting after some period. This is consistent with the press having at least a transitory 
impact on the behaviour of managers.  
In conclusion, although companies continue to report non-GAAP measures and do so more 
frequently and more prominently, evidence is found of a disciplining effect of negative 
media attention on the reporting of non-GAAP metrics. About 60% of the firms that reported 
non-GAAP before 2003 stop reporting non-GAAP earnings afterwards. The firms that 
continue to report non-GAAP earnings, or that are new non-GAAP reporters deviate less 
from GAAP earnings. This suggests that even though the frequency of non-GAAP reporting 
has not decreased over time, the magnitude of the adjustments did decrease in 2003 and 
thereafter possibly as a result of the negative media coverage of non-GAAP earnings in 
general. Furthermore, there is evidence of short-term disciplining effect on companies that 
were ‘named and shamed’ in the media for their non-GAAP reporting. On the other hand, 
several indicators of opportunistic non-GAAP reporting practices, such as avoiding losses 
or avoiding missing a benchmark, persist or even increase after the negative attention.  
2.6 Investors’ use of non-GAAP measures 
In order to determine investors’ use of non-GAAP earnings measures as compared to GAAP 
earnings, we examine the informativeness of the identified earnings metrics. First an event 
study is performed for the entire sample. Next, to delve deeper the sample is split between 
the period before 2003 and 2003 and after to analyse the effect of media attention in general. 
After that there is an examination of the effect of specific media attention by distinguishing 
between companies that were criticized in the media for their non-GAAP reporting and 
companies that were not. The section is concluded with a subsection on robustness tests. 
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Event study for the entire sample 
A standard event study procedure is used to assess if stock prices change in response to the 
different earnings measures disclosed in the press releases28.  
Using a random-walk earnings expectations model we define unexpected earnings as the 
three EPS figures (GAAP, operational GAAP and non-GAAP) minus GAAP earnings from 
four quarters earlier (q-4).  Unexpected earnings are used instead of forecast errors, because 
analyst forecast data is lacking for most Dutch companies during our sample period. We 
calculate three measures of unexpected earnings or earnings surprise: UE GAAP, UE 
OGAAP and UE NONGAAP. On average, the non-GAAP measures result in unexpected 
earnings of 5.3%, compared to UE GAAP of minus 0.2%. The mean market capitalisation 
MCAP (€10,397 million) is much higher than the median (€1,593 million), revealing that a 
few firms in our sample are much larger than most of the sample firms. This is in fact a 
characteristic feature of the Dutch financial market, which is dominated by a few large 
multinational companies. 
 
 
                                                          
28
 The market model is used to calculate daily abnormal returns. We estimate the market model parameters or a 
pre-event estimation period of 100 trading days from of –110 to –10 days before the press release. Abnormal returns 
are computed during the event period. Our event period is from –10 to +10 days. Abnormal returns are then 
averaged across firms to generate the average abnormal return (AARt). Cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR
-1,+1) are calculated by summing the average abnormal returns or an event window [-1,+1 relative to the event 
date (i.e. the date of the press release), which is labeled day 0.  
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We first examine which definition of earnings investors pay attention to: non-GAAP 
earnings or GAAP earnings (either bottom-line or operating). To gain insight into the degree 
to which the market is processing each measure in prices, we investigate a short-window 
association between abnormal returns on each earnings surprise (unexpected earnings) 
measure separately. If the market finds non-GAAP earnings to be a better summary measure 
of performance, returns will be more highly correlated with UE NONGAAP than with UE 
GAAP or UE OGAAP.  
Table 2.5 
Summary statistics 
     
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
N 
EARN GAAP 255.991 44.000 952.908 538 
EARN OGAAP 433.674 69.000 1,329.333 363 
EARN NONGAAP 474.054 106.000 870.280 381 
UE GAAP -0.002 0.001 0.053 538 
UE OGAAP 0.018 0.017 0.072 363 
UE NONGAAP 0.052 0.022 0.090 381 
MCAP 10,397.640 1,592.690 19,653.910 545 
CAR (%) -0.073 -0.430 7.376 545 
     
Note: Table shows summary statistics for quarterly earnings press releases issued by Dutch listed 
companies from January 2000 to April 2005. EARN GAAP, EARN OGAAP and EARN NONGAAP 
denote the GAAP earnings, operational GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings (in millions of euros), 
respectively. UE GAAP, UE OGAAP and UE NONGAAP denote the unexpected earnings (earnings 
surprise) for GAAP, operational GAAP and non-GAAP earnings, respectively. We use the random model 
to compute unexpected earnings and use the GAAP earnings four quarters earlier (q-4) as our proxy for 
expected earnings. The UE GAAP is computed as (EARN GAAP -EARN GAAP (q-4))/MCAP, UE 
OGAAP is computed as (EARN OGAAP-EARN GAAP (q-4))/MCAP and UE NONGAAP is computed 
as (EARN NONGAAP-EARN GAAP (q-4))/MCAP. The unexpected earnings (earnings surprise) is 
trimmed at the 5th and 95th percentile. MCAP denotes the market capitalization five trading days before 
the press release (in millions of euros). CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal return during the three 
trading day interval from one day before to one day after the press release 
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Table 2.6 presents the results of regressions of abnormal returns on unexpected earnings. 
The regression is estimated separately for UE GAAP, UE OGAAP and UE NONGAAP 
(Model 1-3 respectively). The regression is not estimated for the three unexpected earnings 
metrics together, because of high correlations between the earnings definitions (correlations 
above 0.95). 
 
In the separate unexpected earnings regression reported in Table 2.6, UE GAAP, UE 
OGAAP and UE NONGAAP are positively related to short window returns. The coefficients 
on both UE GAAP and UE NONGAAP are statistically significantly positive. These results 
indicate that the different definitions of unexpected earnings have different explanatory 
Table 2.6 
Regression results 
       
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
UE GAAP 0.155 
(2.585) 
 
*** 
    
UE OGAAP   0.033 
(0.602) 
   
UE NONGAAP     0.107 
(2.432) 
 
*** 
Intercept -0.001 
(-0.177) 
 -0.004 
(-1.007) 
 -0.004 
(-0.979) 
 
R2  0.012  0.001  0.015  
F-statistic 6.684 *** 0.363  5.916 *** 
Number of observations 538  363  381  
       
Comparison of earnings measures 
 Vuong’s Z-statistic Probability 
UE OGAAP vs. UE 
GAAP 
7.48 <0.0001 
UE NONGAAP vs. UE 
GAAP 
-1.62 0.1056 
UE OGAAP vs. UE 
NONGAAP 
7.75 <0.0001 
   
Note: Table shows the regression results using CAR as the dependent variable. We refer to Table 
5 for variable definitions. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * statistically significant at the 10 
percent level (one-tailed), ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed) and *** 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed).  
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power with respect to short window abnormal stock returns. Remarkably, bottom-line 
earnings are informative whereas operating earnings are not. Normally it is argued that 
operating earnings are closer to core earnings and are therefore more relevant to investors. 
Furthermore, non-GAAP earnings are informative, which is in line with prior research.  
Consistent with U.S. studies, non-GAAP earnings are found to be more informative than 
GAAP operating earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003), but this does not hold for GAAP 
earnings.  
 
Before and after negative media attention 
If negative media attention has an effect on the way investors perceive non-GAAP 
information and if they adjust their behaviour accordingly, the information content of the 
respective earnings measures should change from 2003 onwards. The results of the 
regressions in these two periods are reported in Table 2.7. 
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The Models 1-3 depict the results of the regression in the period before 2003, the Models 4-
6 refer to the period 2003 until April 2005. Before 2003, both the bottom-line GAAP and 
the non-GAAP unexpected earnings measures are significantly positive. The coefficient on 
UE OGAAP is not significant during this period. This result is similar to the aggregated 
results for the entire period. So before 2003, investors seem to price both GAAP bottom-line 
earnings and non-GAAP earnings.  
In the second period (2003 and after) however, the results change. UE NONGAAP is no 
longer significant, while the unexpected earnings on bottom-line GAAP and operating 
Table 2.7 
The rise and fall of value relevance of non-GAAP earnings 
       
Before negative media attention After negative media attention 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
UE GAAP 0.207 
(2.140) 
 
** 
   0.108 
(1.522) 
 
* 
  
UE OGAAP   -0.021 
(-0.240) 
    0.098 
(1.445) * 
 
UE 
NONGAAP 
   0.130 
(1.808) 
 
** 
 
  0.061 
(1.148) 
Intercept 0.004 
(0.754) 
 -0.005 
(-0.720) 
-0.003 
(-0.331) 
 -0.004 
(-1.247) 
 -0.004 
(-0.890) 
-0.005 
(-1.099) 
R2  0.018  0.001 0.020  0.008  0.010 0.006 
F-statistic 4.580 ** 0.058 3.272 ** 2.317 * 2.089 * 1.318 
Number of 
observations 
248  160 166  290  203 215 
           
Comparison of earnings measures 
 
Before negative media attention After negative media attention 
 Vuong’s Z-
statistic 
Probability Vuong’s Z-
statistic 
Probability 
UE OGAAP vs. UE GAAP 6.76 <0.0001 0.42 0.6759 
UE NONGAAP vs. UE GAAP 0.55 0.5831 -0.66 0.5110 
UE OGAAP vs. UE NONGAAP 4.29 <0.0001 1.02 0.3103 
     
Note: Table shows the regression results using CAR as the dependent variable. We refer to Table 2.5 for 
variable definitions. We split the sample in observations before and after the peak in negative media 
attention.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed), 
**
 statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed) and *** statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level (one-tailed).  
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GAAP earnings are significant (at the 10% level). According to our results, the decreased 
use by investors of non-GAAP information coincides with an increasing popularity of 
operating GAAP earnings. The coefficient on UE OGAAP switches to a positive sign, and 
is significant. 
The coefficient on UE GAAP is statistically significant for the entire sample period as well 
as for the two sub-periods. This may suggest that bottom-line earnings are in fact informative 
to capital market participants. This contradicts the critics of bottom-line earnings, who claim 
that this earnings measure is not useful to investors because it includes items that are non-
operating or transitory. The use of net income in financial reports is strongly encouraged by 
Dutch financial market authorities and regulators such as the DASB. Based on the results, it 
seems investors agree with the regulators on the importance of bottom-line GAAP earnings.  
Although the explanatory power (R2) of the Models is low, as reported in Table 2.6 and 2.7 
is low, it is in line with other research (Bhattacharya, et al., 2003). Vuong’s (1989) Z-statistic 
is calculated to compare the explanatory power of the Models and find that for the entire 
period UE GAAP and UE NONGAAP have significantly more explanatory power than UE 
OGAAP, suggesting that investors find operating GAAP the least informative earnings 
measure. This result holds for the first period of our sample, before the negative media 
attention. After negative media attention, the explanatory power of the models does not 
differ significantly, suggesting that investors find the earnings measures equally 
(un)informative. 
 
Effect on companies that were specifically criticized 
As argued in earlier research (e.g. Dyck et al., 2008) the effect of media attention may be 
stronger for companies that were specifically criticized for their use of non-GAAP earnings 
in newspaper articles. A regression is estimated using the stock market reaction surrounding 
the earnings press release as our dependent variable. In order to test whether there are any 
differences between firms that received negative media coverage and the ones that did not, 
a dummy FIRM IN MEDIA is included that indicates one if the company was criticized in 
the media for using non-GAAP earnings. This dummy (FIRM IN MEDIA) tells us whether 
there is a different intercept for these firms compared to firms that do not receive negative 
media attention. This dummy is then interacted with UE NONGAAP. This interaction term 
captures differences in slope coefficients between the two group of firms and test whether 
investors perceive non-GAAP earnings differently between the two groups.  
Regressions are run before and after the negative media attention in general, enabling one to 
compare the effect of general media and firm-specific media coverage. The results are 
reported in Table 2.8. Results show that investors assign less value relevance to the non-
GAAP earnings of firms that are targeted in the media. The interaction term turns statistically 
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significant for 2003 and after. This suggests that the negative effect of negative firm-specific 
media attention on the use of non-GAAP measures is stronger when there is also more 
widespread critical discussion of the use of non-GAAP earnings.  
Investors continue to assign value relevance to non-GAAP earnings in 2003 and later years 
for firms without negative company-specific media attention but the regression coefficient 
has halved in size (from 0.27 to 0.13). This drop in regression coefficients is significant at 
5% level. This shows that also for these firms the market awards less information content to 
non-GAAP earnings compared to the period before 2003. 
Overall, it seems that firm-specific media attention has a large impact on how investors 
perceive non-GAAP numbers, especially when it is part of a general discussion on the use 
of non-GAAP earnings. However, the negative media attention on non-GAAP earnings in 
general also has an impact on firms that are not targeted in the media. Investors continue to 
perceive their non-GAAP earnings as informative in 2003 and after but less so compared to 
the period before 2003. 
 
Table 2.8 
General media and firm-specific media coverage on non-GAAP 
     
  Before negative 
media attention 
After negative 
media attention 
UE NONGAAP 0.276 
(2.031) 
 
**
 
0.136 
(1.701) 
 
**
 
FIRM IN MEDIA -0.021 
(-0.478) 
 -0.012 
(-1.141) 
 
*
 
UE NONGAAP* 
FIRM IN MEDIA 
-0.237 
(-1.09) 
 -0.128 
(-1.34) 
 
*
 
Intercept -0.004 
(-0.51) 
 -0.031 
(-0.600) 
 
R2  0.059  0.032  
F-statistic 1.622 * 2.271 ** 
Number of firm-quarters  166  215  
     
Note: Table shows the regression results using CAR as the dependent variable. FIRM IN 
MEDIA is a dummy variable that indicates one if the firm was mentioned in the press as an 
opportunistic non-GAAP reporter. We interact this dummy with UE NONGAAP. We refer 
to Table 2.5 for variable definitions. We split the sample in observations before and after the 
peak in negative media attention.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed), ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
(one-tailed) and *** statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed).  
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An additional analysis is performed on firms that were named specifically in the newspapers 
articles. Twelve firms that were targeted in the media for their (opportunistic) use of non-
GAAP measures allow us to examine the effect of the media more closely. Five firms were 
targeted before 2003 and seven in 2003 and later. Here one is able to identify the exact 
quarter in which the media reported negatively on the use of non-GAAP earnings measures 
by these firms. We then compare the quarters before and after the negative media attention 
and examine whether the stock market response is more negative after the firms are “named 
and shamed”. The results are reported in Table 2.9. The informativeness of non-GAAP 
earnings is found to decrease whereas the informativeness of GAAP earnings increases after 
the company was mentioned in the media as an (opportunistic) non-GAAP user.  
 
 
Table 2.9 
The change in value relevance of non-GAAP earnings after firm is targeted in 
media 
       
 Before negative media attention on 
company 
After negative media attention on 
company 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
UE GAAP -0.122 
(-0.394) 
  0.157 
(1.625) 
 
*
 
   
UE OGAAP  -0.245 
(-1.211) 
   0.036 
(0.405) 
  
UE NONGAAP   0.215 
(2.203) 
 
** 
 
   0.016 
(0.233) 
Intercept 0.003 
(0.335) 
-0.004 
(-0.250) 
-0.003 
(-0.263) 
-0.018 
(-2.427) 
 
**
 
-0.019 
(-2.081) 
 
**
 
-0.018 
(-2.081) ** 
R2  0.002 0.025 0.032 0.048  0.003  0.001 
F-statistic 0.152 1.461 4.844 ** 2.245 * 0.163  0.053 
Number of 
firm-quarters  
53 29 51 67  45  67 
           
Note: Table shows the regression results using CAR as the dependent variable. We refer to Table 2.5 of the paper 
for variable definitions. We split the sample in observations before and after the negative media attention on a 
company.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * statistically significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed), ** 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed) and *** statistically significant at the 1 percent level (one-
tailed).  
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Robustness tests 
We perform additional tests to determine if our results are robust for alternate model 
specifications. First, results are tested for sensitivity to the exact date that we chose to 
separate the observations before the negative media attention from the ones after (1 January 
2003). While remaining within the boundaries of the period of intensified media attention, 
we shift the date partitioning the sample one quarter backward (30 September 2002) and 
forward (30 March 2003) and run the regressions again. Similar results occur, suggesting 
our findings are insensitive to the exact date. 
Next, a panel data analysis is performed, which adds the time-series dimension to our cross-
sectional analysis presented in Table 2.6. Panel data help also to control for omitted variables 
that change over time but not across companies (i.e. accounting policies, economic 
conditions etc.) and for unobserved differences in business practices across companies. 
Random effects are used to estimate the panel data regression (the Hausman test rejects the 
use of fixed effects). Unreported results show that analysing the data using random effects 
does not yield materially different results than using OLS. Furthermore, regressions are 
repeated after excluding firms with a cross listing at a U.S. exchange. The results are 
consistent with the results for the entire sample. This alleviates concerns that the findings 
are driven by cross-listed firms that respond to the regulation in the U.S.  
Moreover, in addition to the original specification of the regression presented in Table 2.6, 
we re-estimate the regression using UE GAAP and ADJUSTMENTS (defined as the 
difference between UE GAAP and UE NONGAAP). The (unreported) results show that the 
magnitude of the adjustments matters, as larger adjustments are more informative. This 
finding only holds in the period before 2003. This corresponds with our finding that non-
GAAP earnings are not informative in the period 2003 and after.  
Finally, in addition to the tabulated results, the regressions are performed including the 
market capitalization five days before the press release was published. The results of this 
test are similar to the models excluding market capitalization.  
2.7 Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the use of different definitions of earnings: earnings calculated 
according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP earnings, both bottom-line 
and operating) and alternative versions of earnings that exclude various items recorded under 
GAAP (non-GAAP earnings). Our study is placed in the turbulent period where financial 
scandals are front-page news and investors trust is on a historical low. During this period, 
influenced by the accounting scandals, the use of alternative earnings measures received 
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negative media attention. Building on the growing literature on the influence of media 
attention and press coverage on the behaviour of managers and investors, it is argued that 
this negative media attention may have affected non-GAAP reporting. The Dutch setting 
offers us the possibility to study the effect of the negative attention while the rules and 
regulations remain the same as before the scandals.  
In 2003 and later years, companies are found to have different motivations for non-GAAP 
reporting and that the difference between reported GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings 
is smaller. The change in reporting behaviour is stronger for companies that were named 
specifically in the media. This evidence suggests that companies’ reporting choices may be 
influenced by factors such as media attention, even without regulatory changes.  Investors 
seem to take the warnings in the media seriously and turn away from non-GAAP measures. 
From 2003 on, the evidence shows investors consider GAAP earnings to be informative, 
whereas they do not price non-GAAP earnings measures. This contrasts with the findings 
before 2003, where investors seem to find non-GAAP earnings useful, as well as bottom-
line GAAP earnings. Collectively, the findings here suggest that market participants 
perceive non-GAAP earnings measures to be less informative after a peak in negative media 
attention. 
This study is important to regulators and standard setters. Critical opinions in the media and 
warnings by regulators expressed through the media are shown to be effective means to 
create awareness among investors, and to some extent to alter companies reporting 
behaviour. U.S. studies suggest that specific regulation has successfully restrained 
opportunistic non-GAAP reporting practices. On the other hand, there is evidence that the 
SEC regulation leads to suboptimal reporting decisions (Kolev et al., 2008, Heflin and Hsu, 
2008). Our results cast doubt on the attribution of changes in investor and company 
behaviour to the effect of regulation and suggest that investor perceptions can change 
without regulation. This potentially has important implications for regulation effectiveness 
studies that evaluate the effect of new regulations on the behaviour of market participants.  
The current study indicates the need to expand our understanding of the effect of regulation. 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and necessity of the regulation of financial markets, 
we need to understand the effect of concurrent changes in the environment that may 
influence behaviour of financial markets participants. For example, media attention can 
induce reputation effects that discipline reporting behaviour or create awareness among the 
users of financial information. We report evidence that suggests that investors base their 
decisions on different earnings metrics after negative attention from media and regulators. 
Such effects may decrease the necessity of additional regulation. In order to disentangle the 
effects of regulation and reporting environment, more research in an international setting 
may be fruitful. 
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Chapter 3  
The Diffusion of IFRS around the World29 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the most striking phenomena of the globalization of financial markets is the move to 
one worldwide accounting language. Over the past ten years, there has been a shift towards 
international comparability and harmonization of accounting standards through the adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)30. This shift has a pervasive impact 
on firms’ financial reports throughout the world and consequently on their shareholders and 
stakeholders. More than 120 countries currently use IFRS, which effectively means that for 
the first time in history more than 15,000 firms across different countries use corresponding 
accounting standards (IFRS Foundation, 2013). Considering the rapidity and geographic 
reach of the shift, it is appropriate to ask how the diffusion of these international accounting 
standards can be explained.  
Historically, financial reporting standards have developed over time on a national 
level, reflecting the country-specific environments they served. As a consequence, financial 
reporting has been characterized by large variations across countries, according to the 
relative influence of environmental factors (such as the nature of national legal systems). 
Most notably, there were important differences between the accounting policies of Anglo-
American countries and European continental countries. Financial reporting in many 
European countries can be traced back to tax law and regulations with respect to dividend 
payments and creditor protection (Zeff, 2012). In contrast, the Anglo-American accounting 
model evolved in a context with dominant securities markets, where the primary function of 
                                                          
29
 This chapter is based on a working paper by Koning, M., Roosenboom, P.G. J. and Mertens, G.M.H., (2013a, 
unpublished).  
30
 For convenience, we consistently use the term IFRS to refer to standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and the International Accounting Standards that were issued by the IASB’s predecessor, 
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and that are still recognized by the IASB. 
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financial statements is to provide information to investors (Nobes, 1998). Variation in 
accounting policies causes different outcomes, which impedes meaningful comparisons 
between companies from different countries (Nobes, 1983). When international trade 
became more important, the demand for internationally comparable financial information 
increased. Since then, the harmonization of accounting standards has made considerable 
progress within a relatively short period of time. An important role in this development was 
played by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a privately funded non-
governmental organization located in London. Its objective is to develop high quality, 
understandable and enforceable global accounting standards (IFRS Foundation, 2013). 
During the past decade, many countries across the world have replaced their domestic 
financial reporting standards with the IASB’s international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) while others are converging their national standards to IFRS.  
The arguments offered to support the adoption of IFRS are mainly economic ones 
and focus on improving the functioning of financial markets. In this view, the economic 
globalization leads to a convergence of traditionally national accounting standards in order 
to facilitate cross-border financing. Standard setters as well as adopting countries emphasize 
the economic advantages of global accounting standards. The IFRS Foundation explicitly 
refers to facilitating economic decision-making for investors and other capital market 
participants as the main goal for global accounting standards (IFRS Foundation, 2012). 
Similar views are expressed by adopting jurisdictions, when they announce their decision to 
adopt IFRS and list the benefits they expect from the adoption, such as the reduction of cost 
of capital and improving competitiveness of companies (see Brown (2011) for some 
examples). In academic research, substantial effort has been expended on studying the 
economic reasons for the move to international accounting standards. In a review paper, 
Tarca (2012) concludes that there is evidence that capital market efficiency improves and 
cross-border investment is promoted when countries require companies to use IFRS.  
Although the economic benefits of international accounting standards may seem 
self-evident in today’s globalized world, the rapid spread of IFRS does raise some questions. 
Adopting countries are very different in terms of levels of economic development and 
financing infrastructure. So why would such dissimilar countries all decide to adopt IFRS? 
Is it reasonable to assume that the decision to adopt IFRS was driven by similar economic, 
functional needs? It is not obvious that expected benefits are the same for adopting countries. 
So what is driving the quick spread of IFRS? To enhance our understanding, we look beyond 
the economic forces, and include the international, political and social dimension (Chua and 
Taylor, 2008). On a fundamental level, regulation of any domain of economic life is 
essentially a political affair since it involves the (re-)distribution of wealth (Moran, 2010). 
Accounting standards are designed to facilitate the allocation of capital (e.g. IFRS 
Foundation, 2012), and are therefore shaped by economic and political forces (Watts and 
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Zimmerman, 1986; Ball, 2006). The push for international accounting standards is driven 
by the globalization of the economy and the globalization of politics (Ball, 2006). Currently, 
the political dimension is mostly overlooked, which has led some academics to call for more 
research that addresses accounting standard setting as a political process (e.g. Chua and 
Taylor, 2008; Kothari et al. 2010; Leuz, 2010).  
This study focuses directly on international political influences on countries’ 
decisions to adopt IFRS or not. Our main unit of analysis is the interaction between 
countries, while we observe characteristics at the country level. We offer a new perspective 
using insights from the policy diffusion literature in political science. Diffusion theories 
attempt to explain the pattern of diffusion of specific policies across countries, rather than 
explain the policy adoption itself (Dobbin et al., 2007). The policy diffusion literature argues 
that countries’ regulatory decisions are driven not only by domestic incentives and 
circumstances, but also by the choices made by other countries. The extent to which choices 
by other countries influence the domestic adoption decision differs depending on the 
country’s ties with the adopting countries. The policy diffusion literature distinguishes 
between four diffusion mechanisms, depending on what motivates the actor (the government 
or regulatory authority) and the change that triggers the policy adoption (Dobbin et al., 2007; 
Drezner, 2008): competition, learning, coercion and emulation. We apply the insights from 
the policy diffusion theory on the global adoption of international accounting standards in 
order to identify the mechanisms that drive the diffusion of IFRS. Identifying the dominant 
mechanisms will help explain why many diverse countries adopted the same accounting 
standards. 
Understanding countries’ adoption strategies and their potential responses to IFRS 
is crucial when designing and evaluating international standard setting. Moreover, 
identifying the mechanism that drives the policy switch to IFRS for any country may help 
evaluate or potentially predict the “performance” of the international reporting standards for 
that particular country (Elkins and Simmons, 2005). A few studies have examined the 
determinants of IFRS adoption on a country level. Hope et al. (2006) examine the effect of 
domestic institutional characteristics on the voluntary adoption decision of 38 countries 
before 2004 and find that countries with relatively weak investor protection are more likely 
to adopt IFRS. More recently, Ramanna and Sletten (2010) apply a network perspective to 
analyse adoption of IFRS across countries based on the trade with IFRS-adopting countries. 
They find that the IFRS adoption status of a country increases if it perceives that it has higher 
network benefits from IFRS adoption. These country-level papers are both primarily focused 
on the competitive forces driving international IFRS adoption and find evidence to support 
the economic perspective. 
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With this study, we join the effort to explain IFRS adoption on a country-level and 
contribute by applying a perspective that allows for a broader set of explanations. We 
introduce insights from recent empirical work on policy diffusion in political science. This 
allows us to not only examine competitive forces, but other drivers of diffusion as well 
(learning, coercion and emulation). The first challenge is to empirically disentangle the 
concepts. We use various international data sources to measure the diffusion mechanisms. 
Then we apply logistic regressions to analyse how the probability of adopting IFRS is 
affected by other countries’ choices. We use ordinal logistic regressions to investigate the 
scope of the IFRS adoptions across countries, using a definition of the dependent variable 
that reflects different levels of adoption (permitted, required for some companies or required 
for all companies). Then, in order to analyse the sequence of the adoptions we apply hazard 
regression analysis.  
The results clearly indicate that the pace and pattern of IFRS adoption across the globe 
is influenced by diffusion processes. Our findings suggest that domestic factors do not 
explain the probability of IFRS adoptions. Instead, we do find that other countries’ IFRS 
adoption affects the probability that the country of interest will adopt IFRS, depending on 
the nature and the weight of the connection between countries. We find some evidence for 
each of the four diffusion mechanisms, but some are more robust across model specifications 
than others. We find that adoption decisions of competing countries do influence each 
other’s choices, depending on the nature and the weight of the connection between countries. 
But even more pronounced than the influence of competition, it is evident that emulation 
increases the probability of IFRS adoption. Countries are more likely to switch to IFRS if 
they are involved in the international development of norms via expert communities or if 
close neighbours (geographical or cultural) adopt IFRS. In summary, the evidence suggests 
that emulation may be an alternative explanation for the diffusion of IFRS. At least, our 
findings offer a more complete understanding of the diffusion of IFRS around the world; a 
diffusion that may not be attributed to capital market incentives alone. 
3.2 Policy diffusion mechanisms 
In political science, the occurrence that countries choose similar policies within a fairly 
limited period of time has been studied extensively. Diffusion research within political 
science studies identifies temporal and spatial clusters of policy reform and studies why they 
occur. Central to the diffusion literature is the notion of interdependence of countries’ policy 
decisions. The term “diffusion” in this line of research is defined as the process by which 
“prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for the 
remaining non-adopters” (Strang, 1991, 325). Within the diffusion literature, the term is 
applied loosely, covering research on the internationalization of policies that takes into 
63_Erim_Koning_BW stand.job
 The Diffusion of IFRS around the World 63 
 
 
 
account the possibility that policy choices in one country affect the policy choices in other 
countries (Gilardi, 2011)31. During the past few decades, political scientists have identified 
several diffusion mechanisms that explain how policies spread across countries. Although 
there is some variation in the labels, the diffusion mechanisms are generally classified as 
competition, learning, coercion and emulation, (Simmons et al., 2007; Lee and Strang, 2006; 
Gilardi, 2011). We describe each of these perspectives briefly below. 
3.2.1 Competition 
Diffusion resulting from economic competition occurs when governments that compete for 
the same resources adopt the policy of their competitors for fear of an economic loss if they 
deviate (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009). The classic example is the tax system, where countries 
may compete with each other by imposing low tax rates, although individually they may be 
better off with higher tax rates. The process where competition between countries ultimately 
leads to the laxest tax system is known as ‘the race to the bottom’. It is important to note, 
however, that competition does not necessarily lead to the lowest standards. The opposite is 
also true: in some cases regulatory competition creates incentives for higher standards. In 
the diffusion literature this has been documented as the “California effect”, namely the idea 
that important export markets can push countries to more stringent environmental standards 
by making access to the market conditional on achieving those standards (Gilardi, 2011).   
The competition perspective has been predominantly driving the literature on the 
globalization of the economy. The argument is that the growing international flows of capital 
explain why more and more countries have come to adopt broadly similar investor-friendly 
policies (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The adoption of IFRS can also be seen in this light. 
The IASB consistently emphasizes its conviction that the transparency provided by IFRS as 
high-quality financial reporting standards contributes significantly to the effective 
functioning of capital markets and sound economic growth. This line of reasoning is shared 
by many governments that adopted IFRS, as reflected in the press releases in which the 
reasons for the adoption are explained (Brown, 2011). Competition-driven diffusion 
assumes that it is the decision by competing countries to adopt the policy that alters the 
                                                          
31
 Some policy diffusion researchers argue that the definition should be interpreted more strictly, reserving the term 
“diffusion” for uncoordinated, interdependent policy decisions, that is: decisions made independently by 
governments (uncoordinated) but where governments do take decisions of other governments into account 
(interdependent) (Gilardi, 2011; Elkins and Simmons, 2005). From this point of view, the coordinated spread of 
policies would not be regarded as policy diffusion. Specifically, this would imply that one of the diffusion 
mechanisms that we discuss, coercion, would not meet the definition of policy diffusion. 
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opportunities and hence the probability of adoption for the country of interest. For IFRS 
adoption, following the competitive diffusion hypothesis, we would expect the probability 
of a country’s IFRS adoption to increase when more competitors have adopted IFRS. This 
assumes that governments know who their competitors are and that governments understand 
how policy choices connect to competitive advantages. In order to test competition theory, 
it is important to identify which countries are salient competitors and this may be different 
depending on what the countries are competing for (Dobbin et al., 2007). In the case of IFRS 
adoption, countries expect that the competitive position of the national capital market and of 
the domestic companies will improve (Brown, 2011). From the perspective of domestic 
companies, competing countries will most likely be those countries that are competing for 
trade in the product market of a third country (Dobbin et al., 2007). Alternatively, from the 
perspective of competition for capital, competing countries are more likely to be the 
countries with a similar risk profile (Simmons and Elkins, 2004). 
3.2.2 Learning 
Diffusion may also be caused by learning from the experience of others. If a policy is 
successful in a country, it is more likely that the policy will be adopted by others. The 
consequences of a policy adoption in one country may supply relevant information for others 
that consider a policy change (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009). Berry and Bayeck (2005, 505) 
describe the learning mechanism as follows: “When confronted with a problem, decision 
makers simplify the task of finding a solution by choosing an alternative that has proven 
successful elsewhere”. According to this definition, learning occurs in response to an 
identified problem, a process that has been described as “problem pressure” (Holzinger and 
Knill, 2005). Another aspect of this definition is that policy adoption decisions are 
influenced by the success of similar policies elsewhere (Gilardi, 2010). Although, in most 
of the literature, learning implies a form of rational decisions by governments (Marsh and 
Sharman, 2009), the limitations of the rationality assumption are acknowledged. Most 
studies employ a concept of bounded rationality (Weyland, 2007). When learning is assumed 
to be limited in its rationality, policy decisions will not be based on all available experience 
but on cognitive shortcuts (Weyland, 2004; 2007). For example, policymakers will more 
likely be influenced by success from countries that are close neighbours (Meseguer, 2006). 
In any case, learning assumes that information about policy success abroad will increase the 
probability of adoption of the policy in the home country. When applied to IFRS, the 
decision to adopt IFRS is driven by learning when it is based on evidence that adoption of 
IFRS contributes to the economic success of countries.  
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3.2.3 Coercion 
Coercion essentially involves “the imposition of policies on national governments by 
powerful international organizations or powerful countries” (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009, 
530). Coercion is most likely to explain diffusion patterns to the developing world, such as 
when international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) attach 
conditions to their lending (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The anti-money laundering 
regulations are an example of a policy that was forced upon developing countries. When 
governments of developing countries were reluctant to implement international policies, the 
European Commission pushed for international countermeasures of which the most serious 
was ‘conditioning, restricting, targeting, or even prohibiting financial transactions with non-
cooperative jurisdictions’ (Drezner, 2005). But softer, more indirect manifestations of 
international coercion where countries try to exercise some pressure without actually 
threatening to take measures have also been documented.  
Coercion would not be classified as a diffusion mechanism under more stringent definitions, 
which include only uncoordinated, interdependent policy adoptions (Gilardi, 2012). When a 
country is coerced to adopt a specific policy, it is clearly not a decision that is taken 
interdependently (Elkins and Simmons, 2005). However, the broader interpretation of 
diffusion includes coercion as a diffusion mechanism, in the sense that the policy adoption 
decision is shaped by international influences (Dobbin et al., 2007). 
In the case of IFRS adoption, influential non-governmental organizations such as the IMF 
and the World Bank can be identified as sources of influence since they actively promote 
IFRS. Both institutions perform country audits where one of the items assessed is the level 
of IFRS compliance32. In addition to advocating IFRS, the World Bank or the IMF may 
include the requirement to adopt IFRS in their loan-granting policies (Botzem and Dobusch, 
2012). This form of coercion is also known as conditionality (Dobbin et al., 2007). Diffusion 
driven by coercion would predict a higher rate of IFRS adoption among countries that are 
subject to the influence of these international organizations, most notably the World Bank 
and the IMF. 
 
                                                          
32
 In 1999, the World Bank and the IMF launched the standards and codes initiative to promote international 
financial stability through the “development, dissemination, adoption and implementation of international standards 
and codes” (IMF, 2005). One of the identified set of international standards is IFRS. 
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3.2.4 Emulation 
Emulation occurs when actors model their behaviour on the examples of others, in other 
words when appropriate behaviour is socially constructed (Lee and Strang, 2006). So, 
contrary to learning, the objective functions of a policy do not matter for emulation (Gilardi, 
2011). Instead, it is motivated by a country’s desire to acquire legitimacy and status or to be 
perceived by others as advanced and up-to-date; even if it is fully aware that the policy 
change is ineffective (Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009). The benefit 
of adopting highly accepted policies is reputational (Elkins and Simmons, 2005), even if 
they do not work. 
Emulation in its most typical form involves the automatic, unreflective copying of foreign 
policies as a result of deeply shared norms. This type of emulation is also known as imitation 
or mimicry. Characteristic of copying policies is that adopters do not fully comprehend the 
objective of the policy (Dobbin et al. 2007). Examples have been documented that illustrate 
the occurrence of copying mechanisms, even in the most literal sense33, although downright 
copying of policies without adapting them to local circumstances is exceptional34.  
In any case, for emulation to be the driving force of adopting a policy, the ideas represented 
by the policy should be accepted. Ideas and norms can be influenced by participation in 
international organizations and professional communities (Simmons et al., 2006). For 
example, expert groups may provide arguments for adopting a policy and thereby increase 
its social acceptance (Dobbin et al. 2007). Also, shared cultural values, historical ties or a 
common language may facilitate the spread of ideas. Countries will be more likely to adopt 
a policy that is accepted by their peers, even if they cannot ascertain that adoption will be in 
their best interest (Simmons et al., 2006).  
When we apply this diffusion theory to IFRS adoption, we expect the probability of IFRS 
adoption to be higher for countries participating in organizations that actively promote IFRS 
and for countries that are culturally close to the other IFRS-adopting countries. 
 
                                                          
33
 For example, Venezuela copied and pasted Mexico’s legislation without removing references to the Mexican 
constitution. Even worse, Venezuela ended up blacklisting itself when it copied Mexico’s national tax blacklist that 
included Venezuela (Sharman, 2010). 
34
 In the case of IFRS, however, full adoption would effectively mean literally incorporating the standards which 
is in most cases the adoption mode promoted by the IASB.  
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3.3 Empirical approach 
3.3.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable concerns country-level IFRS adoption decisions. Data on the timing 
and the extent of the adoption are drawn from surveys and reports from international 
organizations. In particular, we combine and triangulate multiple sources to code the IFRS 
adoption history for as many countries as possible and to improve the accuracy of the 
adoption classification. We start the coding procedure with the information from the IAS 
Plus websites35, the only source for which the historical data can be traced. Since we want 
to analyse the pattern of IFRS adoption across countries over time, we need historical data 
on IFRS adoption decisions. We code the data per country year and corroborate initial coding 
and expand the data by carefully reading and combining the rest of the sources as described 
in more detail in Appendix 1. Most importantly, we use surveys that two Big 4 audit firms 
have performed over the past decade in order to take stock of the global use of IFRS36. In 
addition, we use the World Bank reports37, with respect to the compliance of several 
jurisdictions to international standards including IFRS.  
For most of our analyses, we are primarily interested in whether and when a country adopts 
IFRS. However, there is variation in the degree to which countries require or permit IFRS. 
Therefore, we distinguish 5 categories of IFRS (non-) adoption, based on classifications used 
in the IASPlus data. This classification is straightforward in the sense that it distinguishes 
countries that either mandate or allow IFRS and whether IFRS applied to all companies or 
some. It does not take into account more qualitative aspects, such as the rigor of the 
implementation or the enforcement of the standards. Other studies show that there are several 
ways in which countries can implement IFRS and that the method of implementation 
                                                          
35
 We use the IAS plus survey from Deloitte (history from 2002-2012, based on older versions of the website and 
yearly editions of the “IFRS in your pocket publications” by Deloitte, that publish the same tables) and updates on 
the use of IFRS per jurisdiction on the IAS plus website.  
36
 We use the results from a survey by EY (2010) and PWC (2011) to corroborate the findings. In addition, we 
check the reconcile the findings form the Big4 with the information on a IFRS adoption website by the Simon 
Fraser University (www.adoptifrs.org).  
37
 These Reports on Standards and Codes (ROSC) are written for several countries by the IMF and the World Bank 
for jurisdictions at the request of the jurisdiction. The focus of the reports varies. For the purpose of our research, 
the reports with respect to Audit are the most relevant, since they specifically consider the adoption of (and 
compliance with) IFRS. 
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determines the likelihood that companies’ financial statements will actually comply with 
IFRS (e.g. Zeff and Nobes, 2010). Instead, we are interested in the factors that drive diffusion 
of IFRS across countries. When studying the diffusion of IFRS, the primary focus is on the 
adoption decision itself rather than the outcome of the adoption.  
3.3.2 Diffusion variables 
The four policy diffusion mechanisms that were discussed in Section 2 can be distinguished 
along two dimensions: the ideas/incentives axis and the functional properties axis.  
 
First, each of the perspectives either traces policy diffusion to changing ideas or changing 
incentives (Dobbin et al., 2007). The second dimension of our framework, distinguishes 
diffusion mechanisms based on their source: is the diffusion driven by the functional 
characteristics of a policy (utility driven) or by its social acceptance (legitimacy driven). 
Emulation and learning perspectives both assume that changes in ideas lead to changes in 
policy. However, emulation and learning have different sources for the change in ideas. For 
emulation, norms and rhetoric are the origin of the changing ideas. In case of learning on the 
Figure 3.1 
Policy diffusion mechanisms 
 
The Figure charts the theoretical constructs of the four diffusion mechanisms in a 2x2 schema. We distinguish 
the diffusion mechanisms based on the source of the policy change (changing incentives or changing ideas) and 
the intention of the policy change (higher utility or legitimacy). 
 

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Utility driven 
 
 
 
 
Competition 
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other hand, ideas change through rational, observational deduction. The other two policy 
diffusion mechanisms can be categorized along the same lines. In case of coercion or 
competition, policy changes are triggered by changing incentives. However, the source of 
the change in incentives is different. In case of competition, the properties of the adopted 
policy are expected to improve the country’s competitive position. Coercion on the other 
hand leads to the adoption of policies regardless of its functional properties. 
 The theoretical distinction of the four diffusion mechanisms (as depicted in Figure 
3.1) is the foundation for disentangling the concepts empirically. We will address this issue 
in the remainder of this paragraph. 
 
Although the policy diffusion mechanisms may be distinct from a theoretical point of view, 
distinguishing the four mechanisms with distinctive observable variables is difficult. The 
same holds for our study, in the sense that disentangling the four diffusion mechanisms for 
IFRS empirically is a challenge. Our goal is to identify the relative importance of each of 
the mechanisms for IFRS diffusion. The mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and 
identifying the driving force will always be a matter of degree. Policy diffusion assumes that 
a country’s policy choices are affected by other countries’ choices and that the influence of 
another country will be stronger if it is more closely tied to the country of interest. In other 
words, the impact of another country’s policy choice increases relative to the country’s 
proximity. We measure the effect of the policy choices abroad on the country of interest as 
the weighted average of the dependent variable (a measure of IFRS adoption) across the 
country’s neighbours38. The weight is a measure of proximity. Important is that we identify 
neighbours not only in the conventional sense based on geographic distances, but relative to 
the specific dimension that we are interested in. For example, the United Kingdom and 
Australia may be neighbours in the sense that they share cultural characteristics. Based on 
                                                          
38 In line with the policy diffusion literature, we treat the diffusion process as a spatial lag model, by including 
spatial terms as regressors in the model. The dependent variable is ‘lagged in space’, where space is the 
neighborhood of the country. For the respective diffusion mechanisms we are interested in, we construct a matrix 
W of weights that specifies the diffusion effects as the influence of the IFRS adoption of each country j on country 
i. By identifying specific weights for a diffusion mechanism, we are able to analyze how other countries decisions 
affect each other. Such a model can be expressed as: 
 
   	
         (1) 
where  is a spatial autoregressive coefficient, W is the NxNxT spatial weight matrix, X is a vector of non-diffusion 
variables with coefficients , and  is a vector of error terms (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Brooks and Kurtz, 2012). 
In addition to the spatial lag, we lag each diffusion variable in time. 
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the theoretical discussion in the previous section, the definition of proximity will differ 
depending on the diffusion mechanism.  Next we describe the measurement for each of the 
four mechanisms. 
First we investigate the notion that competition is driving the diffusion of IFRS adoption. If 
the widely spread use of IFRS is mainly driven by the integration of global markets 
(economic globalization), then the main motivation to adopt these standards would be to 
maintain the country’s competitive position in the global markets. In order to test this 
assumption, we identify which countries compete with each other. Countries are in 
competition with other countries to the extent to which they trade with the same trade 
partners. We measure the effect of trade competitors’ policy decisions similarly to other 
policy diffusion studies (e.g. Simmons and Elkins, 2004). Based on the IMF Directions of 
Trade Statistics database we retrieve the value of trade between country pairs. With this 
information, the international trade pattern of countries can be compared on a country-by-
country base. First we calculate the proportion of export for a country with all N other 
countries. This results in an NxNxT matrix with the distribution of total trade across all 
foreign N-1 countries for the N countries of interest per year (t). Next we calculate the 
correlation between pairs of countries to determine the extent to which the trade pattern of 
two countries is similar. If two countries have exactly the same relative export to the same 
countries, there will be a perfect correlation. We use these correlation coefficients for each 
country pair as a proximity measure (from a competition perspective) to weigh the expected 
influence of IFRS adoption decisions across close/remote competitors.  
An alternative interpretation of competition is that countries are competitors when they 
compete with each other for capital. Arguably, investors have a specific risk preference and 
will choose between countries that represent the same risk level when deciding where invest 
their money. In that case, a country would be in competition with foreign countries in the 
same risk class. Therefore, we calculate a measure for capital market competitors based on 
country risk measures as provided by The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)39. We define 
the alternative measure for competition driven diffusion as the fraction of IFRS adopters 
among countries in the same risk class. In an alternative model specification reported as 
robustness check (Section 5) we discuss and employ this alternative measure. 
The second diffusion mechanism we investigate is learning. Like competition, this 
mechanism assumes diffusion is driven by perceived improvements in utility, but instead of 
                                                          
39
 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is part of The Economist Group and provides analysis of country-level 
date (as well as industry and management analysis). The overall country risk measure can be used as a proxy for 
general risk of a specific country or as financial research blog states: “These ratings can be used to decide on 
investing in the financial markets or for direct investments in those countries” 
(http://financialresearch.blog2blog.nl/Datastream)  
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changes in incentives learning emerges from changing ideas. The most obvious source of 
ideas about effective policies is the success of other countries. Governments are likely to 
learn from policies that seem to work in other countries. Learning from the success of others 
without imposing strict assumptions regarding the information processing capacities of 
governments, requires a highly visible measure for success. Therefore, we measure success 
as the growth of a country’s GDP. In addition, we assume that governments are more aware 
of the economic performance of neighbouring countries and more likely to learn from their 
neighbours. In order to capture this, we take a look at the GDP growth rate among ten the 
nearest countries (geographically). We compare median GDP growth of the IFRS-adopters 
among the ten nearest countries (geographically) and compare this to the median growth 
GDP growth rate of the countries that did not adopt IFRS among the ten nearest countries 
(geographically). The learning diffusion variable is 1 if GDP growth is higher for the top 5 
neighbouring IFRS adopters and 0 otherwise.   
The third diffusion mechanism assumes that policy decisions are driven by international 
pressures, or coercion. The most obvious source for such pressure with respect to IFRS is 
the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions actively promote and monitor the use of 
IFRS internationally. Since 1999, the support for IFRS is formalized in the standard and 
codes initiative, a joint project by the World Bank and the IMF  “designed to promote greater 
financial stability, at both the domestic and international levels, through the development, 
dissemination, adoption, and implementation of international standards and codes” (IMF and 
World Bank, 2005, p.5). The initiative covers twelve areas and related standards, one of 
which is accounting standards/IFRS. Countries that are depending on finance provided by 
these institutions (“clients” of the IMF or World Bank) are more susceptible to comply with 
the policies advocated by the institutions. Compliance will enhance their reputation with the 
IMF and World Bank (legitimacy) and may therefore improve their access to loans and 
credits (incentives). The operationalization of this concept is straightforward: we use a 
dichotomous variable of whether or not a country has drawn on IMF or World Bank 
resources.   
The final diffusion mechanism that we are interested in is emulation. Similar to policy 
adoption driven by coercion, emulation involves a countries desire to increase international 
legitimacy. But in this case, it is the emergence of new ideas that induce the acceptance of a 
new policy. When international expert communities promote new policies norms, the policy 
may spread across countries (Dobbin et al., 2007). Ideas about accounting standards are most 
prominently advocated by the profession that is accountable for financial reporting: the 
accountants (or auditors). If the accountants of a country are convinced of the advantages of 
IFRS, they can influence public opinion and even government’s adoption decision. The 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is the international body of accountancy 
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organizations. According to the organizations website40, professional accountancy 
organizations recognized by law or general consensus within their countries as substantial 
national organizations may apply to become associate and full member. Primarily, the IFAC 
is concerned with the quality of audit profession and develops international standards on 
auditing (ISAs). The IFAC decided to actively promote IFRS and to cooperate with the IASB 
already in 2002. Members are required to support IFAC’s mission and programs, including 
the requirement that “member bodies shall identify and undertake actions to have IFRSs 
issued by the IASB adopted and implemented for at least public interest entities in their 
jurisdictions”41. If a country has a national body of professional accountants that is affiliated 
with the IFAC, there is an identifiable advocacy group that has the obligation to actively 
promote the norms embodied by IFRS. We therefore operationalize the emulation driven 
diffusion by means of an indicator variable for IFAC membership. Based on IFAC’s annual 
reports we handcollect the membership status for every country in the years 2002-2012.  The 
IFAC membership status for a specific country year can take on a value of 0-3, depending 
on whether there is no professional accountancy organization in the country registered (0), 
or whether at least one accountancy organization for that particular country-year is either an 
affiliate (1), associate (20) or full member (3). 
Arguably, accountants’ organizations may be more likely to join the IFAC if it is likely that 
its country of origin will adopt IFRS in the near future. In that case, the relation would in the 
reverse direction. However, we argue that this is not likely to be case; since IFAC’s primary 
concern is to support the development of the accounting profession. Accountancy 
organizations are likely to join the IFAC as a signal of their professionalism and commitment 
to quality. The commitment to IFRS that IFAC requires is part of the membership, but not 
the main goal. For example, the largest member organization (in terms of individual 
accountants, experts and financial support) of the IFAC is the U.S. accountancy 
organization, the AICPA (Bunting, 2009). As an IFAC member, the AICPA actively 
promotes the adoption of IFRS in the U.S., but the U.S. is still using its national accounting 
standards. At least for the AICPA, it seems clear that their membership is not driven by the 
commitment by U.S. regulators to adopt IFRS. 
However, we are sensitive to the concern that our measure for emulation may be 
endogenous. To alleviate this concern, we lag the emulation with one unit (similar to the 
other diffusion measures). In addition, we define two alternative measures for emulation: (1) 
fraction IFRS adoption among 10 closest countries by geographic proximity and (2) fraction 
IFRS adoption among 10 closest countries by administrative proximity. The alternative 
                                                          
40
 www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership; accessed on 18 November 2012. 
41
 Statement of Membership Obligations (SMOs) 1-7 (Revised) as published by the IFAC 20 November 2012; SMO 
7 art. 11. 
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measures are applied in the alternative model specifications that are further discussed in the 
Robustness Checks section (in Section 5). 
3.3.3 Domestic factors 
Several domestic factors can be assumed to influence if not determine a country’s decision 
to adopt IFRS. The policy diffusion mechanisms that we investigate can be seen as potential 
alternative explanations to the more broadly used domestic explanations. In most of our tests, 
we use country fixed effects to control for domestic factors. However, we also include a 
model where domestic variables are included as separate variables. 
A known problem in empirical policy research is the lack of variation of country 
specific variables over time. We try to find measures for the concepts that we would like to 
control for that vary over time, in order for the measures to be distinct from country fixed 
effects. We include GDP growth as a time varying country measure that captures economic 
strength. A plausible alternative explanation for IFRS adoption driven by diffusion 
mechanisms is the domestic demand by domestic companies that are listed on a European 
stock exchange. We control for this by means of a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
there are companies established in the country that are listed on a European securities market 
or not.  In addition, we control for a country’s international openness as measured by the 
ratio of imports of goods and services to GDP and the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP. It can 
be argued that the quality of government affects the probability of IFRS adoption. A 
commonly used measure to proxy for government quality is the number of days it takes to 
enforce a contract, so we include it as one of the domestic factors. Finally, a government’s 
attitude towards IFRS is likely to be influenced by the party orientation with respect to 
economic policy. For example, parties that are defined as left-wing may be less prone to 
adopt IFRS compared to right wing, liberal parties In order to control for these political 
preferences, we include a measure for government partisanship (from the Database of 
Political Institutions). 
Variables definitions and sources are summarized in Table 3.1. 
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3.3.4 Sampling and estimation 
We test our hypotheses using a cross-national panel dataset on the adoption of IFRS in 182 
countries (World Bank universe) between 2002 and 2012. We focus on this period due to 
data availability and because very few IFRS adoptions were effective prior to this time. The 
unit of analysis is the country-year. Country is a natural choice for the cross-sectional unit 
in this study because the decision to adopt IFRS is typically made at the national level, and 
in most countries around the world national governments either directly govern or 
monitor/regulate capital markets. In our analysis, we drop all member countries of the 
European Union or EEA. These countries adopted IFRS collectively in 2005 (or later for the 
countries that joined the EU after 2005), as this decision was taken at the EU level and not 
on an individual country level. Consequently, the maximum number of countries in our 
sample diminishes with 27. In addition, depending on model specifications, additional 
countries may drop out due to data constraints.  
We are interested in the pattern of IFRS diffusion across the globe. We study the factors that 
explain the occurrence of IFRS adoption, the timing of the adoption across countries and the 
differences in the extent to which IFRS is adopted. Therefore, we first define IFRS adoption 
as a binary variable and employ a logistic model to analyse which factors affect the 
probability of the decision to adopt IFRS. Next, we run hazard regressions to investigate the 
effect of time on probability (hazard) of IFRS adoption. Since we do not have strong 
assumptions about the baseline hazard, we use the Cox proportionate hazard model.  Then, 
assuming that the extent of a countries’ IFRS adoption varies (e.g. countries may require use 
of IFRS for all companies or companies that meet specific criteria), we apply ordinal logistic 
regression analyses in order to see if the diffusion mechanisms affect the extent of adoption. 
In the main analyses, presented in Section 5, the models do not include domestic control 
variables. Instead, we cluster on a country level to control for country fixed effects.  The 
results for models including the domestic control variables are reported in the Robustness 
Checks part of Section 5. Moreover, the (ordinal) logistic models include year dummies to 
control for patterns over time.  
3.4 Findings 
What conditions lead to IFRS adoption? How are countries’ IFRS adoption decisions 
influenced by the international environment? We start with a comparison of the four 
diffusion mechanisms defined according to their primary definitions discussed in Section 4. 
We first run a separate logistic regression for each diffusion mechanism (Model A to D) and 
then rerun the model with all four diffusion variables combined (Model E). For the purpose 
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these model specifications, we translate the dependent variable into a binary format, where 
countries that require IFRS for some or all domestic companies score a 1 and all other score 
0. In these models year fixed effects are applied. Results are reported in Table 3.2. 
 
The findings provide support for three of the four diffusion mechanisms, with emulation 
providing the most pronounced results. Based on these results, it seems that countries’ 
decision to adopt IFRS is influenced by the ideas of the leading epistemic community, which 
we define as is the international professional auditor organization. The separate effect of 
Table 3.2 
Logistic regressions of IFRS status 
 
 
The table presents results from logistic regressions on the binary indicators for IFRS adoption (on a country 
level). Sample is based on country-year observations for the years 2002-2012, maximum sample size of 157 
countries (World Bank universe excluding EU/EEA members). Diffusion variables are as defined in Table 
3.1. All models include year indicators (results not reported).  Estimates are exponentiated coefficients (odds 
ratios). Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance of correlations at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels marked with ***, ** and * respectively. 
          
Diffusion mechanism Model A  Model B  Model C Model D  Model E  
         
Competition 
(IFRS policies among trade 
competitors) 3.153**    2.751 ** 
 (1.429)    (1.394)  
       
Learning  
(IFRS policies of close 
successful countries)   1.632**   1.470 * 
   (0.321)   (0.313)  
        
Coercion  
(IMF credits or foreign aid 
receiver)    0.899  0.685  
    (0.300)  (0.266)  
        
Emulation  
(Pro IFRS auditor body)     1.761 *** 1.686 *** 
     (0.199)  (0.206)  
         
year FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 1379  1311 1579 1519  1194  
Number of countries (clusters) 150  156 169 163  143  
Log pseudo likelihood -863.4  -807.3 -985.9 -861.3  -678.3  
Wald chi 48.59  48.40 49.23 57.25  58.70  
Degrees of freedom 10  9 10 10  12  
Pseudo R2 0.0397  0.0317 0.0254 0.1210  0.1183  
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emulation (Model D) is about the same as the effect net of competition, learning and coercion 
(Model E), in terms of size and significance of the odds ratio.  In addition, Table 3.2 provides 
evidence for diffusion driven by competition and by learning. These results are also 
consistent for the separate models (Model A and B respectively) and the combined model 
(Model E), although for learning the results are less significant in the combined model 
(significance drops from the 5% to the 10% level). Pressure from the IMF or World Bank 
does not seem to play a role in the decision to adopt IFRS. The odds ratio for the coercion 
mechanism is smaller than one (which is contrary to expectations) but not significant. The 
results from Table 3.2 strongly suggest that countries’ decisions to adopt IFRS are driven by 
other countries’ behaviour. The most pronounced effects on IFRS adoption come from 
competition and emulation. The odds that a country will adopt IFRS increase when IFRS is 
more common among the most important competitors. In addition, the decision is influenced 
by changing ideas, measured by the pro-IFRS ideas of professional auditors.  
 
Another way of looking at the IFRS adoption pattern is to focus on the factors that affect the 
timing of countries’ adoption decisions. This can be analysed by means of a survival 
analysis, or hazard model. In principle, every country can decide to require IFRS at any point 
in time. For as long as IFRS is not adopted, the possibility to do so next year remains. In 
other words: a country that has not adopted IFRS yet, is ‘at risk’ of adopting IFRS next year. 
Countries that do not adopt, ‘survive’ possible IFRS adoption. In order to apply survival 
analysis, we redefine the dependent variable as the number of years a country goes without 
adopting IFRS.  
As a first step, we determine the influence of the diffusion mechanisms on the risk of 
adopting IFRS over the years. To isolate the effect of each of the diffusion mechanisms, we 
determine the survival curves per diffusion variable using the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier 
estimator. Visualizing the survival rate helps to diagnose the effect of each of the 
mechanisms. We split the sample in two groups based on binary definitions of each the 
diffusion mechanisms. For this purpose, we apply binary definitions for each of the four 
diffusion mechanism variables. For competition, we split the sample on the median of the 
competition variable, dividing it in the 50% with the highest percentage of IFRS adoption 
among the most competing countries and the 50% with the lowest percentage of IFRS 
adoption among the most competing countries. The variable for diffusion by learning is 
already defined as a binary variable (splitting the sample based on whether economic success 
among the nearest IFRS adopters is higher compared to the IFRS adoption among the nearest 
non-adopters, or not). For coercion the variable is also defined as a dummy, indicating 
whether a country received IMF-credit and/or development aid. Emulation is operationalized 
as an indicator variable, which we limit to two possible outcomes for the purpose of the 
80_Erim_Koning_BW stand.job
80 Chapter 3  
 
 
survival curve, splitting the sample in countries with a professional auditors body affiliated 
with the pro-IFRS IFAC and countries that do not have such an auditors organization.  
Figure 3.2 plots the survival function curves (Kaplan-Meier estimates) conditioned on each 
of the diffusion variables consecutively.  
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The plots provide a first impression of the time to adoption of IFRS, contrasting countries 
that are expected to be affected by the diffusion mechanism to those that are not. Comparing 
Figure 3.2 
Survival curves conditioned on separate Diffusion Mechanisms 
 
The Figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, comparing survival curves when we split the sample in 
two based on a diffusion mechanism. For this purpose, the diffusion variables that have been defined in 
Table 3.1 are transformed into binary variables as follows: : 
• for the competition mechanism, we distinguish countries based on whether their main 
competitors  in terms of export markets and geographic proximity, have adopted IFRS or not,  
• for learning, we split the sample based on whether IFRS adopters among neighbouring countries 
are more successful (in terms of gdp growth and geographic proximity) than the neighbours that 
did not adopt IFRS; 
• for coercion  we compare countries that receive IMF credits and/or foreign aid from those that 
do not; and  
• for emulation we compare countries that have a professional auditors organization that has joined 
the IFAC from those that do not have such an auditors organization. 
Horizontal axes indicates the number of years passed. Vertical axes indicate the cumulative proportion that did 
not adopt IFRS (that is, the proportion that “survived”). 
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the survival curves, it is evident that the effect of emulation (Figure 3.2d) is the most 
pronounced. In fact, for countries that are subject to pro-IFRS ideas almost 50% would have 
adopted IFRS by the end of the sample period, while this is only 20% for the rest of the 
countries. Competition (Figure 3.2a) also has some effect, but learning and coercion do not 
seem to influence the pattern of IFRS adoption decisions. These results are in line with the 
results of the logistic regressions (Table 3.2).  
 
Next, we extend the survival analysis by modelling the data in a hazard model, allowing us 
to include several variables simultaneously. The definition of the dependent for the purpose 
of survival analysis is the number of years that a specific country does not adopt IFRS. The 
variables for the diffusion mechanisms are back to their original definition (specified in 
Table 3.1). Table 3.3 reports the hazard ratios for Cox proportional hazard regressions with 
similar specifications as the logistic regressions in Table 3.2. The hazard ratios can be 
interpreted as the effect on the odds of IFRS adoption associated with a one unit move on 
the dependent variable.. The hazard ratios are proportionate to the baseline hazard rate, 
which represents the risk of IFRS adoption when the values of the covariates are zero 
(relevant for Model E). Hazard ratios greater than one imply that a change in the variable 
raises the hazard of IFRS adoption or decreases the “time at risk” prior to adoption. When 
the estimated hazard ratio is less than one, it indicates that a change in the variable will 
negatively affect the hazard of IFRS adoption, or increase the “time at risk” prior to adoption. 
The regressions confirm the impressions from the survival curves. None of the hazard ratios 
are significant, except the hazard ratio for emulation. Countries are more at risk to adopt 
IFRS when the ideas about IFRS are positive, as measured by the pro-IFRS attitude of 
auditors. Potentially, our measurement of emulation based on expert groups promoting the 
idea of IFRS is in fact endogenous. Although this concern may be alleviated by the fact that 
the emulation variable is lagged by one unit, we are sensitive to these concerns and employ 
alternative definitions and measurements for emulation in the robustness checks section.  
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The results presented thus far all employ a binary definition of IFRS adoption, distinguishing 
countries that have adopted IFRS from those that have not. In reality, there is a wider 
variation in the way that jurisdictions relate to IFRS. Instead of either requiring IFRS or not, 
countries may also allow IFRS or require IFRS only for certain companies. In order to take 
this variation into account, we redefine the IFRS variable, allowing it to take on a value of 
0-4. For each country-year we code the IFRS implementation status based on the 
classifications used in the IASPlus database. IFRS status is 0 when a country has no policy 
Table 3.3 
Hazard regressions of IFRS status 
 
The table presents results from Cox proportional hazard regressions. Dependent variable is the number of 
years that a country goes by without adopting IFRS (i.e. the country “survives” the risk of IFRS adoption). 
Sample is based on country-year observations for the years 2002-2012, maximum sample size of 157 
countries (World Bank universe excluding EU/EEA members). Diffusion variables are as defined in Table 
3.1. All models include year indicators (results not reported).  Estimates are exponentiated coefficients 
(hazard ratios). Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance of correlations at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels marked with ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
Diffusion mechanism Model A Model B Model C Model D  Model E  
Competition 
(IFRS policies among trade 
competitors) 2.467     2.200  
 (1.462)     (1.351)  
        
Learning  
(IFRS policies of close 
successful countries)  1.039    0.942  
  (0.316)    (0.293)  
        
Coercion  
(IMF credits or foreign aid 
receiver)   1.251   0.949  
   (0.433)   (0.362)  
        
Emulation  
(Pro IFRS auditor body)    1.591 *** 1.652*** 
    (0.183)  (0.216) 
Number of observations 814 871 957 912  778  
Number of countries 
(clusters) 109 116 127 122  104  
Time at risk 815 872 958 913  779  
Log pseudo likelihood -183.2 -196.2 -209.6 -198.6  -168.5  
Wald chi 2.32 0.02 0.42 16.33  17.71  
Degrees of freedom 1 1 1 1  4  
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with respect to IFRS in a specific year. When IFRS is required for all firms in a country year, 
the IFRS status is 4. Appendix 1 provides more detailed information about the construction 
of the IFRS implementation status variable. Using the multi-level IFRS variable as 
dependent, we employ ordinary logistic regression in order to take the variation in the scope 
of IFRS adoption into account. Results are reported in Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4 
Ordinal logistic regressions of IFRS status  
           
The table presents results from ordinal logistic regressions on the multi-level indicators for IFRS adoption (on 
a country level). The dependent variable can take on values from 0-4 depending on the IFRS adoption status, 
where 0 is the lowest status (the country has no policy with respect to IFRS) and 4 is the highest (IFRS is 
required for all firms). The construction of the dependent variable is further explained in Appendix 1. Sample 
is based on country-year observations for the years 2002-2012, maximum sample size of 157 countries (World 
Bank universe excluding EU/EEA members). Diffusion variables are as defined in Table 3.1. All models 
include year indicators (results not reported).  Estimates are exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios). Robust, 
clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance of correlations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels marked 
with ***, ** and * respectively. 
           
Diffusion mechanism Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E  
           
Competition 
(IFRS policies among 
trade competitors) 3.530 ***       2.912 ** 
 (1.406)        (1.282)  
           
Learning (IFRS policies 
of close successful 
countries)   1.441 **     1.362 * 
   (0.259)      (0.253)  
           
Coercion (IMF credits or 
foreign aid receiver)     0.640 *   0.553 * 
     (0.169)    (0.172)  
           
Emulation (Pro IFRS 
auditor body)       1.364 *** 1.291 *** 
       (0.117)  (0.119)  
           
year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 1379  1311  1579  1519  1194  
Number of countries 
(clusters) 150  156  169  163  143  
Log pseudo likelihood -1510.7  -1504.4  -1836.0  -1698.0  -1255.2  
Wald chi 60.98  55.55  60.13  62.92  65.09  
Degrees of freedom 10  9  10  10  12  
Pseudo R2 0.0319  0.0186  0.0220  0.0423  0.0544  
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In this specification, the results are very similar to the logistic regressions reported in Table 
3.2. The results are stronger, in the sense that Table 3.4 reports significant results for all four 
diffusion mechanisms. The odds ratios are significant in the separate Models A-D and in the 
combined Model E. The odds ratio for coercion however, is smaller than 1, suggesting that 
the odds of adopting IFRS decrease when countries are dependent on the World Bank/IMF. 
This is in line with the results from the logistic analysis, although the odds ratio for coercion 
in the logistic models is not significant. Model E in Table 3.4 confirms that the emulation 
has the strongest positive influence on the odds of adopting IFRS.  
 
 
Robustness checks 
Throughout our models, we use one empirical definition for each diffusion mechanism. This 
may raise concerns with respect to the sensitivity of our results to these particular definitions. 
Specifically, we check whether the results for competition and emulation are robust to other 
operationalizations of the concept. For competition we construct an alternative measure 
based on a different type of competition. Arguably, in the case of IFRS, countries are 
competing for capital from investors rather than for trade and that our measure should reflect 
this. To address this concern, we identify an alternative measure for competition driven 
diffusion based more directly on capital market competition. From an investor perspective 
countries compete for capital based on the country’s risk profile. Investors with a certain risk 
preference will compare countries within the same risk class.  Hence, when deciding to adopt 
IFRS driven by competition-based arguments, a country will compare itself to countries with 
the same risk rating. To capture this, we use the overall country risk measure from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit. This risk measure is determined annually for 119 countries and 
is calculated as the average of the ratings for sovereign risk, currency risk and banking sector 
risk. For each country, we determine the average IFRS adoption within its risk class, per 
year. 
Also for emulation, we operationalize the concept differently. In this case, we construct two 
alternative measures: a measure for emulation based on geographic proximity and a measure 
based on administrative proximity. Both proximity measures are based on the distance 
measures from Berry et al. (2010), where geographic distance is defined as the great circle 
distance between two countries and administrative distance combines measures for colonial 
ties, common religion and legal system. For both measures, we calculate emulation as the 
fraction of IFRS adoption across the most nearby countries. We run logistic models 
including the alternatively defined diffusion variables. The results in Table 3.5 are in line 
with our original estimates.  
 
86_Erim_Koning_BW stand.job
86 Chapter 3  
 
 
 
Model A introduces the alternative definition for competition, based on countries’ perceived 
risk. We see that the results are similar to the effect of trade competition that we reported in 
our original model specifications. Higher IFRS adoption rates among countries with a 
Table 3.5 
Logistic regressions of IFRS status, alternative measurement of main diffusion 
mechanisms 
 
The table presents results from logistic regressions on the binary indicators for IFRS adoption (on a country 
level). Sample is based on country-year observations for the years 2002-2012, maximum sample size of 157 
countries (World Bank universe excluding EU/EEA members). Diffusion variables are as defined in Table 3.1, 
specifically we use the alternative definitions for the diffusion mechanisms Competition and Emulation. All 
models include year indicators (results not reported).  Estimates are exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios). 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance of correlations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
marked with ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 
Diffusion mechanism Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
Competition           
IFRS policies among 
capital market 
competitors 8.881 *     10.18 ** 5.305 
 
 (10.62)      (11.27)  (5.945)  
Emulation           
IFRS policies among 
geographic neighbours   5.057 ***   6.716 ***  
 
   (2.574)    (4.878)    
          
 
IFRS policies among 
countries with 
administrative similarities     6.499 ***   6.061 
 
 
*
 
     (4.442)    (5.985)  
Learning           
IFRS policies of close, 
successful countries       1.272  1.624 
 
*
 
       (0.292)  (0.406)  
Coercion           
IMF credits or foreign aid 
receiver       0.969  0.959 
 
       (0.404)  (0.409)  
          
year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 931  1310  1470  808  799  
Number of countries 
(clusters) 102  156  158  98  97 
 
Log pseudo likelihood -606.5  -784.8  -898.2  -494.3  -504.1  
Wald chi 44.83  44.12  52.97  40.93  42.75  
Degrees of freedom 10  9  10  12  12  
Pseudo R2 0.0493  0.0574  0.0496  0.0990  0.0687  
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similar risk profile (that therefore compete for investors with the same risk preferences), 
increase the probability of IFRS adoption.  
For alternative definitions of emulation, the results remain roughly the same. Emulation 
based on geographic or administrative proximity seems to positively affect the probability 
of IFRS adoption. Both definitions of emulation remain significant when included in a model 
with the other diffusion mechanisms (Model D and E). 
 
Next we expand the model from Table 3.2 by including domestic factors. We start with a 
stripped down model, which tries to explain the probability of IFRS adoptions with domestic 
factors only. This represents the most fundamental alternative explanation to policy 
diffusion, namely that policy decisions are driven by domestic characteristics only. We 
include six proxies for country characteristics that may influence the probability of adopting 
IFRS, as discussed in Section 4. Model A in Table 3.6 reports the results for the logistic 
regression with domestic factors only. In Model B we expand the model by first introducing 
competition, since this is the most often cited motivation to adopt IFRS. In Model C-E we 
add the alternative diffusion mechanisms one by one; hence Model E includes all diffusion 
variables.  
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Table 3.6 
Logistic regressions of IFRS status, including domestic factors 
           
The table presents results from logistic regressions on the binary indicators for IFRS adoption (on a country 
level). Sample is based on country-year observations for the years 2002-2012, maximum sample size of 157 
countries (World Bank universe excluding EU/EEA members). Diffusion variables and domestic variables are 
as defined in Table 3.1. All models include year indicators (results not reported).  Estimates are exponentiated 
coefficients (odds ratios). Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance of correlations at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels marked with ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
Diffusion mechanism/ 
Domestic factors Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E  
Competition 
 
 3.919 ** 3.668 ** 3.656 ** 3.520 ** 
(IFRS policies among 
trade competitors) 
  (2.152)  (1.999)  (2.013)  (2.120)  
           
Learning     1.327  1.266  1.248  
(IFRS policies of close 
successful countries)     
(0.333)  (0.309)  (0.315) 
 
           
Coercion       0.602  0.612  
(IMF credits or foreign 
aid receiver)       
(0.282)  (0.319) 
 
           
Emulation         1.500 *** 
(Pro IFRS auditor body)         (0.207)  
           
Domestic factors           
GDP Growth 1.002  0.999  0.998  1.004  1.008  
 (0.0257)  (0.0259)  (0.0251)  (0.0251)  (0.0278)  
           
Crosslisting in EU 0.960  1.028  0.992  0.992  1.010  
 (0.326)  (0.364)  (0.358)  (0.358)  (0.372)  
           
FDI inflows/GDP 1.038  1.034  1.032  1.034  1.037  
 (0.0300)  (0.0310)  (0.0305)  (0.0307)  (0.0309)  
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The results reported in Table 3.6 suggest that none of the domestic factors significantly 
influences the odds of a country’s decision to adopt IFRS.  This is consistent across Models 
A-E. This finding supports the notion that countries’ policy decisions are not taken based on 
domestic affairs only. The behaviour of competing countries is influential, with consistent 
significant results across model specifications. More importantly, the results from the 
analysis of the model specifications excluding domestic factors (Table 3.2) are unaffected, 
in the sense that Table 3.6 also reports significant odds ratio’s for two diffusion mechanisms: 
competition and emulation. When the adoption rate among competitors increases (by one 
unit), the odds of IFRS adoption increase by a factor 3. Incremental to the inclusion of other 
diffusion variables, the effect of emulation is most evident. The size of the effect is smaller 
than for competition (with an increase in the odds by a factor 1.5), although comparing the 
size of the effects is complicated because of the different scales of the underlying variables. 
Although the results for competition and emulation are robust, the results for learning 
Table 3.6 (continued) 
Logistic regressions of IFRS status, including domestic factors 
           
Diffusion mechanism/ 
Domestic factors Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E  
Imports/ GDP 0.995  0.998  0.999  1.000  1.000  
 (0.00734)  (0.00783)  (0.00798)  (0.00858)  (0.0103)  
           
Quality of Government 0.581  0.654  0.660  0.706  0.646  
 (0.222) (0.275) (0.283)  (0.305)  (0.278)  
           
Partisanship 
Government 
0.931  0.956  0.941  0.955  0.921  
 (0.107)  (0.113)  (0.113)  (0.115)  (0.115)  
           
year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number observations 888  786  782  782  782  
Number of countries 
(clusters) 
134  128 
 
 127  127  127  
Log pseudo likelihood -547.6  -486.6  -480.4  -477.4  -456.1  
Wald chi 31.72  28.66  30.71  31.66  34.97  
Degrees of freedom 14  14  15  16  17  
Pseudo R2 0.0403  0.0505  0.0549  0.0609  0.1028  
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disappear upon the inclusion of the domestic factors. For the fourth diffusion mechanism, 
coercion, we find no significant results in this model specification, which is similar to the 
findings for models without domestic factors (reported in Table 3.2). 
As a final robustness check, to alleviate concerns that results are biased by the effect that 
one diffusion variable may have on another diffusion variable when include in the same 
model, we run logistic regressions for interactions of all pairs of diffusion variables. The 
(not tabulated) results are very similar to the reported results.  
3.5 Conclusions 
Within the international relations literature, evidence has been building that international 
diffusion plays an important role in the timing and spread of financial liberalization policies. 
Within the international financial reporting literature however, this class of explanations has 
been overlooked. The adoption of IFRS by the majority of countries during the past decade 
has been explained by the economic benefits individual countries expect to gain. This paper 
shows that the economic, domestic explanation is incomplete. There are good reasons to 
believe that countries are sensitive to adoption decisions by neighbouring countries. 
Countries may be neighbours from distinct perspectives, and depending on the nature of the 
ties we measure proximity differently. Countries may be close competitors, close geographic 
neighbours or they may share cultural roots or norms. Based on whether the policy change 
is induced by changing ideas or changing incentives and whether countries strive for 
legitimacy or utility, we identify four diffusion mechanisms: competition, learning, coercion 
and emulation. Across all model specifications and variable definitions, we find evidence of 
emulation as a driving force behind the adoption of IFRS. The changing ideas of a 
government about IFRS increase the odds that IFRS will be adopted. Ideas may change 
influenced by the national accountancy organizations, who are committed by the 
international accountants organization to actively promote IFRS. Alternatively, 
governments may accept IFRS as the norm because neighbouring countries (geographically 
or culturally) already adopted IFRS. These mechanisms of diffusion appear incrementally to 
the effect of competition (defined as the average IFRS adoption across close trade 
competitors). In addition, we found some evidence that governments learn from the success 
of others. In these cases, odds of IFRS adoption are higher when IFRS adopting neighbours 
are more successful. We found no evidence for coercion to be a driving force behind IFRS 
adoption, in the sense that the odds that a country adopts IFRS are not significantly affected 
by pressure from powerful international institutions (IMF and World Bank).  
Domestic factors performed weakly. This is contrary to widely held beliefs that governments 
take the decision to adopt IFRS primarily based on specific national circumstances. Again, 
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this emphasizes that we need to broaden our perspective on IFRS adoption. Policy decisions 
cannot be explained by domestic country characteristics alone. 
Essentially, this study adds two main points to our understanding of the worldwide adoption 
of IFRS. First, we cannot understand the pace and pattern of IFRS adoption without a 
conjoint model of domestic and international influences. Second, the diffusion of IFRS is 
not simply induced by the globalization of markets. Adoption decisions are clearly 
influenced by the acceptance of IFRS as the norm. This influence is consistent and 
incremental to the effect of competition. As such, the worldwide adoption of IFRS reflects 
the global spread of an idea.  
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Appendix 3.1 Collection and construction of the dependent 
variable IFRS status 
This appendix describes the construction and coding of the dependent variable in some more 
detail. We collect data on the adoption per jurisdiction over the period 2002 till 2012. This 
period is chosen for 2 reasons: 
 
1. Before 2002, only few IFRS (or IAS as they were named at that time) took place. 
This is probably related to the changes that took place with respect to the IASB. 
The status of the IASB and IFRS changed dramatically during 2001. The IASB in 
its current form was constituted during 2001. The new organizational structure was 
changed in order to increase its independence and hence it legitimacy as an 
international standard setter. In the same period, the IASB increased the intensity 
with which it was working to improve its accounting standards. Also, in 2002 the 
European Union announced its intention to adopt IFRS in 2005, augmenting the 
legitimacy of IFRS considerably.  
2. Most of the data with respect to IFRS/IAS adoptions start in 2002, most likely for 
reasons similar to the ones stated under point 1. 
 
We base our IFRS variable on several data sources. We do so in order to augment the 
reliability of the data and in order to increase coverage and include as many countries as 
possible. In social sciences, the convergence of multiple data sources in order to corroborate 
the data is known as triangulation42 (Denzin, 1978). 
 
Below, the sources (including websites, as visited for our data collection) are listed.  
1. IAS plus (Deloitte) history from 2002-2012: 
http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm 
2. EY IFRS implementation (based on a 2010 survey): 
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/IFRS/IFRS-Status-of-implementation-by-
country 
3. PWC IFRS per country (based on a 2011 survey) 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/issues/ifrs-reporting/country-adoption 
                                                          
42
 This definition is consistent with The Encyclopedia of research design (Salkind, 2010, p.1510). Like most 
researchers, the encyclopedia refers to Norman Denzin, the author of the book “The act of research” from 1978, 
who defined the concept of triangulation. 
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4. Reconstruction of IFRS adoption per country, produced by the IFRS Adoption 
Research Group at Simon Fraser University, Canada: http://www.adoptifrs.org/ 
5. IAS plus (Deloitte) updates per country:  
http://www.iasplus.com/en/jurisdictions  
http://www.iasplus.com/en/resources/use-of-ifrs 
6. IMF/World Bank Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs): 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc.html 
http://www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx 
  
We start off with the historical data from the IASPlus websites (source 1) (based on older 
versions of the website and yearly editions of the “IFRS in your pocket publications” by 
Deloitte, that publish the same tables) and code the data per jurisdiction year. Although the 
information on the IASPLus website is presented in a table format, it is accompanied by 
many footnotes. So coding the IASPlus information includes the interpretation of the 
additional information presented in the extensive footnotes. Then we check the initial 
coding, corroborating it with the other data sources, and expand the data by carefully reading 
and combining the rest of the sources. 
To construct the IFRS variable, we code the information about the IFRS adoption per 
jurisdiction per year, for domestic companies (listed and unlisted companies separately) and 
for the IFRS implementation status. We distinguish 5 categories of IFRS (non) adoption, 
based on classifications used in the IASplus data. The categories are: 
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We apply this coding scheme as straightforward as possible, applying a very broad 
understanding of IFRS adoption. Since we are interested in the decisions governments make 
with respect to the acceptance of the standards produced by the IASB, we include many 
different types of IFRS adoption. When a country explicitly refers to its accounting standards 
as IFRS’s, it is coded as IFRS adoption. Although we do acknowledge that there is variety 
in the rigor with and the extent to which countries adopt IFRS, we do not try to distinguish 
between countries that have adapted the standards, countries that do not update the standards 
in a timely manner and countries that incorporate the standards as issued by the IASB 
immediately. The primary focus of our study is on the process (the flow of adoption 
decisions across countries) rather than on the outcome (the quality of the IFRS adoption). 
For this purpose, the IFRS adoption measure should reflect a country’s decision to use IFRS 
as its accounting standards, regardless of the quality of the implementation of the adoption 
decision. Moreover, the interpretation and coding of the type of adoption would require 
substantial interpretation. Hence, we choose to code the IFRS variable as clean as possible. 
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Chapter 4   
Auditor selection and IPO underpricing43 
4.1 Introduction 
In this paper we examine the factors that affect the demand for auditing at the time of an 
initial public offering (IPO). The audit of financial information plays an important role in 
the functioning of financial markets. Audited financial reports are perceived as more credible 
and hence help to alleviate information asymmetry problems.  At the time of an IPO, 
information asymmetry problems are particularly present and therefore the demand for 
external assurance of financial reporting information is more pronounced. Moreover, the 
change in the ownership structure of the issuing firm affects the demand for monitoring. In 
this setting, it is important for the issuing firm to select an auditor that will provide the 
appropriate quality level of audit services. The high incidence of auditor switches prior to 
an IPO illustrates the notion that the selection of an appropriate auditor is taken seriously by 
issuing firms. We exploit these circumstances to study the drivers of auditor selection.  
The literature on the demand for differential audit quality draws on signalling and agency 
theories, and on the insurance role of auditors. Several theories suggest that the demand for 
auditing is driven by incentives to reduce information asymmetry and, hence, potential 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Reputable auditors help to mitigate these 
problems by credibly certifying the information (e.g. financial statements, prospectuses) that 
allows stakeholders to estimate future prospects of the firm and to monitor the actions of 
managers. Based on these theories, we expect issuing firms with higher ex-ante uncertainty 
to have an increased demand for high-quality auditors. In addition, the degree of the issuing 
firms’ agency conflicts will affect the demand for audit services. Related to the certification 
role is the insurance role of auditors.  Auditors are liable for irregularities in the audited 
reports and may be required to indemnify the losses of stakeholders resulting from these 
                                                          
43
 This chapter is based on a working paper by Koning, M., Roosenboom, P.G. J. and Mertens, G.M.H. (2013b, 
unpublished).  
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irregularities. The insurance role of auditors would lead to a demand for higher audit quality 
in case of more risky offers. 
We examine the demand for audit services in a sample of 728 U.K. firms that went public 
on the London Stock Exchange in the years 1995-2003. The study is set in the U.K. because 
of the principal institutional features in two areas: the audit market and the financial 
reporting requirements. First, the market for audit services in the U.K. is relatively dynamic 
and competitive as compared to other countries. While in many countries the audit market 
is dominated by the large international audit firms, the U.K. audit market is characterized by 
a more dispersed market share across audit firms of different sizes. Second, in the U.K. both 
public and private companies are required to file audited annual reports. This means that 
firms that go public already have a history of disclosing financial information, while in other 
countries the prospectus is the first publicly available financial report. Moreover, since all 
financial statements must be audited, firms already have an auditor before they decide to go 
public. This affects the level of information asymmetry at the time of an IPO. In addition, it 
affects auditor selection dynamics at the time of an IPO since breaking a longer term auditor-
client engagement is costly. The combination of these features of the audit market and 
financial reporting requirements provides the opportunity to increase our understanding of 
auditor selection and the role of audit quality in the IPO process. 
Since our sample period includes the years in which the dotcom bubble took place (1999 
and 2000), we analyse the dynamics of this period separately. Ritter & Welch (2002) argue 
that despite the large list of theoretical reasons to go public, evidence supports only two: 
favourable market conditions or the stage of the firm’s life cycle. We expect different auditor 
choices depending on what motivated the decisions to go public. In case of an optimistic 
market, we expect incentives to be different. As a consequence, the determinants of auditor 
choices may be different and the subsequent effect on underpricing is potentially altered. 
Turning to our results, we find that auditor selection is affected by the issuing firms’ demand 
for certification (driven by signalling or monitoring) and insurance. Loss making firms are 
more likely to have a larger audit firm at the time of an IPO, or to switch to a larger audit 
firm if they did not already have one. This is in line with higher demand for certification 
when the uncertainty of future prospects is higher. The choice for a higher quality auditor at 
the time of an IPO is also associated with the firm’s ownership structure. In line with lower 
monitoring costs, firms are less likely to appoint a Big 4 auditor when insider ownership 
stakes are larger.  Instead, issuing firms are more likely to choose a mid-tier audit firm when 
insiders hold a larger part of the shares prior to going public.  For the insurance role of 
auditors, we find that more risky offers are associated with lower quality auditors. This result 
may be driven by the supply of high quality audits instead of the demand. More specifically, 
IPO’s with higher litigation risk may not be eligible for more reputable audit firms. In that 
sense, the finding is consistent with the insurance role of auditors.  
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In addition to the auditor selection analysis, we analyse the effect of the auditor selection of 
the IPO firm on the first day returns (underpricing). Since underpricing is commonly seen 
as a performance measure for IPOs, this allows us to evaluate auditor selection in relation to 
the IPO. Contrary to expectations based on the certification hypothesis, we find that 
choosing a big or mid-size auditor to audit the prospectus increases underpricing. When an 
IPO firm has a higher quality audit firm after a recent upward switch, the increasing effect 
on initial returns is mitigated. This suggests that switching to higher quality auditor prior to 
the IPO is perceived as a stronger certification signal than the quality of the incumbent 
auditor.  Moreover, this finding is driven by the bubble years (1999-2000) in our sample and 
may therefore be distorted by the behaviour of overoptimistic investors (who may cause 
higher than expected initial returns).  In addition, it is consistent with the insurance role of 
auditors. During the hot market period, lower quality firms go public and seek higher quality 
auditors. Reputable audit firms are more willing to accept risky clients in bubble years. In 
the no-bubble years, the auditor selection doesn’t seem to matter for underpricing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature on 
auditor selection and underpricing. Section 3 describes the sample and provides some results 
from univariate tests, while section 4 presents the main results from multivariate tests. 
Section 5 discusses some sensitivities of the main analyses and offers some robustness 
checks. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
4.2 Literature review: of auditor selection and underpricing 
Firms’ demand for audit quality arises from incentives to reduce information asymmetries.  
IPOs can give rise to particularly severe information asymmetry problems. First, since an 
IPO leads to more dispersed ownership it will aggravate agency problems (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Second, information asymmetries between current owners and uninformed 
investors lead to the risk of adverse selection (Rock, 1986).  Audit quality can play a role 
reducing these problems. Several studies suggest that reputable auditors have incentives to 
supply high-quality information about the issuing firm, thereby helping resolve information 
asymmetries of IPO firms (e.g. De Angelo, 1981; Titman and Trueman, 1986). According 
to this certification function, the reputational capital of audit firms serves as a bonding 
mechanism, committing them to provide high quality information44.   In addition, auditors 
                                                          
44
 High quality audit may reduce information asymmetry by providing 1) more accurate information (Beatty, 1989); 
or 2) more information, either private information from the owners or the information content of the auditor report 
itself. 
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play an insurance role since they are at risk for litigation and substantial fines in case of audit 
failure.  
Analysing auditor selection at the time of an IPO places our study against the back drop of 
the vast underpricing literature. Underpricing is the difference between the closing price of 
the shares on the first trading day and the price at which the IPO’s shares were initially 
offered45. A common assumption in the underpricing literature is that issuing firms try to 
maximize the gross proceeds of the IPO (Chambers and Dimson, 2009). From the 
perspective of the issuing firm, underpricing is an opportunity cost in the sense that the 
market was apparently willing to pay more for the shares than the firm actually raised (the 
firm ‘left money on the table’).  Underpricing is a very common phenomenon for IPOs 
internationally, although the differences across countries are substantial (Ritter, 2003; 
Ljungqvist et al., 2003). Average underpricing in the U.K. over the period 1959-2001 is 17.4 
% (Ritter, 2003), but there are substantial fluctuations over the years.  Most notably during 
the dotcom bubble (during 1999 and 2000) considerably higher average underpricing is 
reported (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Ljunqvist and Wilhelm, 2003)46.  
Although the concept of underpricing is straightforward, the explanation as to what 
determines the extent of underpricing is more ambiguous.  Several review papers provide an 
overview of the explanations for underpricing (e.g. Ritter and Welch, 2002; Ljunqvist, 2007; 
Ritter, 2011) and describe the developments in this literature over time. Traditionally, many 
explanations focus on information asymmetries that arise when a firm goes public. In order 
to compensate the uninformed investors for their adverse selection risk, issuers decide to 
underprice the offered shares (Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986). In general, the greater 
the ex-ante risk related to the IPO (firm risk or specific characteristics of the deal), the higher 
the IPO underpricing.  The extent to which an IPO firm should underprice the offer can be 
reduced if the firm can signal its higher quality.  For instance, firms can seek high quality 
advisers (underwriter, auditor, legal advisers) that will serve as a signal of firm value. The 
involvement of prestigious intermediaries in the IPO process serves as a certification of the 
quality of the issue. The role of the auditor in IPOs has been studied from the certification 
perspective. Datar et al. (1991) formally show that IPOs can signal quality by setting the 
optimal auditor choice and level of retained ownership. Copley and Douthett (2002) provide 
                                                          
45
 The terms ‘underpricing’ and ‘initial returns’ are used interchangeably in the literature.  
46
 Average underpricing percentage for the U.K. as reported by Ritter (2003). The U.K. average is close to the U.S 
average reported over the same period of 16.8%. In our sample, as reported later in the paper, the overall average 
underpricing is 22.7%, which is higher than the 17.4% reported by Ritter (2003) due to the relative impact of the 
dotcom years. In our sample, the mean underpricing for 1999 is 40.5% and for 2000 42.7%. For the dotcom bubble 
years, Loughran and Ritter (2004) find an average underpricing in the U.S. of 65%. International comparatives 
available on http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
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empirical evidence for the jointly chosen auditor and retained ownership. In an early paper, 
Beatty (1989) reports evidence that higher auditor reputation is associated with lower 
underpricing levels. That does not imply that the highest quality auditor is always the best 
choice in case of an IPO. A lower level auditor may be optimal if that is what the market 
expects (Willenborg, 1999) or if that optimizes total IPO costs (Hogan, 1997).  
For underwriters, this certification role has been studied extensively. The findings are 
however sensitive to the period studied. Until the 1980s, more prestigious underwriters were 
associated with lower underpricing, but since then the sign has flipped (Beatty and Welch, 
1996). The debate as to what explains this change has sparked new perspectives on 
underpricing. More recent models explicitly take into account the incentives of the owners 
to explain the level of underpricing. These models assume that owners care for underpricing 
only to the extent that they potentially lose from it, or as Habib and Ljungqvist (2001, p.434) 
put it: “Some IPOs are more underpriced than others because their owners have less reason 
to care about underpricing.” The issuers can affect the level of underpricing by the choices 
they make in the IPO process with respect to hiring a more reputable the investment bank, 
law firm or auditor. Top tier advisers will increase direct cost of the issue because of higher 
fees47 but will lower expected underpricing. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that the net 
effect of the owners’ incentives is affected by the extent to which the owners will participate 
in the secondary market and the fraction of new shares that will be issued (the dilutive effect 
of the issue). In a formal model, they demonstrate that promotion cost of an IPO will increase 
with the participation ratio and the dilution factor. For underpricing they show negative 
relation with the participation ratio and an inconclusive relation with the dilution factor. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) analyse the extremely high underpricing in the bubble years 
1999 and 2000 from an ownership incentive perspective and find that the underpricing in 
the dotcom bubble was at least partially explained by changes in ownership. Their prediction 
that initial returns will be larger when ownership is more dispersed and insider hold smaller 
stakes is known as the realignment of incentives hypothesis. A group of pre-IPO owners that 
has been subject to several researches is the venture capitalists (VC).  Previous studies find 
evidence suggesting that backing by venture capitalists reduces underpricing (e.g. 
Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Chang et al., 2009), consistent with the expectation that ex-
ante uncertainty is reduced when an IPO is backed by a VC (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003).  
The more recent literature on what determines underpricing potentially shed more light on 
the role of the auditor at the time of an IPO. We distinguish three main classes of 
determinants of auditor selection and underpricing as follows: 1. Firm risk characteristics, 
                                                          
47
 Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) call these costs the promotion costs of going public. Total promotion costs include 
not only the fees paid but also the cost of road shows, listing fees and so on. 
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2. Ownership characteristics; and 3. IPO deal characteristics. A more detailed discussion of 
the variables that we identify in each class is provided in section 3. 
4.3 Sample and Data, descriptive evidence 
4.3.1 IPO firms  
The dataset consists of 728 U.K. IPO firms during the period from January 1995 to 
December 2003.  The IPO firms are identified from Thomson Financial and the London 
Stock Exchange New Issue file. We exclude transfers between market segments, and 
introductions without raising capital, financial companies, investment funds and foreign-
incorporated firms. For each IPO firm we collect financial statement information (as 
published in the prospectuses) and the name of audit firm that audited financial statements 
prior to the IPO from the FAME database (Bureau Van Dijk) and IPO prospectuses obtained 
from Thomson Research. For 728 firms we obtain the IPO prospectuses and hand-collect 
the names of the audit firm that signed off the prospectus and that acted as reporting 
accountant for the IPO. The pre and post IPO shares held by several board members, CEOs 
and venture capitalists are collected from the IPO prospectuses. First-day trading prices, 
FTSE market returns are taken from Datastream. 
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample by year. Panel 1 summarizes the 
characteristics of the IPO firms across the sample years. Similarly to Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003) we test whether the changes over the years reveal a significant time trend. 
For most characteristics, the time trend is significant. The number of IPOs per year varies, 
with three years of over a 100 IPOs. IPO frequency peaked in 2000, with 168 IPOs 
accounting for 23% of our sample. The median age of the IPO firms at the year of the 
introduction is 7 years. Again the year 2000 stands out with the youngest IPO firms with 
median (average) age of four (five) years. Overall, IPO firms have become younger and 
smaller over the sample period. The average (median) age at issue (significantly) declines 
over our sample period from 37 (14) years in 1995 to 9 (5) years in 2003. This is consistent 
with U.K. data documented by Ljungqvist (2003) and similar to the pattern in the U.S. 
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Median book values of assets 
dropped from $21.7 million in 1995 to $2.4 million in 2003.  In line with this, the median 
proceeds declined from $14.3 to $5.4 million. Median underpricing does not change 
significantly on an annual time trend. The year 2000 has highest average underpricing of 
42.7%, compared to an average of 22.7% over the entire sample. The statistics for that year 
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are heavily influenced by one extreme observation, with an underpricing of 1,166.7%48. 
Excluding this observation, the average underpricing for 2000 is 36.0%.  The years 1999 
and 2000 stand out in terms of average underpricing, which is in line with the so-called 
dotcom bubble during those years.   
                                                          
48
 The extreme observation is Forbidden Technologies plc, an introduction on the Alternative Investment Market 
early 2000 at an offer price of 22.5 pence and a price of 285 pence by the end of the first trading day, resulting in 
1166.7% underpricing. The price rose even more during the days thereafter, reaching 925 pence closing price at 
day five. 
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample consists of 728 IPO firms in the U.K. in the years 1995-2003. Included in the sample are all equity 
introductions for companies that did not have a listing before on the London Stock Exchange’s Official List 
(OL) and Alternative Investment Market (AIM). All currencies are translated into U.S. dollar ($) exchange 
rates on the IPO date. Panel 1 depicts the frequency and the mean and median (p50) of the characteristics of 
the IPO firms and the issue itself. Age at IPO in years is the IPO year minus the year operations commenced, 
as identified in the prospectus. Assets are book values as reported in the financial statements in the prospectus. 
Proceeds are the gross proceeds and equal the offer price times the number of shares sold. Underpricing is 
defined as the first-day closing price divided by the offer price, minus one. Panel 2 reports the auditors that 
are appointed at the time of the IPO by the issuer. We partition the audit sector in three different segments 
(Big, Mid and Small audit firms) based on their relative sizes. The identities of reporting accountants (auditor 
at IPO) are hand-collected from the prospectuses. Frequencies are the number of times (percentage) that an 
audit firm is identified as the reporting accountant for an IPO, calculated within sample. Upward switches 
occur if the reporting accountant at the IPO is from a higher segment than the auditor that audited the financial 
statements of the firm before the IPO. For each of the characteristics in Panel A and B, we test if the year by 
year changes are significant. We regress each characteristic separately on the annual year time trend t and 
report significance level for the estimated coefficient for t at the bottom row of the Table (using OLS and 
median regressions for trends in means and medians respectively and logit regressions for trends in binary 
variables). We use ***,** and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-sided) respectively 
and – to indicate lack of significance  
 
Panel A. IPO firms and Deal characteristics 
 
 
  IPO Firm characteristics Deal characteristics 
Year IPO Age at IPO (years) Assets (in $mln) 
Proceeds (in 
$mln) Underprcing % 
 
N mean median mean median mean median mean  median 
          
1995 57 37 14 74.4 21.7 55.6 14.3 14.7 8.0 
1996 145 23 10 200.2 9.8 79.5 10.6 14.6 12.5 
1997 112 26 12 115.8 8.7 50.3 11.1 12.8 10.9 
1998 61 22 10 93.7 15.4 82.8 12.1 17.6 12.4 
1999 49 16 7 68.9 7.7 94.5 9.7 40.5 20.3 
2000 168 5 4 26.3 2.1 55.7 13.6 42.7 11.6 
2001 59 11 5 13.4 1.7 24.3 3.3 16.6 10.0 
2002 42 21 5 157.3 4.2 88.8 6.7 10.9 6.7 
2003 35 9 5 67.0 2.4 61.0 5.4 13.0 8.6 
          
All years 728 18 7 95.5 5.4 64.1 10.0 22.7 11.0 
Trend  Neg*** Neg*** Neg* Neg** _ Neg*** Pos** _ 
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Panel B. Auditor  Selection 
 
  Audit firm selection at IPO 
Year IPO Big audit firm 
Mid-size audit 
firm 
Small audit 
firm Upward switches 
 
N N % IPO N % IPO N % IPO # % IPO 
          
1995 57 41 71.9 7 12.3 9 15.8 11 19.3 
1996 145 92 63.4 35 24.1 18 12.4 36 24.8 
1997 112 69 61.6 30 26.8 13 11.6 34 30.4 
1998 61 43 70.5 14 23.0 6.6 8 13.1 
1999 49 22 44.9 22 44.9 5 10.2 13 26.5 
2000 168 92 54.8 57 33.9 19 11.3 27 16.1 
2001 59 23 39.0 26 44.1 10 16.9 7 11.9 
2002 42 22 52.4 13 31.0 7 16.7 5 11.9 
2003 35 14 40.0 13 37.1 8 22.9 3 8.6 
          
All years 728 418 57.4 217 29.8 93 12.8 144 19.8 
Trend  Neg***  Pos***    Neg***  
 
 
4.3.2 Audit firm selection 
The literature on audit services during IPOs is based on the demand for certification, which 
will vary depending on IPO characteristics. But preceding the certification theory is the 
presumption that there is variation in audit quality. Although actual quality of the performed 
audit is unobservable, there is a large body of theoretical and empirical evidence that 
suggests that the level of audit quality is higher for larger audit firms. Several theories have 
been proposed to explain the association between the size of an audit firm and audit quality. 
DeAngelo (1981) argues that larger audit firms have more technical capabilities and more 
resources to detect misstatements and that larger audit firms will be able to operate more 
independently from their clients (and independent auditors are assumed to perform better 
audits). Moreover, larger audit firms have more reputational capital that they want to protect, 
which provides an incentive to perform high quality audits.  A vast body of empirical 
research on audit quality supports the theory that audit quality is related to the size of the 
audit firm. Most importantly, the 4 largest audit firms (the Big 4) are often regarded as the 
highest quality segment. Assuming that audit firms can be divided in different quality 
segments, we can distinguish switches to another firm within the segment and switches to a 
firm in another segment. Switches within a segment do not affect the audit quality level and 
106_Erim_Koning_BW stand.job
106 Chapter 4  
 
 
are therefore more likely to be driven by the auditor-client relation. In contrast, switches to 
another segment change the quality of the auditor and can be explained by signalling theory 
and the information role of the auditor.  
The outcome of the audit firm selection process is disclosed in the IPO prospectus, which 
includes a signed auditor’s report. In any case, this reveals the auditor choice of the IPO 
firm. It may be though that the auditor of the prospectus is different form the auditor of the 
preceding financial statements of the issuing firm. In these cases, the IPO firm apparently 
switched to another audit firm prior to the introduction. We collect the names of the audit 
firms that audited the prospectus and the names of the auditors of the financial statements of 
the two years prior to the IPO (which are also disclosed in the prospectus). Using the 
information in the FAME database and the historical information on the ICAEW website49, 
we track the mergers and name changes that occurred during our sample period. Most 
notably, two big audit firms (Arthur Andersen and Deloitte) merged in August 2002 as a 
consequence of the Enron scandal. The combined firm operates under the name Deloitte. 
Our sample includes 2 switches from Arthur Andersen, which took place in 1995 and 1996 
and where therefore not influenced by the merger. We did not remove the Arthur Andersen 
clients from the sample; instead these observations are included under the Deloitte header. 
This way, the big audit firms in our sample are identical to the current Big 4 in the U.K. 
audit market. The classification does not affect the results, since both firms are in the same 
audit firm tier (big audit firms). Panel B of Table 4.1 provides a summary for the audit firms 
that the issuing firms in our sample selected. Issuing firms select a big audit firm less 
frequently over the years. In 1995, 71.9% of the IPOs were audited by a big firm, compared 
to 40.0% in 2003. In contrast, mid-size audit firms are increasingly popular. The fraction of 
issuing firms with a mid-tier auditor increased from 12.3% to 37.1%. In both cases, the trend 
is significant. The fraction of small audit firms varies over the years, but there is no 
significant trend in our sample. In total we observe 144 upward switches in our sample, 
which means that 19.8% of the issuing firms either switch to a mid-size or big audit firm. 
Another 18 IPO firms switch downwards and 40 firms switch within the same tier, bringing 
the total number of switches to 202 (or 27.7% of our sample). This is remarkably high 
compared to the overall switching rate of 4.2% for U.K. listed companies during 1996-2004 
(Oxera, 2006)50. Issuing firms are less inclined to switch to an audit firm in a higher tier in 
                                                          
49
 The ICAEW provides the history of mergers and demergers of accounting firms on its website. The so-called 
family trees have been compiled by Peter Boys and updated in 2005. http://www.icaew.com/en/library/subject-
gateways/accounting-history/resources/whats-in-a-name 
50
 In a report on the U.K. audit market, Oxera (2006) reports an overall auditor switching rate of 4.2 % over the 
years 1996-2004, for firms that were listed in 2004. Of this percentage, approximately 20% is driven by mergers 
between audit firms. 
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later years of the sample; the highest frequency of upward switches occurs in 1996 (36 
switches), the highest relative frequency in 1997 (30.4% of IPO), both early sample years. 
In the final sample year only 3 IPO firms switch (8.6% of IPOs). The negative time trend is 
significant. After the bubble years, switches to higher quality audit firms seem less common. 
Taken together, the snapshot of auditor selection suggests that IPO firms in later years are 
more likely to choose a mid-tier audit firm before the start of the IPO process and to stick 
with the mid-size audit firm during the IPO.  
 
Table 4.2 summarizes the main characteristics of the audit firms active in the U.K. IPO 
market and that audited at least one of the IPO prospectuses in our sample.) We identify the 
auditor for the two financial statements prior to the IPO and for the prospectus (the reporting 
auditor). In total 48 different audit firms are identified to have been appointed as reporting 
Table 4.2 
Audit Firms’ Presence in the IPO Market 
The audit sector is partitioned in three different (segments Big, Mid and Small firms) based on their relative 
sizes. Frequencies are the number of times (percentage) that an audit firm is identified as the reporting 
accountant for an IPO, calculated within sample. The identities of reporting accountants (auditor at IPO) are 
hand-collected from the prospectuses. Market share is calculated as within sample fraction of gross proceeds. 
Proceeds are gross proceeds in U.S. $ millions Underpricing is defined as first-day closing price divided by the 
offer price, minus one. Univariate significance tests are based on the two tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann 
Whitney) test of the null hypothesis that the distribution of gross proceeds (underpricing) is identical across 
audit firm segments. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (for two-sided tests) respectively. 
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accountants. We partition the audit firms in three different segments (Big, Mid and Small 
firms) following the convention in academic and professional literature. As a group, the 4 
largest audit firms that are commonly labeled the “Big 4”51 (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG 
and PWC) dominate our sample as well. The big audit firms cover 68.1% of the IPO-market 
in our sample, in terms of gross proceeds and audit 57.4% of the IPOs. At the individual 
firm level, these firms have a much larger market share (percentage of total gross proceed in 
the sample) compared to the firms in the mid-tier. In terms of frequency however, Grant 
Thornton is the number four audit firm, auditing 12% of IPOs.  Among the big audit firms, 
mean underpricing of KPMG audited IPOs is notably high (33.9% compared to the average 
for big audit firms of 19.5%). This value is driven by the same extreme observation that 
affects the average underpricing for the year 2000 in Table 4.1, Panel 1 (see footnote 4). 
Excluding the extreme observation brings the mean underpricing for KPMG at 20.5%, which 
is in line with the other big audit firms.  
The category mid-size audit firms consists of the non-Big4 audit firms that audited more 
than 15 of the IPO firms in our sample. We classify 6 audit firms as mid-size, covering in 
total 7.2% of the IPO market. The applied criterion to distinguish mid-tier from small-tier 
audit firms leads to a clear gap between the two segments: lowest frequency for a mid-tier 
firm equals 18 and the highest frequency for a small audit firm is 7. The classification is 
consistent with professional publications that report descriptive statistics of the U.K. audit 
market (e.g. FRC 2002, 2006; Oxera, 2006). Our mid-tier includes 4 of the 5 largest audit 
firms excluding the Big 4, measured by total fee and audit fee earned in 2003-200452. Mean 
gross proceeds for this group is significantly lower (Mid $8.9 million, Big $105.7 million, 
                                                          
51
 During our sample, originally 6 big audit firms were active including Coopers & Lybrand and Arthur Andersen. 
In 1998, Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse. From 2002, since Arthur Andersen’s demise, only 4 
big audit firms are left (the Big 4). Arthur Andersen surrendered its CPA licenses and its right to practice before 
the SEC in August 2002, after being convicted of obstruction of justice related to the audit of Enron (the verdict 
was later reversed by the Supreme Court). Although the scandal was U.S. based, it effectively put Arthur Andersen 
out of business. The operations started to wind down when the Enron scandal surfaced in 2001. There are a larger 
number of mergers in the mid-size and small segments of the audit market.  
52
 Reports before 2003 do not disclose a ranking with the individual names of audit firms. The top 4 in the reports 
over 2003-2004 is: 1. BDO Stoy Hayward LLP; 2. Grant Thornton LLP; 3. Baker Tilly; 4. PKF (FRC, 2005; Oxera, 
2006). The number 5 of mid-tier firms, Mazars LLP, is not in our mid-size group because it has only audited one 
IPO in our sample. Horwath Clark Whitehill LLP is number 7 in the ranking. HLB Kidsons is not in the rankings 
because it merged with BDO in 2002. The IPO-audits by HLB Kidson in our sample are all before the merger (last 
IPO date 2 January 2002, the merger was announced on 7 January 2002, see 
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2002-01-07/baker-tilly-and-hlb-kidsons-to-merge last accessed 29 June 
2013). 
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z=-12.719) while the initial returns are on average significantly higher compared to the Big 
audit firms (Mid 32.5%, Big 19.5%, z= 3.783). This suggests that the mid-tier audit firms 
are generally involved in lower quality IPOs than their big peers. More unexpectedly is the 
observation that underpricing is on average higher for IPOs audited by a mid-size firm 
compared to the IPOs audited by the small audit firms, with mean underpricing for IPOs 
audited by small firms of 15.2%. However, the difference between the distributions is not 
significant (z= 1.609). 
4.3.3 Other determinants of auditor selection and underpricing 
Several determinants of the demand for auditor choice and switches have been suggested in 
prior literature. Like previous auditor choice studies (e.g. Beatty, 1989; Willenborg, 1999), 
we control for firm characteristics age, size (assets), profitability (loss), high-tech industries 
(internet and tech) and market segment (AIM).  As discussed in section 2, competing views 
are proposed in the underpricing literature with respect to owners’ incentives in an IPO 
process. Although predictions vary, there is consensus that ownership structure of a firm 
prior to going public will affect auditor choice incentives. We therefore include a measure 
for pre-IPO insider shareholdings and holdings by venture capitalists. In addition, we include 
two measures that are suggested by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) a measure for the 
percentage of shares sold by pre-IPO owners (participation ratio) and a measure for the 
dilution effect of the issue that the pre-IPO owners suffer (dilution factor). Previous studies 
suggest that low-priced issues exhibit higher risk and are often speculative issues (Chalk and 
Peavy, 1987; Ibbotson et al., 1988). Issuing firms do not choose the offer price randomly 
and low prices may be set in order to promote diffuse ownership and to attract retail investors 
(Booth and Chua, `1996).  Therefore, as a proxy for potentially speculative issues, we 
include the reciprocal value of the offer price per share.  
The underpricing model we employ is similar to the auditor selection model. We use a 
different measure for size. Instead of the size of the IPO firm (measured by assets in the 
auditor selection models), underpricing is more likely to be influenced by the deal size of 
the offering. Hence, we include gross proceeds in the underpricing model.  
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Table 4.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for each of the variables included in our 
auditor selection and underpricing models. In light of the discussion with respect to the 
distinct properties of the bubble years (1999 and 2000) we specify the statistics for this 
period separately. Comparing the statistics for 1999 and 2000 with the ‘normal’ years, many 
differences are as expected. During the years 1999 and 2000, issuing firms were on average 
significantly smaller and younger, more often reported a loss in the year before IPO and 
were more often in the internet or high-tech industry. All these characteristics are consistent 
with higher risk firms going public at the peak of the dotcom bubble and higher information 
asymmetry for IPOs in those years. With respect to the ownership characteristics, insiders 
held on average approximately half of the shares before the IPO and 37% after IPO. These 
percentages are almost the same for the bubble years and the ‘normal’ years. Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003) also report insignificant differences in 1999-2000 and non-bubble years for 
the U.S., with average post-IPO insider ownership of 44.6%. One third of our sample IPO 
firms are backed by a venture capitalist, but the numbers are significantly different for 1999-
2000 compared to the rest of the sample years. During the bubble years, VC’s were less 
involved (26%) and held a smaller stake in the firm (9%). Also, the participation ratio is 
significantly lower in the bubble years. This is different from the findings reported by U.S. 
studies, where the fraction of VC-backed IPOs increased to over 70% in 1999 and 2000, 
although the stakes held by VC declined (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). We calculate the 
means for each of the ownership characteristics separately for the years before and after the 
bubble years separately and none of these deviating results for 1999 and 2000 are explained 
by a continuing time trend. The third category of explanatory variables is that related to the 
specific risk of the IPO deal. During bubble years, firms issued more often on the Alternative 
Investment Market segment, but the average deal size and offer price is not significantly 
different during the bubble years.  
4.4 Results from multivariate analysis  
We turn to the results of the multivariate regression results in order to get a clearer picture 
of what determines auditor selection and how this in turn affects the IPO. First the analyses 
of the determinants of auditor selection (choice and switches) at IPO are discussed. We then 
continue with an underpricing regression and examine the effect of auditor selection on first-
day returns. 
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4.4.1 Auditor selection 
The results for logistic regressions on the auditor choice and upward switch indicator 
variables are reported in Table 4.4. We perform a separate regression for each of the three 
segments (Big, Mid, Small) to analyse the likelihood of choosing an audit firm of a particular 
quality level and the characteristics that are associated with this likelihood. In addition, we 
estimate the logistic model for the decision to switch to a higher-quality auditor at the time 
of the IPO. In the auditor choice models, three of the IPO firm characteristics are significant 
for each of the auditor quality segments. Big audit firms are more likely to be appointed by 
larger IPO firms and IPO firms that reported a loss in the final financial statements. The 
mirror image of these characteristics is reported for the mid and small segments: larger IPO 
firms and loss reporting IPOs are less likely to either have a mid-tier or small auditor. The 
finding that larger firms will more likely choose a big audit firm is consistent with previous 
studies (e.g. Bédard et al., 2000). For firms that are issuing shares on the Alternative 
Investment Market the odds are higher that they will have a small or mid-size auditor. Our 
measure for potentially speculative issues (1/offer price) is significantly associated with 
issuing firms selecting small audit firms. Of the ownership characteristics included in the 
choice models, only the insider share holdings are a significant determinant for auditor 
choice. When insiders have a higher stake in the IPO firm prior to the issue, it is more likely 
that a mid-tier audit firm will be appointed. This is consistent with the monitoring role of 
auditors, for which the demand is less when incentives are aligned. The stake of venture 
capitalists in pre-IPO firms is not significantly associated with auditor choices.  Model 4 
reports the estimates for the upward switches model. If we look at the determinants of the 
likelihood that an IPO firm will switch to a higher quality auditor, we see that larger and loss 
generating issuing firms will more likely switch to a higher quality audit firm while AIM 
issuers are less likely to switch to a higher segment audit firm, reflecting the findings for the 
choice models. When we split the upward switches into switches to big audit firms and 
switches to mid-size audit firms and repeat the regression (not tabulated), we see that firms 
issuing on the AIM segment are significantly more likely to switch upwards to a mid-size 
auditor. The odds that an IPO firm will switch to a big audit firm increase as the participation 
rate increases, while IPO firms with higher shareholdings by insiders are more likely to 
switch to a mid-size audit firm. 
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Table 4.4 
Auditor Choice and Upward Switches, all years 
 
The Table presents results from logistic regressions on the binary indicators for auditor choice and auditor upward 
switches. Auditor Choice variables Big, Mid and Small are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the audit 
firm at the time of the IPO is a firm from the big or mid-size segment respectively. Classification of audit firms 
is explained in Table 4.2.  Auditor Switch variable upsw is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
IPO firm switches to an audit firm of a higher tier (from a small firm to a mid-size or big firm; or from a mid-
size firm to a big firm) prior to the IPO. Explanatory variables as defined in Table 4.3. Auditor Choice models 
are estimated over the full sample of 728 IPO firms. The Auditor Switch model is estimated over the subsample 
of IPO firms that initially had a small or mid-size audit firm (and hence could potentially switch to a higher tier). 
All models include year indicators (results not reported). Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) are reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance of correlations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels marked with 
***, ** and * respectively. 
      
 Auditor Choice Auditor Switches 
Variable Big 
all years 
(Model 1) 
Mid 
all years 
(Model 2) 
Small 
all years 
(Model 3) 
Upward  
all years 
(Model 4) 
         
Firm 
Characteristics 
        
ln_assets 1.329 *** 0.849 *** 0.844 ** 1.074  
 (0.104)  (0.0536)  (0.0632)  (0.0953)  
         
ln_age 0.895  1.035  1.168  1.393 ** 
 (0.0978)  (0.117)  (0.179)  (0.216)  
         
loss 1.905 *** 0.635**  0.829  1.677*  
 (0.452)  (0.144)  (0.229)  (0.468)  
         
internet 0.905  1.073  1.008  1.511  
 (0.358)  (0.409)  (0.514)  (0.640)  
         
tech 1.237  1.200  0.493 ** 1.328  
 (0.266)  (0.246)  (0.156)  (0.362)  
         
Ownership Characteristics        
ins_pre 0.404 *** 2.357 *** 1.064  1.319  
 (0.128)  (0.728)  (0.374)  (0.559)  
         
vc_pre 1.486  0.853  0.243  1.472  
 (0.807)  (0.496)  (0.256)  (1.198)  
         
dilution 1.174  1.111  0.620 ** 1.056  
 (0.190)  (0.164)  (0.136)  (0.191)  
         
part 0.953  2.170  0.203  1.849  
 (0.767)  (1.799)  (0.281)  (2.041)  
         
Deal Characteristics        
aim 0.208 *** 4.468 *** 3.100 *** 0.446 ** 
 (0.0581)  (1.331)  (1.331)  (0.149)  
         
1/price 0.00151 *** 3.841  9.970 *** 0.186  
 (0.00277)  (3.403)  (8.044)  (0.283)  
115_Erim_Koning_BW stand.job
 Auditor selection and IPO underpricing 115 
 
 
 
 
 
Because the incentives are potentially different when the IPO-market is hot, we estimate the 
same logistic regressions for the years of the dotcom bubble (1999 and 2000) separately. 
The results are presented in Table 4.5 
       
Year indicators Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
N 728  728 728  377 
Log likelihood -359.0  -367.2 -239.6  -216.7 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.277  0.172 0.139  0.135 
Chi-squared 169.3  119.9 76.72  60.78 
Degrees of freedom 19  19 19  19 
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Table 4.5 
Auditor Choice and Upward Switches during Bubble Years 1999 and 2000 
 
This Table presents results from logistic regressions on the binary indicators for auditor choice and auditor 
upward switches once we split the sample for the years 1999 and 2000 only. Auditor Choice variables Big, Mid 
and Small are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the audit firm at the time of the IPO is a firm from the 
big or mid-size segment respectively. Classification of audit firms is explained in Table 4.2.  Auditor Switch 
variable upsw is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the IPO firm switches to an audit firm of a higher 
tier (from a small firm to a mid-size or big firm; or from a mid-size firm to a big firm) prior to the IPO. 
Explanatory variables as defined in Table 4.3. Auditor Choice models are estimated over the subsample of IPOs 
in the years 1999 and 2000 (217 IPOs). The Auditor Switch model is estimated over the subsample of IPO firms 
in the years 1999 and 2000 that initially had a small or mid-size audit firm (and hence could potentially switch 
to a higher tier). All models include year indicators (results not reported). Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) 
are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance of correlations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
marked with ***, ** and * respectively. 
  
   
  Auditor Choice  Auditor Switches 
  Big 
1999-2000 
(Model 5) 
Mid 
1999-2000 
(Model 6) 
Small 
 1999-2000 
(Model 7) 
Upward switches 
1999-2000 
(Model 8) 
Firm Characteristics        
ln_assets  1.336 * 0.841  0.871  1.000  
  (0.219)  (0.114)  (0.109)  (0.153)  
          
ln_age  0.835  1.408  0.734  1.705 * 
  (0.189)  (0.340)  (0.269)  (0.485)  
          
loss  1.520  0.896  0.599  1.386  
  (0.616)  (0.347)  (0.293)  (0.559)  
          
internet  0.997  1.263  0.650  1.578  
  (0.479)  (0.583)  (0.479)  (0.716)  
          
tech  0.996  1.502  0.474  1.732  
  (0.348)  (0.522)  (0.246)  (0.761)  
          
Ownership Characteristics        
ins_pre  0.890  1.352  0.905  1.718  
  (0.512)  (0.762)  (0.630)  (1.468)  
          
vc_pre  1.867  0.708  0.102  1.077  
  (1.841)  (0.694)  (0.220)  (1.288)  
          
dilution  1.279  1.261  0.347 ** 0.784  
  (0.350)  (0.328)  (0.171)  (0.241)  
          
part  0.253  33.52  0.00000787  5.021  
  (0.525)  (75.89)  (0.0000775)  (12.37)  
          
Deal Characteristics        
aim  0.110 *** 9.350 *** 3.996  1.495  
  (0.0603)  (5.990)  (3.838)  (0.928)  
          
1/price  0.00462  64.36 ** 0.207  5.222  
  (0.0189)  (109.5)  (0.323)  (11.01)  
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Across model specifications, the size of the issuing firm and the market segment that the 
firm is issuing on remain relevant, although size matters to a smaller extent. There are some 
differences compared to the models for all sample years in Table 4.4. Speculative offers are 
notably more likely to choose a mid-size audit firm in the bubble years, judging by the size 
and significance of odds ratio for 1/offer price. This is in line with the high level of 
underpricing for the mid-tier auditors reported in Table 4.2. Pre-IPO ownership structure 
does not seem to affect the auditor choice in bubble years, whereas this is a significant 
characteristic across the entire sample period in Table 4.4. In addition to the tabulated results, 
we run the same models on the sample excluding the dotcom bubble years and find similar 
results to the reported findings for all sample years. With respect to auditor switches in the 
heated market conditions of the bubble years, we see positive but insignificant odds ratios 
for the indicator variable for the AIM issues and for the reciprocal offer price. When we split 
the upward switches into switches to big and mid-size audit firms (not tabulated), we see 
that the odds ratios for these two characteristics are opposite for big and mid and significant. 
IPOs on the AIM are much more likely to switch to a mid-size audit firm, while the odds of 
switching to a big audit firm are significantly lower. The reciprocal offer price that proxies 
for more speculative offers displays a comparable pattern: the odds that an issuer of a more 
speculative offer will switch upward to a mid-size firm are significantly higher, while the 
odds of switching to a big auditor diminish significantly when the offer share price is lower. 
These findings suggest that more risky IPO firms (AIM-segment, low share price) are more 
likely to switch to a mid-size auditor in the bubble years, which is likely to contribute to the 
observed higher underpricing levels in the mid-tier auditor segment in our sample. 
4.4.2 Underpricing 
The main focal point of the IPO literature is the underpricing phenomenon. Given its 
prominence, we turn to this discussion in the current section and apply our measures of 
auditor selection in an underpricing model. We are interested in the association between the 
auditor selection variables and the level of underpricing. Table 4.6 presents the results for 
        
Year ind.  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
N  217 217 217  199 
Log likelihood  -111.0 -114.9 -61.19  -89.96 
Pseudo-R-
squared 
 0.261 0.193 0.189  0.0991 
Chi squared  42.17 38.59 19.16  19.87 
Degrees 
of_freedom 
 12 12 12  12 
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the underpricing OLS-regressions models that include the explanatory variables explained 
in section 3 and summarized in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.6 
Underpricing models 
 
Cross-sectional results from OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is underpricing and 
is calculated as (first day closing price – offer price)/ offer price. Closing prices obtained from Datastream. Offer 
prices collected from IPO prospectuses. Auditor selection variables are dummy variables for auditor choice and 
for auditor switches by the IPO firm. Auditor Choice variables Big and Mid are dummy variables that take the 
value of 1 if the audit firm at the time of the IPO is a firm from the big or mid-size segment respectively. 
Classification of audit firms is explained in Table 4.2.  Auditor Switch variable upsw is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the IPO firm switches to an audit firm of a higher tier (from a small firm to a mid-size 
or big firm; or from a mid-size firm to a big firm) prior to the IPO. Other explanatory variables as defined in 
Table 4.3. All models include year indicators (results not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance of correlations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels marked with ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
        
 All years Non Bubble 
years 
Bubble years 
 Basic model 
(Model 9) 
Auditor 
Choice 
(Model 10) 
Auditor Choice 
and Switch 
(Model 11) 
Auditor 
Choice and 
Switch 
(Model 12) 
Auditor Choice 
and Switch 
(Model 13) 
Auditor Selection       
Big   0.191 ** 0.216 ** 0.0183  0.675 * 
   (0.0929)  (0.102)  (0.0342)  (0.347)  
           
Mid   0.141 *** 0.172 *** 0.00704  0.570 *** 
   (0.0444)  (0.0511)  (0.0297)  (0.178)  
           
upsw     -0.101 ** 0.00712  -0.263 ** 
     (0.0508)  (0.0235)  (0.118)  
           
Firm Characteristics        
ln_age -0.0535 *** -0.0538 *** -0.0506 *** -0.0304 *** -0.142 ** 
 (0.0163)  (0.0165)  (0.0162)  (0.0111)  (0.0664)  
           
loss -0.0449  -0.0497  -0.0435  -0.0695 *** 0.0593  
 (0.0772)  (0.0723)  (0.0734)  (0.0260)  (0.205)  
           
internet 0.126  0.128  0.135  -0.0136  0.137  
 (0.166)  (0.162)  (0.161)  (0.0566)  (0.211)  
           
tech 0.136 ** 0.129 ** 0.130 ** 0.0275  0.284 * 
 (0.0558)  (0.0553)  (0.0555)  (0.0240)  (0.162)  
           
Ownership characteristics        
ins_post 0.205  0.220  0.232  0.0198  0.692  
 (0.175)  (0.185)  (0.187)  (0.0438)  (0.554)  
           
vc_back 0.0166  0.0139  0.00991  0.0149  0.0317  
 (0.0275)  (0.0280)  (0.0287)  (0.0167)  (0.0933)  
           
dilution 0.119 ** 0.117**  0.117 ** 0.0341  0.175  
 (0.0557)  (0.0561)  (0.0559)  (0.0246)  (0.161)  
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We are primarily interested in the certification effect of auditor selection on underpricing.  
Model 10 includes the indicator variables for auditor choice. Both the indicator for a Big 4 
auditor and the indicator for a Mid-size audit firm (Big and Mid) are significantly and 
positively associated with underpricing, indicating that having a higher quality auditor is 
associated with an increase rather than a decrease of initial returns. In contrast, we see that 
switching to an auditor in a higher quality segment (upsw) reverses this effect to some extent 
and reduces underpricing. These findings are driven by the dotcom bubble years 1999-2000 
(Model 13) and disappear once we remove the bubble years from the sample (Model 12). 
This is consistent with the notion that the dynamics are different in a hot market. Particularly, 
it is consistent with lower quality firms going public during the bubble years and trying to 
signal quality by appointing a reputable auditor. A switch to a higher tier audit firm may be 
seen as a stronger quality signal, as this means that the large audit firm has accepted the IPO 
firm as a client and thereby signals that the quality is adequate, reducing the increasing effect 
on underpricing. In addition, the findings of increased underprcing for higher quality audits 
in the bubble-years are consistent with the insurance role of auditors. The incentives to go 
Table 4.6 (continued) 
Underpricing models 
 
 All years Non Bubble 
years 
Bubble years 
 Basic model 
(Model 9) 
Auditor 
Choice 
(Model 10) 
Auditor Choice 
and Switch 
(Model 11) 
Auditor 
Choice and 
Switch 
(Model 12) 
Auditor Choice 
and Switch 
(Model 13) 
           
part 0.111  0.105  0.116  -0.00567  0.881  
 (0.132)  (0.138)  (0.140)  (0.0662)  (0.819)  
           
Deal characteristics          
           
aim -0.103 * -0.0886 ** -0.0904 ** -0.0266  -0.248  
 (0.0559)  (0.0451)  (0.0454)  (0.0242)  (0.155)  
           
ln_grpr -0.0463*  -0.0560 * -0.0597 * -0.0191 * -0.192  
 (0.0262)  (0.0333)  (0.0346)  (0.0100)  (0.147)  
           
1/price 0.517 ** 0.602 *** 0.596 *** 0.388 *** 0.783  
 (0.208)  (0.203)  (0.200)  (0.0923)  (0.630)  
           
_cons 0.602 ** 0.535 ** 0.554 ** 0.378 *** 1.549  
 (0.234)  (0.237)  (0.242)  (0.110)  (1.202)  
           
year ind. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 722  722  722  505  217  
R2 0.109  0.117  0.121  0.125  0.158  
adj. R2 0.085  0.090  0.093  0.089  0.095  
F 2.471 *** 2.481 *** 2.487 *** 3.861 *** 2.096 ** 
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public are different in a hot market, when firms are driven by the optimistic market rather 
than by the life cycle of the company (Ritter and Welch, 2002).  As a consequence, the type 
of IPO firm differs depending on the market circumstances. In a hot market, issuing firms 
on average are more risky and will be more inclined seek insurance from high-quality audit 
firms. But if big audit firms accept more risky clients, the certification effect will diminish 
and may even counter.  Moreover, the favourable market may explain the reverse effect of 
high quality auditors on underpricing. The certification of a high quality auditor may in fact 
increase the price at which the share trades (Chang et al., 2009) and this effect may be 
stronger in a hot market. 
Besides the auditor selection variables, we include several determinants of underpricing. For 
these variables we first run the basic model for underpricing (Model 9), excluding auditor 
selection variables. Most firm characteristics perform as predicted, although not all variables 
are significant. Underpricing is lower for firms that are older as they go public, although the 
effect is small. Firms in industries with higher ex ante uncertainty (internet and high-tech) 
are associated with higher underpricing, although only significant for the high-tech sector. 
The coefficient on the indicator variable for a reported loss is negative, although 
economically and statistically insignificant. This counter-intuitive effect is driven by the 
‘normal’ years (Model 12, excluding the bubble years 1999 and 2000), during which IPOs 
with a reported loss had slightly higher initial returns. The variables that capture deal 
characteristics are all significantly associated with underpricing. Across all models, firms 
that list on the Alternative Market Segment have lower underpricing, which is inconsistent 
with the general notion that more risky forms issue on the AIM. The finding is not driven by 
either the specific circumstances in the dotcom bubble. The significant positive relation with 
the proceeds of the placing is also unexpected, although the size of the effect is small. 
Potentially speculative issues, indicated by small share prices, are associated with higher 
underpricing. In sum, the evidence for the predicted ex-ante risk characteristics is mixed.  
Ownership characteristics are included for the predicted effects of realignment as suggested 
by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and show weak results. 
We find a positive association with the dilution factor, which is significant only in the 
estimations including all sample years (Models 9-11). According to the proposed model of 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), this implies that the promotion cost paid by the issuer offset 
the negative effect on underpricing. The participation ratio however does not significantly 
impact underpricing. The predicted negative sign is reported only if we exclude the bubble 
years from our sample (Model 12), but the coefficient is small and insignificant.  
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4.5 Sensitivity tests 
Our results may be sensitive to a selection bias and endogeneity. A selection problem 
potentially exists if observations are not randomly distributed across discrete groups. 
Specifically in the context of this study: if an issuing firm chooses its auditor in order to 
optimize total issuing cost (as suggested by Hogan, 1997), then the observed auditor choice 
would not be randomly distributed across IPO firms in the underpricing models. In that case, 
the estimated coefficients in the underpricing model may suffer from selection bias (Lennox 
et al., 2011). Selectivity is a well-documented issue in the audit fee and audit quality 
literature, where it is common to treat the choice of an audit firm from a specific quality 
level as a non-random predictor for the outcome (f.e. audit fee, audit opinion or a measure 
of financial reporting quality). In an IPO setting, the level of underpricing is affected by 
several choices made by the owner, such as which underwriter to hire or on what exchange 
to list (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001). Several choice variables have been endogenized in 
previous literature in addition to auditor choice, such as retained ownership and earnings 
disclosure (Datar et al., 1991; Copley and Douthelt, 2002). Similarly, in the underpricing 
literature the choice of underwriter and ownership structure is often assumed to be 
endogenously determined in the underpricing model since these determinants are all choice 
variables. The common approach to these endogeneity issues is to estimate a two-stage least 
square or Heckman-type regression.  Recently, some papers critically review the application 
of selection models and instrumental variables to resolve endogeneity issues and argue that 
these models aggravate the problems in many cases (Lennox et al. 2011, Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010).  Problem is that these estimation procedures rely on the validity and strength 
of the instrumental (or exclusion) variables. A proper instrument should be correlated with 
the endogenous regressor, but not to the error term (that is: it should be exogenous). 
Moreover, the instruments should be justifiable from a theoretical perspective. If two-stage 
regressions are applied using weak or invalid instruments, models are potentially more 
biased than OLS and results will be very fragile. As Lennox et al. (2011) demonstrate, the 
conditions for strong and valid instrumental variables are rarely met in auditing research. 
We do not endogenize auditor choice in our underpricing models. This is partly motivated 
by the concerns discussed above. Next, we briefly describe why we think the U.K. 
institutional setting mitigates the potential endogeneity issue to some extent. In addition, we 
describe a robustness test and a diagnostic test.  
We argue that the IPO process in the U.K. is such that auditor choice is less likely to be 
endogenous to the underpricing model, mainly because the auditor has been engaged before 
the IPO or as a first step in the IPO decision making.  In the U.K., the IPO process generally 
takes one year and the auditor is the first adviser to be involved in the process (see for 
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example LSE, 2002). Moreover, in many cases the issuer already has a client-auditor 
relationship before the IPO decision. This is a distinctive feature for the U.K. institutional 
environment, which requires private companies to report audited financial statements. Since 
breaking a client-auditor relationship is costly, the fact that IPO firms already have an auditor 
raises the barrier to choosing an auditor for the IPO specifically. In addition to an early 
appointment of the auditor, the price for the vast majority of U.K. issues is set earlier in the 
process and incorporates the market demand to a lesser extent. This effectively reduces the 
influence of the advisers (including the auditor) on the initial returns.  Taken together, the 
auditor choice and pricing decisions are likely to be taken consecutively rather than 
simultaneously and the initial returns are determined by the trading on the first day rather 
than the setting of the IPO price. This would imply that treating the choice for a particular 
audit firm as exogenous to the underpricing model is not a significant concern in a U.K. 
setting.  
We challenge our empirical translation of the U.K. institutional setting for IPOs by 
identifying the situation in which the exogenous determination of auditor choice is less 
likely. Auditor choice is more likely to be endogenous if it takes places shortly before the 
IPO date. The decision to break the auditor-client relationship shortly before going public is 
more likely to be part of the overall IPO-process, perhaps in an attempt to optimize overall 
issue costs (Hogan, 1997). In other words: potential selection bias would most likely apply 
to auditor switches in the IPO year itself. We identify 117 auditor switches that take place 
in the period between the pre-IPO financial statements and the IPO-date and label these 
switches with a dummy variable Interim that takes the value of 1 if the issuer makes an IPO-
year auditor switch. We then rerun our auditor choice model for the sample of IPO firms that 
did not make a last-minute switch, thereby excluding potentially endogenously determined 
auditor selections. Our findings are very similar with the results in the main section of the 
paper (not tabulated). Also our underpricing model produces very similar results for the 
sample excluding Interim switchers (not tabulated). This supports the argument that our 
findings are not driven by selection bias.  
In addition to partioning our sample, we perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. This test is 
used to diagnose endogeneity, but assumes that the instrument is valid and is therefore 
subject to the same concerns for two stage regressions that we discussed above. We diagnose 
whether the choice for a big audit firm or upward auditor switches are endogenous in the 
underpricing model by including the residuals of the choice (upward switch) model in the 
underpricing models. To identify the instruments for auditor choice and switches, we rely 
on previous literature. Lennox et al. (2011) survey 75 articles in accounting that apply 
selection models, most of which use a measure of size and a measure of profitability as 
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exogenous variables in the first stage53. In line with these studies, we use our measure for 
size (ln_assets) and our indicator variable for loss as instruments in the first stage 
regression54.  We then include the residuals from the choice and upward switch model in the 
underpricing regression. The coefficients on the residuals are not significant, suggesting that 
our OLS regressions are consistent and that we do not need to use an instrumental variable. 
Again, this is under the assumption that the instruments (size and loss) are valid and strong.  
Arguably, the models for underpricing that we define are limited in the sense that we do not 
include all the determinants that have been suggested in existing literature. The (adjusted) 
R-squares are low, indicating that our models do not explain a large proportion of the total 
variance. Since we are primarily interested in the relation between underpricing and auditor 
selection (instead of predicting underpricing), the R-squares that we observe (all within the 
range 0.10 to 0.15) are reasonable. Moreover, they are in line with prior U.K. underpricing 
research (e.g. Unlu et al. 2004). The significant F-test indicates that the observed R-square 
is reliable, and is not a spurious result of oddities in the dataset. The proposed relation 
between the response variable and the set predictors is statistically reliable. As a test of the 
robustness of our results, we repeated our analyses with different specifications and included 
some of explanatory variables suggested in previous research. Including additional variables 
in our model improves explanatory power, but hardly affects the results for our variables of 
interest55. For example, we ran the models for the years 1995-2000 including control 
variables for market conditions at the time of the IPO and including an indicator variable for 
underwriter reputation. Although the model improved, the coefficients on the variables that 
we report are hardly affected (not tabulated). 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper explores different explanations for auditor selection (auditor choices and upward 
switches to another audit firm) when a firm goes public. Depending on the dominant 
incentives, the auditor selection will be driven by different characteristics of the issuing firm, 
the ownership structure and the offer itself. Studying auditor selection at the time of an IPO 
                                                          
53
 The majority of the studies in reviewed by Lennox et al. (2012) use an auditor choice model in the first stage. 
Although none of the studies provide a theoretical or economic rationale for the independent variables used to 
estimate the first stage regression, we use the same measures.  
54
 We perform the test manually in order to be able to include two endogenous variables simultaneously. We cannot 
include more, again for lack of instruments. The standard errors produced are incorrect, but this is of no concern 
for our purpose here. We use OLS estimation in the first stage to relax concerns about the distribution.  
55
 For market conditions we include market returns (FTSE 100), number of IPOs and average underpricing for the 
period during a period of 90 days before the IPO date. For underwriter reputation an indicator variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the lead underwriter in the IPO is in the 5th quintile of the largest marketshares of the underwriters 
in the sample. 
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offers some advantages. First, studying auditor selection of IPO firms offers more variation 
in audit firms, since IPO firms are usually smaller firms. Second, prior literature contends 
that there is an increased demand for credible auditors at the time of an IPO, driven by the 
desire to signal firm value or to minimize monitoring costs (e.g. Menon and Williams, 1991). 
Related to this, an IPO marks an important change in a company’s circumstances and can 
trigger auditor change. The increased number of auditor switches for issuing firms in itself 
provides an interesting setting to study auditor selection.  
We analyse a sample of 728 firms that went public on the U.K market in the years 1995-
2003. The U.K. provides an interesting setting to study the switches of IPO-firms to higher 
quality level audit firms for at least two reasons: 1) the audit market is less dominated by the 
Big 4 and hence firms have more to choose from; 2) the disclosure requirements for private 
firms are very similar to public firms and therefore switches are not driven by a change in 
required audit services when going public. We document that over the years 1995-2003 IPO 
firms are on average increasingly younger and smaller. In addition, less IPO firms choose a 
Big 4 audit firm or switch to a higher level audit firm prior to an IPO. Instead, mid-size audit 
firms are increasingly popular for IPO’s. In sum, the descriptive evidence shows that as 
average size and age of issuing firms declines over the years, they stay with their mid-size 
audit firm more often. This is in line with the certification role of audit firms. 
In order to study the determinants for auditor selection and switches, we employ logistic 
regressions for each of the audit firm tiers Big Mid and Small and for upward switches. In 
line with previous studies, we find that larger (smaller) firms are more likely to select a Big 
(Mid /Small) audit firm. Since larger firms have more agency costs (Simunic and Stein, 
1987), this finding is consistent with monitoring needs driving the demand for auditors.  Ex-
ante uncertainty factors show mixed results, where firm risk increases the odds of selecting 
a big audit firm while deal risk factors decrease the odds that a big audit firm is appointed. 
In other words: higher risk firms will choose a more reputable audit firm but when the IPO-
deal is more risky the firm will more likely appoint a small audit firm. Alternatively, this 
may be explained by audit firms’ preferences instead of the IPO firms’ selection. From the 
audit firms’ perspective, deal risk may be reason to decline the client, while firm risk may 
be more acceptable. Although going public affects the ownership structure of the firm, this 
does not seem to drive the auditor selection. The shareholdings of insiders prior to the IPO 
are significantly associated with the odds of choosing a particular audit quality level. IPO 
firms more likely appoint a mid-size audit firm when insiders have a larger stake, but 
retained ownership has no effect in our analysis. 
In addition to the auditor selection analysis, we study the potential effect of the auditor 
selection on the first day returns of the IPO based on similar theoretical explanations. In the 
underpricing literature, the certification hypothesis covers informational incentives and the 
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realignment hypothesis addresses conflicts of interests and agency problems. We find mixed 
results for the certification hypotheses when testing for the effect of auditor reputation on 
initial returns. The negative effect of upward switching on underpricing is consistent with 
the certification hypothesis. On the other hand, the finding that IPO firms with a big or mid-
size audit firm have higher underpricing seems unexpected. When we split the sample to 
analyse the years of the dotcom bubble (1999 and 2000) separately, we find that the results 
for auditor choice and upward switching are driven by the bubble years. Therefore, this 
finding may be driven by the specific market circumstances in these years, causing firms 
with a different risk profile to go public and potentially increasing the importance of the 
insurance incentive to demand high quality audits. In addition, the favourable market itself 
may respond differently to high quality certification and increase the share price.  
Overall the results indicate that IPO firms select an audit firm based on incentives that are 
consistent with certification and insurance motivation. Despite careful selection, a higher 
audit quality level does not diminish underpricing.
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Chapter 5  
Summary and concluding remarks 
This thesis comprises of three studies that analyse the financial reporting environment. Each 
Chapter presents a separate study and takes a different approach. More specifically, each of 
the studies focuses on specific factors that together shape financial reporting. The study 
presented in Chapter 2 focuses on the users and preparers of financial information and 
information intermediaries. Chapter 3 specifically studies the choices made by regulators. 
In Chapter 4 the preparer and the auditor are the focal point. Each of the studies contributes 
to our understanding of the financial reporting environment, albeit from different 
perspectives.  
 
The research presented in Chapter 2 zooms in on the role of the media as financial 
intermediaries. Particularly, the study in Chapter 2 analyses managers’ reporting choices and 
investors’ perception of the usefulness of the reported information at a time when a series of 
critical newspaper articles were published with respect to a specific reporting practice: the 
use of alternative earnings measures. According to the press, companies publish their own 
earnings metrics, stripping out expenses like interest, tax, depreciation or other items, in 
order to mislead investors. These non-standard (or non-GAAP) measures allow managers to 
report more favourable results compared to earnings as defined by accounting standards (or 
GAAP measures). Regulators shared these concerns, but the response varied across 
countries. The U.S. regulators intervened with a radical reform of regulations aimed at 
curtailing non-GAAP reporting practices. This contrasts with the Netherlands, where 
regulators did not respond with additional regulation. Hence, the research in Chapter 2 
focuses on the Dutch situation, to observe what happens to a popular but widely criticized 
financial reporting practice if regulators do not intervene. We analyse a sample of earnings 
press releases published in the period 2000–2005 by companies listed at Euronext 
Amsterdam. Our findings indicate that Dutch companies report non-GAAP measures 
frequently and prominently. However, companies’ reporting behaviour changes after a peak 
in negative media attention for non-GAAP reporting. The magnitude of the adjustments to 
GAAP earnings decreases and companies seem to have different reasons to report non-
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GAAP measures. The effect of the media attention is stronger for companies that have been 
criticized specifically for their non-GAAP reporting in the press. Investors seem to have 
become more hesitant towards the use of non-GAAP measures for their decision-making 
after negative media attention. Together, these findings suggest that the negative media 
attention for non-GAAP measures has influenced the decisions of investors and managers. 
Moreover, it seems that information intermediaries influence the demand and supply of 
financial reporting information, in the absence of regulatory measures. 
 
The third Chapter focuses on regulators and their role in the financial reporting environment. 
More specifically, this study examines why countries make different choices with respect to 
(the timing of) International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. IFRS is 
generally promoted from a specific, capital market perspective that may not be equally 
convincing to every country. Applying a framework with a broader set of forces that 
potentially drive IFRS adoption decisions, the pattern of IFRS diffusion across the countries 
of the World Bank universe is analysed. Building on the international relations literature, we 
analyse the role that decisions by other countries have on the IFRS adoption decision of a 
specific country. We distinguish diffusion mechanisms based on the motivation of the 
decision and the response. A decision to adopt a new policy may be motivated by changing 
incentives or by changing ideas. The response to the change may either be driven by 
expected utility of the new policy or by the legitimation that adoption would provide. The 
results of this analysis suggest that the decision to adopt IFRS is not simply driven by 
perceived competitive benefits, but by adoption decisions that peer-countries have made. 
Countries can be peers or neighbours from different perspectives: geographically, 
economically or culturally. Especially the choices of culturally closely related countries 
seem to matter. These adoption decisions seem to be motivated by a change in ideas and 
driven by the desire for legitimacy. In our research design, this motivation is distinct from a 
competition driven decision, which is how the success of IFRS is commonly explained. It 
seems that adopting IFRS can also be influenced simply by the desire to emulate others, just 
because it seems the right thing to do.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the relation between the preparers and auditors of financial reports. This 
study takes a closer look at the selection of an audit firm at the time when credibility of 
financial reports is especially important for a company, namely when a company goes public 
and offers (part of) its shares at the stock market. Arguably, assurance is particularly 
important to outsiders of the company when it makes an entrance to the stock market. In a 
setting of U.K. IPO firms in the years 1995-2003 it seems that the selection of an audit firm 
matters. We observe increased number of companies decide to switch to an audit firm of a 
different size when they face an IPO. Applying the insights from the finance literature, more 
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specifically the findings in the underpricing literature, we explore whether the selection of 
an auditor by IPO firms is driven by the demand for certification or insurance. We find 
evidence that IPO firms are more likely to choose a high quality auditor when the uncertainty 
of the future prospects is higher and the IPO firm wants to signal quality (certification driven 
by signalling). In addition, the demand for higher quality auditors can be driven by the 
demand for monitoring issues, as reflected by the IPO ownership structure (certification 
driven by monitoring), although the evidence is mixed. The finding that more risky IPO 
firms select higher quality audit firms is in line with the insurance hypothesis. Given the 
descriptive evidence that IPO firms are actively selecting an audit firm (as reflected in the 
high switching rate), it seems that IPO firms make an effort to select the desired level of 
audit quality. In order to evaluate whether these efforts are successful, we take the study a 
step further and analyse auditor selection in light of the performance of the offer. Since the 
IPO literature is particularly concerned with underpricing as an indication of IPO quality, 
we attempt to place the audit firm selection in the perspective of the pricing of the offer. IPO 
firms that switch to a higher quality level audit firm experience lower underpricing, which 
is in line with the certification hypothesis. On the other hand, IPO firms with a big or mid-
size audit firm have higher underpricing, which contradicts certification. However, the 
findings are affected by the market circumstances during the bubble years (1999 and 2000), 
in which high underpricing may be driven by investors’ enthusiasm. In other words: the 
difference between the offer price and the market price may not be caused by underpricing 
of the offer by the issuer, but rather by ‘overpricing’ by the market. Overall, although there 
is notable effort to select an appropriate auditor at the time of an IPO, the effectiveness of 
the selection as reflected in underpricing deserves further attention. 
 
The studies presented in this dissertation share the notion that financial reporting information 
emerges from the interplay of groups in society that all have an interest in this information; 
users of the information, preparers of the information, regulators (including standard setters), 
intermediaries and auditors. In that sense, the studies advocate a broader view on financial 
reporting issues in order to enhance our understanding of its function in financial markets 
and society at large. The dominant perspective, both in research and standard setting is an 
informational view, where the main purpose of financial accounting is to provide 
information that is useful for decision making. Investors are considered to be the most 
important user. Within the information perspective, the focus is on the valuation role. 
Financial reporting facilitates the optimal allocation of financial resources and this can only 
be achieved if the information is relevant for the prediction of future cash flows. Recently, 
the IASB decided to focus solely on decision usefulness for capital allocation purposes in its 
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revised Conceptual Framework56. This was a big step, in the sense that it was the first time 
in the history of the writings of objectives of financial reporting that the stewardship role 
was deprived of its status as a separate goal next to the valuation role (Zeff, 2013). It led to 
some debate (mostly among practioners), where critics argued that the decision usefulness 
approach has been taken too far (Whittington, 2008). In this debate the stewardship role is 
defined as a form of information provision that serves contracting purposes for the labour 
market of managers. Both the valuation role and the stewardship role fit into a strict 
economic view. In any case, financial information is regarded as a commodity that facilitates 
efficient transactions among individual investors and managers, whether on capital markets 
or managerial labour markets. Since this perspective was embraced by accounting 
academics, research has improved in terms of scientific rigor and objectiveness and progress 
has been made in terms of our understanding of accounting information in capital market 
context. At the same time, it has been argued that the accounting research became less 
relevant for ‘the real world’ when it became more scientific (Granof and Zeff, 2008). 
Moreover, the dominance of the economic, information perspective came at the expense of 
the diversity in accounting research. The tendency of researchers to restrict themselves to 
conversant areas may cause fundamental questions and promising research methods to be 
overlooked (Brown, 2013). For example, the historical, institutional and political context of 
financial reporting is mostly overlooked on current research agendas. A more expansive 
view would contribute to a richer understanding of financial reporting. At a Strategy Retreat 
of the American Accounting Association, one of the participants used the following words 
to describe the issue: “If accounting researches do not tackle the fundamental issues in 
accounting, we collectively face obsolescence, irrelevance and oblivion” (Basu, 2012, 855). 
It seems one can hardly disagree. 
                                                          
56
 The IASB is updating the Conceptual Framework in separate stages. Chapter 1 Objectives of general purpose 
financial reporting was completed in September 2010. It states the following: “The objective of general purpose 
financial reporting1 is to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and 
potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those 
decisions involve buying, selling or holding equity and debt instruments, and providing or settling loans and other 
forms of credit.” (F OB2) 
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Nederlandse samenvatting  
(Summary in Dutch) 
Financiële verslaggeving van ondernemingen komt tot stand in een omgeving waarin 
allerlei, soms tegengestelde, belangen bestaan bij financiële informatie. Behalve de 
opstellers van de informatie (de onderneming) en de gebruikers van de informatie, spelen 
ook andere partijen zoals accountants, regelgevers en media een rol. De studies in dit 
proefschrift betrekken verschillende aspecten van dit speelveld in het onderzoek, waarbij in 
elk hoofdstuk andere belanghebbenden centraal staan.  
In Hoofdstuk 2 staan de opstellers, gebruikers en de pers centraal. Het onderzoek richt zich 
op alternatieve winstmaatstaven (non-GAAP maatstaven). Dit soort maatstaven, dat niet 
gedefinieerd is door regelgevers, biedt de mogelijkheid om bepaalde posten niet mee te tellen 
bij het bepalen van de winst, waardoor veelal een gunstiger resultaat kan worden 
gerapporteerd. Het onderzoek in dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat de keuzes van zowel de opstellers 
als gebruikers van financiële informatie veranderen in een periode waarin de media zich 
kritisch uitlaten over bepaalde winstmaatstaven, ook al is er geen specifieke regelgeving 
ingevoerd om de rapportage van alternatieve winstmaatstaven in te perken.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 staan de keuzes van internationale regelgevers centraal. De wereldwijde 
verspreiding van IFRS wordt vaak verklaard op grond van het bevorderen van een efficiënt 
functioneren van internationale kapitaalsmarkten. Als we de (timing van de) keuze van 
landen wereldwijd om IFRS in te voeren analyseren vanuit het perspectief van internationale 
betrekkingen, dan blijkt dat di keuze wordt beïnvloed door de keuzes van verwante landen. 
Het gaat daarbij niet alleen om economische verwantschap tussen landen; ook culturele 
verwantschap met IFRS-landen vergroot de kans dat een land IFRS zal invoeren. 
Tenslotte wordt in Hoofdstuk 4 de rol van de controlerend accountant onderzocht, ten tijde 
van beursintroducties. Bedrijven wisselen vaker van accountant voorafgaand aan een 
beursgang, wat suggereert dat ondernemingen in dit proces belang hechten aan de selectie 
van een geschikt accountantskantoor. Het onderzoek laat zien dat ondernemingen proberen 
kwaliteitssignaal af te geven door te switchen naar een groter accountantskantoor. De 
resultaten suggereren dat ondanks dat beursintroducees belang hechten aan de selectie van 
een accountantskantoor, de keuze zich niet altijd vertaalt in een betere introductieprijs 
(lagere underpricing). 
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De studies in dit proefschrift onderstrepen het belang van een breed perspectief in het 
onderzoek naar financiële verslaggeving, met aandacht voor de diversiteit van de omgeving 
waarin de informatie tot stand komt
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THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA, REGULATORS AND AUDITORS
Financial reporting is the process of disclosing financial information about a company
to external users. This dissertation investigates three different parties involved in the
environment of financial reporting: the media, regulators and auditors. The media, or
more specifically the financial press, are central to the first study. This study shows that
reporting practices are sensitive to critique in the financial press. Both reporting choices
and investor decisions can be affected by negative press. The second study in this
dissertation examines a remarkable change in the regulation of financial reporting that
took place during the past decade: the diffusion of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) across the globe.  The competitive benefits of IFRS that are commonly put
forward are not equally important for every country. The study explores alternative
motivations that may have been driving the widespread acceptance of IFRS and finds that
changing ideas and the desire for legitimacy also play a role. The third study explores
auditor selection in a time when credible financial reporting is particularly salient, namely
when a company goes public. Many firms switch to another audit firm when they go
public. Different audit quality levels are selected depending on characteristics of the firm,
ownership or the offering.  But despite the careful selection of an auditor, audit quality
does not seem to reduce underpricing. Overall, the studies in this dissertation emphasize
that in order to enrich our understanding of financial reporting we need to examine its
environment.
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